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

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Pedro De Valdivia, Conquistador Of Chile

BY

Ida Stevenson Weldon Vernon

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Foreword

The Institute of Latin-American Studies of The University of Texas continues with this publication, under the general title of *Latin-American Studies,* a series of monographs and volumes in the Latin-American field, including proceedings of conferences sponsored by the Institute of Latin-American Studies.

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III—*Pedro de Valdivia, Conquistador of Chile* by Ida Stevenson Weldon Vernon

Preface

It was to the Spanish *conquistadores* of the sixteenth century that Spain owed the foundation of her extensive empire in the new world. Mounted on their horses and armed with their blades of Toledo steel, they traversed the continents from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the upper reaches of the Mississippi to the Strait of Magellan. Neither desert, jungle, nor snow-covered mountains served to stop their march. Obstacles seemed only to augment their courage, deepen their faith, and harden their resolution.

Among those bold, reckless, resourceful men, none was more typical of the breed than Pedro de Valdivia, the conqueror and colonizer of Chile. His crossing of the Atacama Desert with a mere handful of men, fighting off hostile natives with one hand while holding back the twin demons of hunger and thirst from his dust-choked camp with the other, rivals the exploits of Cortés in Mexico. His tenacity in holding on to Santiago during a starvation period that beggars description might have been an inspiring example to Captain John Smith and the Englishmen of Jamestown, three-quarters of a century later, had they known of it. His concern for the natives under his care must have been gratifying to priests like Las Casas, who too often found themselves at variance with the *conquistadores*.

In spite of Valdivia's heroic feats, however, no adequate biography of him exists. In the general histories of Chile, the space allotted to his conquests necessarily is limited, since the period of his leadership covered only fourteen years. Of the few works devoted exclusively to this period, none gives a detailed account of the incidents largely associated with Valdivia which so clearly reveal the many-faceted character of the man. The present work has been attempted, then, with the purpose of supplementing that which already has been done. A pattern of detailed chronological development has been followed with no attempt to present Valdivia as either better or worse than he was. The incidents related carry their own revelation of both the man and his time.

Material for this study has been taken principally from the documents collected and published by José Toribio Medina in his *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile* (30 volumes), and from the histories written by two contemporaries of Valdivia—Pedro Mariño Lovera and Alonso de Góngora Marmolejo. Other works have been consulted, however, and, in several instances, cited.

The writer wishes to acknowledge her indebtedness and gratitude to all who have so kindly assisted in this work. Foremost among them is Dr. Charles W. Hackett, Professor of Latin-American History in The University of Texas, who has given able direction and kindly encouragement. Others of the Department of History have manifested a friendly interest which has added materially to the pleasure of the undertaking. Miss Nettie Lee Benson, acting librarian of the Latin-American Collection of The University of Texas Library, has given cheerful and efficient aid in locating and obtaining material. Miss Julia Harris, reference librarian, also has assisted in securing material through interlibrary loans. The entire library staff has been most helpful and courteous. Mrs. Marcelle Lively Hamer has contributed much help in the reading of proofs, and Dr. J. Lloyd Read, Professor of Spanish at the Southwest Texas State Teachers College (San Marcos, Texas), has given valuable aid in clarifying obscure phraseology and obsolete words often used in the old Spanish documents.

MRS. IDA STEVENSON WELDON VERNON

Austin, Texas

August, 1945

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CHAPTER I

Spain's Movement to the New World[1]

When King John II of Portugal refused to sponsor the voyage proposed by Christopher Columbus in search of new lands or a western waterway to the Indies, whichever it may have been, he unwittingly tossed into the lap of the Catholic Monarchs of Spain the foundation upon which to build an empire in the western hemisphere. The continuous current of Protuguese discovery and re-discovery of unknown or forgotten lands in the latter half of the fifteenth century had given Portugal an enviable prestige. By various bulls the Pope—who presumably held in the hollow of his hand all undiscovered and unchristian lands—had recognized Portugal's achievements by giving her all lands discovered or to be discovered "from Capes Nun and Bojador southward to Guinea, and beyond." In the confused geographical ideas of the time, this was understood to include India, Cipangu (Japan), Cathay (China), the Spice Islands—any and all of the real or mythical lands reported by such travelers as the Polos.

Spain had recognized the Pope's concession in a treaty with Portugal, 1479–80. When, however, Columbus—having been refused Portuguese aid—sailed westward under the flag of the Castillian Queen and returned with news of his great discovery (1493), a different light was thrown upon the whole matter. If he had reached the Indies, he had entered Portugal's sphere of operations, but he had not sailed "from Capes Nun and Bojador southward." If the Indies could really be reached by sailing west, then, in Spain's opinion at least, the entire question needed clarification.

Spain lost no time in carrying the problem to the Pope. Pope Alexander VI, himself an Aragonese and already deeply indebted to Ferdinand and Isabella, was disposed to be helpful. In May he issued a new bull delimiting areas of Spanish and Portuguese control by drawing an imaginary line from north to south one hundred leagues west of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. East of this line, Portugal retained all of her former rights; west of it Spain gained similar ones. In September of the same year a supplementary bull specifically included the Indies in Spanish territory if Spain reached them by going west. The Portuguese

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[1]Note: Account of these events may be found in numerous histories, but the following summary is based largely upon R. B. Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire*, Vols. II and III.

king saw the futility of protesting to the Pope, who was scarcely more than a mouthpiece for the Spanish sovereigns, and, fearing more concessions to them, he entered into direct negotiations with Ferdinand and Isabella. The result was the Treaty of Tordesillas, June 7, 1494, in which the line of demarcation was moved westward and fixed at three hundred seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands—a distance about half-way between the Islands and the New World. With her title thus seemingly secure, Spain was now ready to investigate her latest acquisition.

Columbus, himself, it seems, was not wholly sure of what he had discovered. The wealth and the cities described by Marco Polo were lacking on the shores that he had touched. He was afraid that he had struck an extension of the Asiatic mainland to the north of Cipangu; but, if so, then to the south and west must lie a strait which would allow him to pass to the Spice Islands and the wealthy region of the Ganges. The search for such a strait was to occupy the Spanish mind for decades to come and was to acquaint many Spaniards besides Columbus with the islands of the Caribbean and the coastline of the Americas.

In his successive voyages, Columbus became acquainted with many of the smaller islands, the large island of Trinidad, the southern coast of Cuba (which he took to be part of the mainland), Honduras, and the northern coast of South America. It was his discovery of the mouth of the mighty Orinoco River and the immense volume of water that it carried which confirmed him in his belief that he had struck a vast continent and that any strait must lie far to the southward. Others—some who had sailed with him on previous voyages and some who had come later—carried the delineation of the coastline farther and farther. Alonso de Ojeda reached the north coast of South America (1499) near the present Guianas and sailed along the coast as far as Cape de la Vela. It was he who gave Venezuela its name, from a small native village which he found built on piles. In the same year Alonso Niño found the "Pearl Islands" off the north coast of Venezuela and carried much booty back to Spain. Still in the same year Vicente Yáñez Pinzón, blown off his course by a storm, reached the coast of present Brazil below the equator and discovered the mouth of the Amazon River which he took to be the Ganges. Diego de Lepe (1499–1500) struck the coast still farther south. Rodrigo Bastidas, in the autumn of 1500, explored the Caribbean coastline from Cape de la Vela to the Isthmus of Panamá. Almost at the same time Columbus explored the coast of Honduras. By the end of the century the entire coast of the new land from Honduras to Cape St. Augustine in Brazil—a distance of some three thousand miles—had been explored by the Spaniards.

After the death of Queen Isabella (1504), Spanish exploration lagged. Prodded by the sight of successful Portuguese trade with the East—which they had reached around the Cape of Good Hope in 1497—Spain again bestirred herself in 1508 to renew the search for the much-needed strait that would allow her to participate in that lucrative business. This time the search for the strait was definitely coupled with the idea of conquest and colonization.

Colonization had not been entirely neglected in the beginning. Columbus certainly included it in his aims and ambitions. On his first voyage he had left a small group on the north coast of Española at the little colony called La Navidad. On his second voyage he had carried all the necessities of colonization—seeds, plants, implements of agriculture, carpenter's tools, livestock, artisans and laborers. When he failed to find any trace of the group he had left, he moved the site of the colony to a more desirable spot farther down the coast and called the colony Isabella. The year was 1493, and from then on the Spaniards never lacked a base from which to operate.

From that small, fragile nucleus went swift tentacles of Spanish endeavor, coruscating with unsurpassed courage, indomitable resolution, and the greatest test of human endurance known to history, to form in less than a hundred years the great web of Spanish empire that stretched for thousands of miles over the new hemisphere. No well-organized, brilliantly-executed plan gave uniform texture to the web. It was the work of individuals—the *conquistadores*—and its character varied even as the character of the men who wove it. Some were actuated by love of adventure and personal glory; some by a consuming avarice that would endure much for gold; others saw themselves as instruments of Divinity sent to save a heathen people from a fate worse than death—worse even than the slavery which the Spaniards carried with them. But all went armed with superior weapons, usually mounted on horses, always confident of success. The natives, seized with fear at the sight of the horse, filled with superstition at the white faces of the invaders, and armed with ineffective weapons, fell easy prey to the handful of conquerors.

From Española the *conquistadores* spread easily to the neighboring islands. Diego Velásquez, Pánfilo de Narváez, and others conquered and settled Cuba, Porto Rico, and Jamaica. Pinzón, Solís, and Pineda added to the knowledge of the coastline in their search for the much-desired strait. Ponce de León made the acquaintance of Florida (1513), and Hernández de Córdoba and Juan de Grijalva learned of a superior civilization on the mainland, 1517–1518, through contact with the natives on the east coast of Mexico, where they also "saw much gold."

The movement to the mainland was almost simultaneous with that to the surrounding islands, and began in the section best-known to the Spaniards—the Isthmus and the north coast of Venezuela. In 1508 two grants were made for colonies on the mainland: one to Alonso de Ojeda on the so-called "Pearl Coast," called Urabá (later, New Andalusia), and one to Diego de Nicuesa, called Veragua (later, Castilla del Oro), lying north and west of the Gulf of Urabá. Both men proved failures at colonization but the remnants of their two attempted colonies united under the leadership of Vasco Núñez de Balboa (1510) to form the first permanent settlement on Tierra Firme. It was called Santa María de la Antigua del Darién, which was conveniently shortened to Darién. Balboa kept the colony at peace with the natives by making a strong alliance with one powerful chief and taking his daughter as his wife. He heard strange tales of a land to the south "flowing with gold," and of another great sea to the south. He resolved to investigate. In 1513 he verified the tale of the other sea, for, from a mountain top he viewed the wide expanse of the Pacific. Going down into the water, he took possession of it for his king, calling it the Mar del Sur.

Before he had time to look for the land "flowing with gold," a new governor arrived from Spain—Pedro Arias Dávila, better known as Pedrarias. He had already heard of the rich empire to the south and he saw at once the strategic position of the Isthmus for trade. Being intensely jealous of Balboa, he had him beheaded in 1519, on some flimsy pretext, to avoid any future complications with him. In the same year he founded the town of Panamá on the Pacific side of the Isthmus and built a good road to connect it with Nombre de Dios on the Atlantic side. He then seized some ships that had been built for Balboa and resolved to put them in the Mar del Sur and investigate the land to the south. Before he could carry out his project, however, his attention was called to the north.

In 1519, the same year that Pedrarias had Balboa beheaded, Hernando Cortés began his spectacular conquest of Mexico. By the spring of 1521, he was in possession of the city. Shortly thereafter he started sending out expeditions to reduce the remainder of the country to obedience. In 1523, he sent Pedro de Alvarado into Oaxaca where he founded the town of Santiago de los Caballeros, today Guatamala City. In 1524, he sent Cristóbal de Olid to occupy Honduras.

News of these developments reached the ears of Pedrarias. Since he had every intention of occupying Honduras, himself, he could not remain inactive while Cortés seized the prize. He at once sent forces to the north, and a race was on between him

and Cortés to see who could gain control of the intervening territory. To make matters more complicated, Gil González was competing with both for control of the same territory. This confused state of things lasted for several years and prevented Pedrarias from giving his attention to the south.

The region, however, was not wholly neglected. In 1522 Pascual de Andagoya crossed the Gulf of San Miguel to the south and some natives he found there asked him for aid against an enemy that came from a place which they called Birú. Andagoya consented and led them in a successful raid. They repaid him with golden objects taken from the conquered and with tales of a still richer people farther to the south known as Incas. Andagoya returned to Panamá with his story and wished to make an immediate second voyage south. He was seized, however, with an acute attack of rheumatic fever and forced to relinquish his plans. Friends of his proposed to carry them out. Francisco Pizarro (companion of Ojeda in his attempt to found a colony in 1509, companion of Balboa when the Pacific was discovered, supporter of Pedrarias when he arrived to take over the colony), Diego Almagro, a man of unknown parentage, and Fernando de Luque, a priest, formed a company for the discovery and conquest of Perú.

Two attempts proved unsuccessful. Francisco Pizarro then went to Spain for reinforcements and royal approval for his enterprise. He secured both. Among those he brought to aid him were his four brothers. They returned to Perú in 1531 and, taking advantage of a civil war between two rival Incas, were able to repeat the ruse used by Cortés in Mexico to get control of the ruler and leave the people helpless. The story of the captured Inca, Atahualpa, and of the fabulous amount of gold brought in by the natives for his ransom soon reached Panamá. Later, the Indians rose against the Pizarros and they sent frantic calls for help to their friends on the Isthmus. Hoping to find another Atahualpa's ransom, many answered the call. Among the ones who came was a man who, like the Pizarros, was a native of the province of Estremadura in Spain; who, unlike them, was a man of education and refinement; who had served the King of Spain in his Italian wars, possibly as a captain in his army; and, who, when the wars were ended, had left Spain for the New World to make his fortune—Pedro de Valdivia.

CHAPTER II

The Pre-Chilean Career of Pedro de Valdivia

It is unfortunate that so little can be said with certainty concerning the birthplace, the parentage, the year of his birth, or the youth of the *conquistador* of Chile. Not only are facts scarce, but no legend—such as that of Washington and the cherry tree—has come down to the present to give any clue to his environment or training. It is known only that he came from the province of Estremadura in Spain and from the district of La Serena, but from which of the fourteen little villages that comprise that district it is impossible to say positively. Góngora Marmolejo, who went to Chile with Valdivia in 1549, and who for years fought with him against the Araucanian Indians, says that Valdivia was born in the little village of Castuera.[1] The other contemporary of Valdivia who has left a history of that period, Pedro Mariño de Lovera, does not give the birthplace of the conqueror but says only that his mother was a native of Campanario.[2] Juan Pinel, who was living in Santiago as early as 1547 (and probably some years before, since he was an *encomendero* at the time), in writing to his wife about Valdivia, says that the governor was a native of Zalamea in La Serena and was married there.[3] Tomás Thayer Ojeda, one of the latest investigators, discounts the statement of Juan Pinel as coming from one of unsound mind.[4]

José Toribio Medina who went to the district of La Serena in the latter part of the nineteenth century to investigate the early life of Valdivia found little to aid him. The priest of Campanario showed him a certificate of baptism for one Pedro de Valdivia who, the priest was convinced, was the conqueror of Chile. But the year of birth was 1513, and, since Pedro was serving in the Spanish army in 1520 or 1521, that date would be entirely too late. Inhabitants of Villaneuva showed him a house purported to be that in which Valdivia had lived in his youth. Cabeza de Buey

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[1]Alonso de Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 39.

[2]Pedro Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 158.

[3]J. T. Medina, *Documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile*, IX, 187.

[4]Tomás Thayer Ojeda, *Formación de la sociedad chilena*, III, 288.

Juan Pinel was one of those forced by Valdivia to donate money (3,000 pesos) to help pay for supplies brought from Perú in 1547. Since he was preparing to take the money to Spain to use as a dowry for his marriageable daughters, the blow of losing it deranged his mind, and he killed himself in 1550. The above-mentioned letter was written in September, 1548, and Thayer Ojeda thinks it probable that his mind was already beginning to wander.

attempted to establish itself as his birthplace. It was certain that Valdivia's wife resided, after their marriage, in Castuera; therefore, that village claimed Valdivia also. After weighing what he found, Medina's conclusion is that Campanario is the *cuna* of the Valdivia family and that, later, part of the family moved to Castuera, but there is no certainty as to the date of the moving. Finally, Medina concludes that "nothing is known of the early years of the *conquistador* of Chile."[5]

Among the later historians, opinion is divided, though few state a positive conviction on the subject. A noted exception is Vicente Mena, who claims to possess a copy of the *partida de bautismo* of Pedro de Valdivia, brought to this country in 1731 by a relative, Sebastián de Valdivia, and signed by Juan Gellego, curate of Castuera. Thayer Ojeda thinks there is too great a chance of the document's being fraudulent to accept it as conclusive proof.[6] Francisco Antonio Encina, whose work was published in 1940, also seems unconvinced by Vicente Mena's claims, since he has this to say:

> Pedro de Valdivia was born . . . in la Serena, that is, on the plain of Estremadura enclosed between Cabeza de Buey and Villanueva. No one has succeeded in proving which of the fourteen villages of la Serena was his birthplace. The investigators have pointed successively to Castuera, Villanueva, Campanario, Zalamea, etc.; and the villages have quarreled over the honor of having him for a son, without shedding more light [on the subject].[7]

A question, scarcely less baffling, has arisen over the parentage of Pedro de Valdivia—probably stemming again from a statement by Mariño de Lovera that he was the son of a Portuguese nobleman, Oncas de Melo, and Isabel Gutiérrez y Valdivia.[8] R. B. Cunninghame Graham has accepted the above statement and from it has drawn the conclusion that the father's family was of lower birth than that of the mother, since Pedro took his mother's name.[9] Carlos Pereyra also inclines toward that opinion.[10] Later writers refute that statement. Thayer Ojeda, who seems to have investigated Valdivia's genealogy very thoroughly, says that "the names of the parents of Don Pedro de Valdivia mentioned by Mariño de Lovera are imaginary or inexact as [are] innumerable

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[5]J. T. Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico Colonial de Chile*, 904–905.

[6]Thayer Ojeda, *Formación de sociedad chilena*, 289.

[7]Francisco Antonio Encina, *Historia de Chile*, I, 176.

[8]Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 158.

[9]R. B. Cunninghame Graham, *Pedro de Valdivia*, 1.

[10]Carlos Pereyra, *Historia de la América española*, I, 30.

other data of his *Crónica."*[11] From data gathered from many sources, Thayer Ojeda's conclusion is that the father of Valdivia was Diego de Valdivia and that his mother probably was Isabel Gutiérrez—people of noble birth but in straitened circumstances.[12]

Another point still undetermined, and likely to remain so, is the date of Valdivia's birth. If the record of baptism before mentioned could be accepted as authentic, the matter would, of course, be settled. It gives the date as April 17, 1497. Góngora Marmolejo also makes 1497 the year of Valdivia's birth, for he says that Valdivia was fifty-six years old when he was killed—[13] an event usually placed in December, 1553, though it may have been as late as January, 1554, before his actual death took place. In October, 1537, in a Declaration of Services by Diego de Fuenmayor at Lima, to which he was a witness, Valdivia gave his age as thirty-five years—*"poco más o menos,"*[14] which would place his birth as late as 1502. Francisco Antonio Encina accepts Valdivia's declaration,[15] while Rosa Arciniega, a still later biographer, seems to favor the earlier date, saying he was born in 1498 *"o bordeando."* Perhaps, as she has pointed out, the question is of minor importance and that for us

> the origin of Valdivia . . . dates from the day of his daring departure from Cuzco at the head of a poor handful of adventurers, under the most difficult conditions . . . to begin such a colossal undertaking as he was proposing. From there and only from there commenced his true life, his extraordinary career, the glory of his name which was to eclipse those of Pescara and Colonna, of all those victorious captains whose ignored subordinate he was in Italy.[16]

Pedro de Valdivia differed from most of the Spanish *conquistadores* in two important respects: he was brought up to a military career and he was well educated. His forefathers were military men, he proudly told Charles V in a letter, and he chose the same career to follow their example. He entered the army in 1520 or 1521—a very young man for the strenuous life of the Spanish troops. He fought in Flanders under Henry of Nassau and in the Italian campaign under Próspero Colonna until his death and then

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[11]Thayer Ojeda, *Formación de la sociedad chilena,* 300.

Bartolomé de Escobar, a priest, rewrote the original manuscript left by Mariño de Lovera and Thayer Ojeda places the errors to his credit.

[12]*Ibid.,* 294.

[13]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile,* 39.

[14]Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* V, 4.

[15]Encina, *Historia de Chile,* I, 176.

[16]Rosa Arciniega, *Don Pedro de Valdivia,* 20.

under the Marquis of Pescara.[17] He was with the Marquis of Pescara at the battle of Pavia (1525) where "the two greatest caesars of the time—Charles V and Francis I—confronted each other,"[18] and where Francis I was taken prisoner. It was in those campaigns that Valdivia became acquainted with Francisco de Carvajal, later known as the "Demon of the Andes"—a man who at first befriended him in America but later fought against him.[19]

Nothing definite is known concerning Valdivia's rank in the Spanish army. Góngora Marmolejo speaks of him as *"un escudero"*[20]—a squire. Did the man whom the great Carvajal feared acquire his military skill fighting as a squire at the side of some greater personage?

Mariño de Lovera says he was an *alférez* (an ensign) of one company[21] while Thayer Ojeda says that after four years of service he became a captain.[22]

Medina thinks it more likely that he served as a simple soldier[23] and since that is the only claim that Valdivia, himself, makes, it probably is correct. In his letters and dispatches to the King he never failed to call attention to the fact that he had rendered valuable service to His Majesty, both in Italy and in Flanders, but only *"como buen soldado."*[24] If he had acquired rank, it is only natural to suppose that he would have mentioned that fact.

It is possible that the superior learning evidenced in Valdivia's letters may have resulted from his long stay in France and Italy. The military campaigns were interspersed with long weeks, and sometimes months, of comparative idleness. Since he entered the army at such an early age, Medina thinks it probable that his education was acquired there during the intervals between campaigns.[25] It could have been gained, however, in the University of Salamanca before he entered the army.

Be that as it may, Valdivia served his king faithfully and well until the battle of Pavia had given Spain the victory. Upon the

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[17]Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 47; Encina, *Historia de Chile*, 1, 177; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550. Note: The letters of Pedro de Valdivia have been printed in various editions. Unless otherwise stated, the letters referred to in this work are found in J. T. Medina, *Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia.*

[18]Luis Alberto Sánchez, *La conquista de Chile*, 7.

[19]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[20]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 34.

[21]Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 37.

[22]Thayer Ojeda, *Formación de la sociedad de Chile*, III, 306.

[23]Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico*, 908.

[24]Letters of Pedro de Valdivia to Emporer Charles V, September 4, 1545, October 15, 1550, and September 25, 1551.

[25]Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico*, 907.

death of his famous leader, the Marquis of Pescara, Valdivia retired to his native town and soon married a girl from the neighboring village of Zalamea—Marina Ortíz de Gaete. She was hardly more than a child at the time—only fourteen or fifteen years old—and her life had been secluded, as custom dictated. She was untraveled, unlearned, and illiterate (she never learned to write),[26] but apparently to the war-weary young soldier she appeared as an angel of domesticity, representative of the rest he craved, and for almost ten years he remained at her side, tilling the soil, tending the flocks, doing whatever an impoverished nobleman could to wrest a livelihood from the lands he had. It is a period of obscurity for him, and from his reticence in speaking of his life in Spain one is almost led to believe that he deliberately fostered that obscurity.

It was inevitable that Valdivia should tire of his sedentary and probably penurious existence. Neither his nature nor the era was conducive to such a life. Not only had his country been drawn into the maelstrom of European politics through the accession of the empire-minded Charles V, but there was also a constant influx of strange and exciting news from across the sea—from that New World that all loyal Spaniards believed to belong exclusively to Spain. Tales of adventure, of conquest, and—most exciting of all—of abundant gold were heard on every hand. Both Cortés and Francisco Pizarro were in Spain in 1529, and both had stirring accounts to give of the riches of the New World and each carried concrete evidence of his claims. Stella Burke May, in her delightful, but not always factual, romance of Valdivia and Inés de Suárez says that Pedro de Valdivia was one of the soldiers who accompanied Pizarro on his tour of triumph through Spain during his return visit there in 1529 and that he was fascinated by the soft woolen blankets woven by the Incas, the llamas, the chains and the bracelets of gold carried by that conqueror.[27] Though no documentary evidence of this claim has been found, it might well have been true and it is almost certain that Valdivia met with Pizarro while he was in Spain because Pizarro, also, was a native of Estremadura and went there to persuade his four brothers to accompany him back to Panamá. However much the tales may have stirred him, Valdivia did not return with the Pizarros. Five more years he stayed with what must have been an uncongenial task to one trained in the military and to one of his social instincts. When the desire to enter the arena of activity proved too strong—since there were no children by his marriage to hold

[26]Arciniega, *Don Pedro de Valdivia*, 21–24.
[27]Stella Burke May, *The Conqueror's Lady*, 86.

him to the responsibilities of fatherhood[28]—he embarked for *Nuevo Mundo.*

Miguel Luis Amunátegui says that Valdivia came to the New World

> to promote with the sword the faith of Christ, and to search for riches—that which would assure his salvation in the skies and his well-being on earth[29]

—laudable ambitions, both (though the method for the first is somewhat questionable); however, if we may believe Rosa Arciniega, the last played a somewhat greater part than the first. In her effort to give the reader an understanding of Valdivia, Arciniega attempts to get back of the bare facts and to "read between the lines," so to speak. Two of the instances she gives in support of her theory that poverty was a major cause of his crossing to Panamá may prove interesting here. In one of his letters to Charles V he says:

> You may tell all the gentlemen and subjects of Your Majesty who do not have there in Spain *"de comer"* [land to support them comfortably] that they should come [to Chile] if they desire to have it here.[30]

The fact of his mentioning *"de comer"* suggests to her that his own poverty in Spain was haunting him, but an equally sound explanation, it seems, is that Valdivia needed more people in Chile and any attraction that he could hold out might induce more to come.

The second instance Arciniega cites is that in the list of accusations brought against Valdivia by his enemies before the priest, La Gasca, is found the following:

> He [Valdivia] wrote to the king that if he should want to give the government [of Chile] to another that he [the king] should send him the said three hundred thousand dollars [the amount which the detractors of Valdivia falsely accused him of saying that the king usually paid a priest to come]; and because Juan Zurbano, *encomendero,* said to him: "and what if the king should ask you what lands and cattle you sold [to come to America]," he [Valdivia] said that he ought to hang him and spoke to him harshly [*le trató mal de palabra*] and left him without Indians.[31]

Arciniega sees in the incident a desire on the part of Zurbano to taunt Valdivia with his former poverty. And of the anger of Valdivia she says:

> The remembrance of his lack of lands and cattle in Zalamea, brought about by Zurbano, provoked this excess of irritation in Valdivia; it was sufficient to

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[28]Arciniega, *Don Pedro de Valdivia,* 25.
[29]M. L. Amunátagui, *Descubrimiento i conquista de Chile,* 182.
[30]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.
[31]Barros Arana, *Obras completas,* VII, 30.

upset his nerves and to bring about a reprisal which was not usually his custom.[32]

Regardless of what his motives were in leaving his home in Spain, Pedro de Valdivia did come to America in 1535, spent an unprofitable year in Venezuela, and went on to Perú in 1536.[33] There is no record of his leaving Spain—on what ship or in what year—and, in spite of his own statement mentioned above, different historians assign different dates to his arrival in America.

Baldomero Menéndez places it earliest. He writes:

> . . . a companion of Francisco Pizarro from his first departure from Panamá, he had taken part in all the glorious deeds of the conquest of Perú and had since contributed with his valor and his military experience to the triumph obtained by the Pizarros over the partisans of Almagro in the battle of Las Salinas.[34]

This date is obviously too early since Pizarro's first voyage to Perú (1524) antedated the battle of Pavia in which Valdivia undoubtedly participated. Also, his name is not included in the list of the famous thirteen who crossed the line drawn by Pizarro with his sword on the sand of Gallo Island—an act which committed them to following him in the conquest of Perú.[35] One cannot doubt that he would have been in the group had he been in the expedition.

R. B. Cunninghame Graham gives no definite date of Valdivia's departure but says "in 1530 he (Valdivia) distinguished himself in the conquest of Perú."[36] If the assertion were true, it would mean—in view of the slowness of crossing the Atlantic—that Valdivia had left Spain before the arrival there of Cortés and Pizarro—an occurrence greatly to be doubted. It is almost certain that Pizarro's visit to Estremadura was a contributing influence to Valdivia's decision to seek his fortune on the new continent, if only by taunting him with the spectacle of one much lower by birth than himself having attained such affluence.

Luis Alberto Sánchez, one of the later historians, writes concerning Valdivia's arrival in America that "at last, Pedro de Valdivia, greedy, enterprising, and bold, abandoned his hearth and came to the new continent in the year that Francisco Pizarro attacked the majestic Incas . . .: 1532."[37] While this date is much more probable than those before mentioned, in the face of Valdivia's statement that he came in 1535, it needs much more evidence than the author supplied to make it acceptable.

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[32]Arciniega, *Don Pedro de Valdivia*, 23.
[33]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.
[34]Baldomero Menéndez, *Historia y cronología de Chile*, 96.
[35]Cunninghame Graham, *Pedro de Valdivia*, 10.
[36]*Ibid.*, 1.
[37]Sánchez, *La conquista de Chile*, 8.

Barros Arana, Sir Clement R. Markham, J. T. Medina, Crescente Errázuriz, Thayer Ojeda, F. A. Encina, and Rosa Arciniega all accept Valdivia's statement at face value.[38] It seems evident that if he had wished to misrepresent the date at all, it would have been more expedient to move it back, since more years of service in conquest of the new land would give greater credit in the eyes of the king. There is no reason, however, to believe that he changed it at all, and it is hardly probable that his memory failed him.

Lacking any record of his sailing, Medina thinks it "very probable" that Valdivia sailed on a ship brought out by Jerónimo Alderete, which reached Cubagua in December, 1534, or January, 1535—a hundred men, *"todos de guerra y de hechos."*[39] This probability is heightened by the fact that both of the Alderete brothers—Jerónimo and Juan Fernández—remained loyal friends to Valdivia and accompanied him on his conquest of Chile.

Valdivia remained in Venezuela more than a year—another period of obscurity. Although—as pointed out earlier—Cunninghame Graham says that "he distinguished himself in the conquest of Venezuela," surely that distinction could not have been very great or his name would find itself included in the histories of Venezuela, and some echo of his exploits would have followed him to Perú and Chile. It is more probable, as Rosa Arciniega has concluded, that he found there only "hardships, poverty, miseries, and obscurity."[40] It is certain that he did not find wealth, for when he started preparations for his expedition to Chile, he was forced to form a partnership with a merchant in order to raise money to equip his men. Barros Arana says that he found Venezuela not "a theatre of brilliant and profitable deeds," but was a witness to "a battle without glory and without prospects of riches, disturbed besides by the dissensions and quarrels of the *conquistadores* themselves."[41] The conqueror's star had not yet risen, and hearing that Perú, the land of fabulous riches, was about to be lost to the Spaniards by an uprising of the Indians, Valdivia hastened to add his services to those of many other adventurers going to the aid of the Pizarros.

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[38]Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*, I, 207; Sir Clement Markham, "Pizarro and the Conquest and Settlement of Peru and Chile" in Justin Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History of America*, II, 528; Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico*, 909; Crescente Errázuriz, *Pedro de Valdivia*, I, 3; Thayer Ojeda, *Formación de la sociedad chilena*, 306; Encina, *Historia de Chile*, 177; Arciniega, *Don Pedro de Valdivia*, 27.

[39]Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico*, 909.

[40]Arciniega, *Don Pedro de Valdivia*, 28.

[41]Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*, I, 207.

The Audiencia of Santo Domingo had heard Francisco Pizarro's call for help and sent out as many men as could be spared, under Diego de Fuenmayor. His ship reached Nombre de Dios in November, 1536, where Pedro de Valdivia joined his forces. They moved on to Panamá where they were detained three months for ship repairs. Early in February, 1537, they set sail for Perú and arrived at Tumbez a short time later—four hundred of them.

Pizarro was, of course, greatly heartened by the sight of so many reinforcements. He had just dispatched Alonso de Alvarado with most of his forces to the relief of Cuzco, which was under siege by the natives led by the Inca, Manco Capac. With his greatly-strengthened forces he at once started to the aid of Alvarado. Before he reached Cuzco, however, word reached him that the Indians had raised their siege and that the city had been seized by his former partner, Diego de Almagro, lately returned from his disappointing expedition to Chile. Two of his brothers, Hernando and Gonzalo, had been taken prisoners in the seizure. The news accelerated the movement of Pizarro's forces to join Alvarado, but while they paused at Chincha for reorganization, news came of the disastrous battle of Abancay (fought July 12, 1537) in which Alvarado's forces were ingloriously defeated and the leader, himself, taken prisoner by Almagro. Pizarro now hastened to revamp his army (if the word should be applied to such a small force). He appointed Felipe Gutiérrez captain-general of the forces and Pedro de Valdivia, *maestre de campo*. Fearing that Almagro's followers in the flush of victory might fall upon his men before they were ready, he withdrew to Los Reyes (Lima).

While Gutiérrez and Valdivia were rigorously training the men, Pizarro sent emissaries to Almagro to arrange, if possible, for a peaceful settlement of the Cuzco matter. The meeting at Mala was arranged, to which Valdivia went as aid to Pizarro (November, 1537). Though the former partners received each other well, the efforts at negotiation proved fruitless and civil war followed. The battle of Las Salinas the following spring (April 6, 1538) gave victory to the Pizarros and death to Almagro.[42]

The civil war provided an ideal setting for Valdivia's qualities of leadership. He was a good organizer and soon had his forces operating smoothly, while his boldness and good fellowship helped to keep the turbulent spirits in control. He seems to have inspired equally high regard among his men, his fellow-officers, and in his chief. He was free with both his money (when he had any) and his friendship and entered into the chance-taking atmosphere

[42]Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico*, 909–10.

around him like the proverbial duck to water. Crescente Errázuriz writes of this period of his life:

> Not quite three years was Valdivia with Pizarro and in them his career was most brilliant: the outstanding military ability with which he was gifted was recognized by all. No one censured his rise, and, with a universal reputation of the perfect captain, he gained soon the post of *maestre de campo;* he had almost always the decisive authority in the councils, and a youth of thirty-six or thirty-seven years, he saw himself respected by the oldest and most experienced chiefs.[43]

Pizarro's reward to Valdivia was something more tangible than praise. He gave him in *encomienda* the entire valley called Canela in Charcas—a *repartimiento* which later served to reward three men: Captains Diego Centeno, Lope de Mendoza, and Dionisio de Bobadilla. In addition he got the silver mine of Porco, valued at two hundred thousand *castellanos* (a sum equivalent in 1911 to forty thousand pounds sterling).[44]

Such a handsome reward gave Valdivia both wealth and position, and the man who had come from Spain

con una espada y capa solamente[45]

now had renown to satisfy his ambition and wealth to indulge his generosity. Circumstances seemed favorable toward the consummation of a desire that he often referred to in his letters—the establishment of the House of Valdivia in the New World. Why, then, was he not willing to send for Doña Marina, his wife, and settle down to the fulfillment of his plan? No doubt there were many and complex reasons, but three deterrents at once strike the attention of a student of his life.

First, through all of Valdivia's correspondence runs the fear of being supplanted in his work. Even after La Gasca, the king's representative in Perú, recognized him formally as governor of Chile he still pointed out to Charles V in his letter why he should be left undisturbed in carrying out his plans and pleaded that another should not be sent to interfere with his work. He had seen men in high position one day—as Almagro had been—dead or reduced to flight the next. His extensive *repartimiento* and his rich mine were his by virtue of his having been on the winning side in the recent civil war. So long as the Pizarros remained successful his property was safe. But it might be a matter of only days, weeks, or months before a new faction arose to replace the defeated Almagristas. If it should succeed where Almagro had

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[43]Errázuriz, *Pedro de Valdivia,* I, 4.

[44]*Ibid.,* 4, note; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550; Valdivia's instruction to his agents in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* IX, 48.

[45]Alonzo de Ercilla y Zúñiga, *La Araucana,* canto I, 14.

failed, his property would be liable to confiscation since he in no wise had aided in the conquest of Perú but held his possessions only as a reward for faithful service to one man. He desired, then, conquest in his own right.[46]

Second, Valdivia had lived with Doña Marina almost ten years before coming to America and there were no children. It was doubtful, therefore, if ever there would be children, and, since divorce was reserved for those especially favored by the Pope or for those, like Henry VIII of England, who were obstinate and powerful enough to resist papal displeasure, Valdivia must have seen little chance of carrying out his design. The few glimpses we have of Doña Marina reveal an upright but colorless and complaining individual. Had her failure to bear children and the attitude of the medieval mind toward barren women produced in her self-consciousness to the point of self-obliteration? It is possible. At any rate, though Valdivia sent her money from time to time, he showed no disposition to bring her to America until forced to do so by La Gasca.

The third and perhaps the most potent reason for Valdivia's action was Inés de Suárez—the Spanish woman who had come from Panamá to Perú on the ship of Rodrigo de Grijalva, sent by Cortés of Mexico to carry aid to Pizarro in 1538.[47]

Alejandro Vicuña says that Inés de Suárez had known Valdivia in Venezuela but that their relations there had not passed beyond *"la buena amistad."* She was a widow some six or seven years younger than Valdivia and had come to America to look for her husband who had left her in Spain while he sought his fortune in *Tierra Firme.* Not finding him in Venezuela, she had extended the search to Perú. There she learned from one of his shipmates that he had died on the voyage over. She had no near kin in Spain to return to, and the *cabildo* of Cuzco had been kind enough to grant her a small *repartimiento* and a few Indians, so in Cuzco she had remained and was living there when Valdivia and his troops entered after the battle of Las Salinas. The old friendship was renewed, and it was not long before Doña Inés accompanied Valdivia to his *repartimiento* in Charcas.[48]

There is another version of how Valdivia met the Spanish woman who was to be no less than co-conqueror with him of the land to the south called *Nuevo Toledo* (Chile): Valdivia was extremely fond of gambling. Each evening he was to be found in the *bode-*

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[46]Valdivia's letters to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545, June 15, 1548, October 15, 1550, September 25, 1551, and October 26, 1552; Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile,* I, 208.

[47]May, *The Conqueror's Lady,* 117.

[48]Alejandro Vicuña, *Inés de Suárez,* 10–36.

gón of the merchant, Francisco Martínez de Peñalosa, operated by a mulatto called Pinillos. One evening Valdivia had won continuously from a fellow named Fernán Núñez. Affable as always, he remarked:

"You play in bad luck, Señor."

"Bad luck at gambling is a good sign for beginning a love affair," answered the other angrily and, turning on his heel, he went out and slammed the door.

The crowd of hangers-on laughed and Valdivia ordered drinks for everybody to be paid for from his winnings. As they raised their glasses, a woman's cry for help came through the window. Everybody rushed for the door. Once outside they separated through the streets looking for the distressed one.

Valvidia and Luis de Cartagena went out together. They heard the cry again and located it. As they rushed toward the place, leaping ditches and walls, they saw the fleeing figure of a man and heard the woman's voice again, this time urging them to catch the fleeing one. They gave chase, captured the man, and delivered him to the constable who had just appeared on the scene. They then returned to the small inn of *"Juan el Mocho"* where the trouble had started. There they found the woman, still weeping. Valdivia demanded to know the name of the man who had molested her, threatening to cut off the ear of one so low. Her answer was—Fernán Núñez!

Intrigued by the manner of the woman, her blue eyes, and the fact that she was Spanish, Valdivia sent Luis de Cartagena away while he stayed to learn that the distressed one was a widow—Inés de Suárez—who had followed her husband to Perú only to learn that he was dead. Now she was alone, defenseless, waiting only for peace to come to Perú so that she might return to Spain, where an equally lonely life awaited her.

The chivalrous soul of the Spaniard was stirred, and he must have been sincere when he answered, "be assured, Señora, that while you remain in this country, your cause will be mine," for within a short time, the widow accompanied him to his *repartimiento.*[49]

Again obscurity descends on Valdivia, but not for long. Whether his restless, energetic nature was constitutionally averse to domesticity, or whether this time he had found a woman as restless and energetic as himself (she later proved herself as courageous as any man and more venturesome than most), it is not possible to say. It is only known that in April, 1539, Francisco Pizarro

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[49]J. T. Medina, "De cómo y por qué vino a Chile la primera mujer española," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 1–11.

visited the region of Lake Titicaca in Charcas and that Valdivia joined him there. Sometime in the course of the visit, Valdivia asked for permission to conquer and explore the land abandoned by Almagro.[50] Pizarro was, of course, amazed. Why should a man wish to leave a comfortable home and a rich mine to conquer a land held, since the return of Almagro, as utterly worthless? Valdivia says that his chief thought that he had taken leave of his senses and tried to argue with him but, "seeing my determination, he graciously opened to me the door" for the undertaking.[51]

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[50]Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*, I, 209.

[51]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 5, 1545.

Si implicant indi tauros et equos
projicientes ad extrema funis ligatos
globos

CHAPTER III

Chile: Land and People

Nuevo Toledo, later known as Chile, was contained in a grant of land made to Diego de Almagro in 1534 by the Emperor, Charles V. In an effort to satisfy both the original partners of the Peruvian conquest, the Emperor had granted Francisco Pizarro land stretching two hundred seventy leagues south from the vicinity of the Gulf of Guayaquil,[1] and had given Almagro that extending two hundred leagues south of Pizarro's southern boundary. Both grants were to be measured by the coast and neither had an eastern boundary—since the width of the continent was unknown—though presumably it was the Atlantic Ocean.[2]

It was well for the immediate peace of Perú and the future of the Pizarros that Almagro did not know the nature of the land contained in his grant when Hernando Pizarro returned from Spain in 1534, and that in gaining that knowledge he so depleted his forces that the Pizarros were able to triumph over him. Not that Chile was as poor as Manuel de Espinar, treasurer of the Almagro expedition, described it when he said that the country could not "anywhere give *'de comer'* to fifty *vecinos.*"[3] It was only that by contrast with the easy wealth of Perú, Chile's resources were invisible to Almagro's men. They saw and remembered only the biting cold of the high mountain passes, the drenching rains of the valleys, and the choking thirst of the deserts. They failed to see the fertile soil of Aconcagua, the abundance of wood for building and of water for irrigation because they were looking for only one thing—Gold! When they failed to find that, no other virtue remained to the land.

As a matter of fact, the land was, and still is, forbidding in certain topographical aspects. The Andes Mountains on the east present difficult passes among peaks covered with perpetual snow. Strong west winds blow across the icy summits, tearing at the luckless traveler, while the rarity of the air produces the dreaded *puna,* or *soroche,* a suffocating nausea. The glacial soil rolls under the horses' hoofs until it draws blood and the lack of trails makes the going still harder.

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[1]Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire,* III, 554.

[2]Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* IV, 224.

[3]Manuel de Espinar to Emperor Charles V, June 15, 1539, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* IV, 288.

The Coastal Range nearer the sea rises abruptly from the Pacific and it is between it and the Andes that the central or longitudinal valley lies—the most habitable part of Chile. This valley is, of course, not a real valley in the usual sense of the word. It is only a depression between the two great ranges, itself crossed by many valleys running toward the western coast. In the north of this central portion stretches the great desert which extends from Arica, across the province of Tarapacá, Antofagasta, and Atacama, to Copiapó. This region was almost uninhabited by the natives except for the oases of the Azapa and Loa valleys. To the south lies the region of extremely heavy rainfall and the cold Patagonian south winds. It was, then, in the central part of the central valley, "from the slopes of Chacabuco south of the Aconcagua River to the Gulf of Reloncaví, fronting the Island of Chiloé," that the primitive population was most numerous and that the Spaniards found most hospitality to themselves.[4]

It was in the fertile valley of the Aconcagua River that the name, "Chile," or "Chili," originated, though there is some question as to whether it was first used as the name of a chieftain or a stretch of territory. If, however, it first applied to a chief, it was soon transferred to the territory he controlled. Some historians explain the name as coming from the Quichua word for "cold" but Medina objects on the ground that the whole region is dominated by the Andes and that there would be no point in applying such a name to only one valley. He also points out that "chili" is used both as a prefix and as a suffix to other words in the Quichua language. His final conclusion is:

> *Chili* is a word that properly belongs to the Quichua language, and whose true significance, "better than something," explains perfectly the frequency with which it has been employed concerning places . . . therefore . . . there is nothing strange that the Peruvian hosts that arrived at the valley of Aconcagua, after having crossed regions more or less sterile, admiring its fertility and beauty, should call it *Chili*.[5]

The Spaniards heard of Chile from the Indians. It was the subject of vague, ill-defined rumors somewhat akin to those circulating about "El Dorado" and the "Seven Cities of Cíbola." Chile had gold—much gold! The magic word that led the *conquistadores* to explore so much territory and to endure such unequalled hardships! The Incas fathered the rumors and fostered them—exaggerated, embroidered—fired by the hope of freeing their own country from the hated foreigners. The Spaniards, as greatly fired by avarice as the Incas by patriotism, were only too willing to follow the path that rumor pointed out.

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[4]Luis Galdames, *A History of Chile*, 3–27.
[5]J. T. Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile*, 7.

The first expedition, that of Diego de Almagro in 1535–1536, turned out disastrously. Much of his force was lost from the mountain cold, the hostility of the Indians—brought on as reprisals for his own atrocities against them—and the return trip through the desert. Since his followers found no gold, their conclusion was that the land was worthless. Five years later a second expedition under Pedro de Valdivia rendered a different verdict. Valdivia confidently wrote to Charles V:

I have the hope, under God, to give food in Your Majesty's name to more *conquistadores* than were fed in New Spain and Perú; I say that I will give more allotments than there are in both places and so that everyone will have a very large one and [one] befitting his services and position.[6]

Quite a contrast between his letter and the one previously mentioned by Espinar! Where Manuel de Espinar saw a country that would not feed fifty, Valdivia saw one that would feed more than both Mexico and Perú. In another letter he describes the land in more detail:

For this land is such that there is none better in the world for living in and settling down; this I say because it is flat, very healthy, and very pleasant; it has four months of winter, no more, and in them it is only when the moon is at quarter that it rains one day or two; on all the other days the sun is so fine that there is no need to draw near the fire. The summer is so temperate, with such delightful breezes, that a man can be out in the sun all day without hurt. It is the most abounding land in pastures and fields, and for producing every kind of livestock and plant imaginable; much timber and very fine for houses; endless wood for use in them; . . . and wherever men may wish to settle they will find a place to sow, and that with which to build, and water, wood, and grass for their animals; . . . there are two sowings in the year, the maize being gathered in April and May, and then wheat is sown; and in December it is harvested, and maize sown again.[7]

It is to Valdivia's great credit that he was able to see the agricultural possibilities of the country and to realize, despite the immediate importance of gold, that the real future of the land lay in its soil.

The Incas had become acquainted with *Chili* in the preceding century. Medina gives an interesting account of their first news of that country:

When the Inca, Viracocha, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, was visiting the territories of Tarapacá that his generals had just added by force of arms to his royal crown, certain *Tucman* ambassadors presented themselves and spoke to him thus: "We must let you know that far away from our land, to the south and west, is a great kingdom called *Chili*, populated by many people, with whom we do not have any commerce because of a great snow-capped range of mountains that is between them and us, but we have heard

[6]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.
[7]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

the account from our fathers and our grandfathers. And it seems best to us to tell it to you willingly in order that you may conquer that land."[8]

The news must have constituted a challenge to the Incas for later in the century their control was established as far south as Copiapó and forays were made as far as the Biobío River. They were not able, however, to conquer the tribes to the south, though their influence was felt as far as the Maule River and some intermarriage had taken place.[9]

Conquest by the Incas sat lightly on the subject tribes. A tribute was levied and many Incan customs introduced, but they seem to have avoided harsh military measures. In order to make their control effective, they moved the local Indians from certain places and in a manner reminiscent of Alexander's march through Asia, they established colonies of their own people. These colonies, called *mitimaes,* were governed either by a member of one of the Incan tribes or by a local chief known to be loyal. The opinion has been advanced that Michimalongo, the chief who waged such unrelenting war against Valdivia and his men, was such a governing chief.[10]

Tomás Guevara has this to say of the Incan conquest:

The Peruvian invasion did not pass over Chile like a destructive hurricane; on the contrary, it greatly modified their primitive customs and their material conditions, carrying considerable industrial progress. . . .
The army of the Inca was not dominated exclusively by the military spirit; his soldiers were warriors and at the same time, farmers, industrialists and colonizers. . . .
This system of civilization . . . was highly humanitarian and discreet. . . .
The soldiers did not kill or commit robbery nor subject the conquered to the burden of overwhelming work.[11]

Instead, the Incas provided the subject tribes with a means of livelihood, introduced new crops—pumpkins, corn, beans—and taught them the art of weaving cloth from the llama's wool, cotton, or rabbit's fur.

Many tribes and diverse groups inhabited the long strip of land now known as Chile, but only those of the central valley contacted the early Spaniards and influenced the course of Chile's subsequent history. In the northern deserts were the Changos and the Atacamians. Between Copiapó and the Biobío River were the Pehuenches, while south of that river were the numerous, stubborn, racially-pure, hard-fighting natives known to the Spaniards as the Araucanians.

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[8]Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile,* 1.
[9]*Idid.,* 322–330.
[10]Domingo Amunátagui y Solar, *Formación de la nacionalidad chilena,* 12.
[11]Tomás Guevara, *Historia de la civilización de Araucania,* II, 6.

No matter how light the yoke of the Incas, these Indians refused to accept it. Stubbornly they battled them; stopped their southward march. Just as stubbornly they battled the Spaniards and for more than three hundred years slowed, if they could not stop, their march to the south.[12]

Nothing certain is known of why the Spaniards called these Indians Araucanians. Galdames says it might have been from a Peruvian word meaning "free,"[13] but Horacio Lara gives the opinion of an earlier historian that it came from a custom found among certain Indians of making a sauce for their food from a certain kind of yellow earth—*rag*—and water—*co*. The Indians called it *ragco* and Spaniards corrupted it to Arauco, a name which they applied to that province. The inhabitants, therefore, became Araucanians.[14]

At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards the Indians of Chile had already progressed from the stage of nomadic hunters to that of agriculturists. While there were few villages and no towns, they had developed an irrigation system and made some improvements in agricultural tools. Juan Ignatius Molina says that the tribes early

> became weary of the fatiguing exercise of the chase in a country where game is not very abundant, and having but few domestic animals, they began . . . to attend to the cultivation of such nutritious plants as necessity or accident had made known to them.[15]

Among these plants were the maize, potato, yellow pumpkin, *madi*, Guinea pepper, squash, and strawberry.

The economic system of the tribes was based on barter, but on regulated barter according to which all articles were appraised under the name of payments: one article might be considered one payment, another two payments, etc.[16]

Historians differ in their description of the physical appearance of the natives. Evidently the tribes varied somewhat according to location and changed somewhat through the centuries as they mingled with the Spaniards or with the negroes, some of whom accompanied the first-comers. Valdivia described the Araucanians as "tall . . . amiable, and white, with handsome faces, both men and women, . . . great husbandmen, and as great drinkers."[17] Góngora Marmolejo, the soldier-historian who accompanied Val-

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[12]Galdames, *A History of Chile*, 6.
[13]*Ibid.*, 6.
[14]Horacio Lara, *Crónica de la Araucania*, I, 28.
[15]J. I. Molina, *The Geographical, Natural, and Civil History of Chili*, II, 12.
[16]*Ibid.*, 108.
[17]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 25, 1551.

divia, also described them as being "for the greater part white."[18] González de Nájera says that "some are more white than others" but that the women are "more chestnut *(castaño)* than dark." The people in general he pictures as of medium build, eyes large and dark, eyebrows well-defined, eyelashes long, hair black and very thick.[19]

Galdames describes the Araucanian type as follows:

> Medium height, with well-proportioned limbs, large head, round face with narrow forehead, small eyes usually black, short and flat nose, large mouth with thick lips, and white teeth; thin, short beard, pronounced cheek bones, medium-sized ears, and, completing the whole, a grave, sober manner, at times mistrustful but showing resolution and commanding respect. The complexion varies from mulatto to white but ordinarily it is copper-colored.[20]

Ercilla, the poet, perhaps with a poet's license, describes them thus:

> They are strong in action, beardless,
> Well-formed the bodies, and large,
> Broad-shouldered, thick-chested,
> Strong limbs, abounding energy,
> Agile, assured, courageous,
> Alert, valiant, audacious,
> Enduring in works and in sufferings
> Of mortal cold, hunger, and heat.[21]

The clothing of the Indians was simple, and varied as the climate. Those far enough south to feel the cold Patagonian wind used sealskins and wolfskins, while some of the coast tribes went almost nude. The latter, in order to protect themselves from the sun and from mosquitoes, daubed their bodies with clay mixed with grass and leaves. Among the tribes of the middle section, garments of cotton and woolen cloth were common and several dyes were known.[22] Sallusti describes the clothing of the Araucanians as follows:

> As they are the most bellicose of the natives and live constantly under arms, in order to have greater freedom and liberty of movement they use a garment short and straight, belted in at the waist, woven of cotton and wool, like that of the Greeks and Romans. . . . All the wearing apparel consists of a shirt, a blouse, a pair of trousers narrow and short, reaching to the knees, and a *poncho*, which is a cape . . . so long and wide that it covers the arms and reaches below the knees. This woven of cotton or wool of a deep bright blue, which is in general the most favored color.[23]

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[18]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 2.

[19]González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile*, 47.

[20]Galdames, *A History of Chile*, 6.

[21]Ercilla y Zúñiga, *La Araucana*, canto I.

[22]Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile*, 164–167.

[23]José (Guiseppe) Sallusti, *Historia de las misiones apostólicas de Monseñor Juan Muzi en el estado de Chile*, 499.

Despite the fact that the Indians were agriculturists, home-making was still in a most primitive stage. The houses themselves were simple, being built for the most part from four uprights tied at the top and strengthened by cross timbers, with a roof of straw, cattails, or rushes. The walls were built of reeds mixed with clay. *Ruca* was the native name for such a house. Where the afore-mentioned materials were not available, the home was built of whatever the country afforded. In the south, caves were utilized, a sort of porch being built over the entrance. On the northern desert where no protection from rain was needed, four stakes—sometimes of whalebone—supported a roof of skins.[24] Valdivia noted that many of the houses were large, well-built, with heavy timbers, and having two, four, or eight doors. They used them for storing their food and wool, as well as for living.[25] Furniture was completely lacking. The Indians ate and slept on the floor, the bed being a skin or a pile of straw with a slightly hollowed log for a pillow. They ate from clay or wooden bowls and drank from wooden or gourd vases.

The food was sufficiently varied, but most of it was eaten raw or only partially cooked, since they had no vessels that would bear the heat of the fire.[26] Valdivia reported that their houses were full of every kind of food—maize, potatoes, *quinua, madi,* pepper, beans—and that they had many very fine vessels of clay and wood.[27] To cook, or rather to heat, food in their vessels, they employed the method so commonly used by the North American Indians: heating stones in the fire and dropping them into the broth until it steamed. Fire was obtained by the primitive two-stick method.[28]

Their social organization was the rudimentary one of the tribe and the patriarchial family. The tribe had the character of a free association, the position of *cacique*—usually held by the father of the oldest family—carrying much honor but little authority. The father was supreme in his own family. He had the right to sell his wife or children. Marriage was polygamous, the number of wives being limited only by desire or by the ability to pay the father's price for his daughters. Since wives were bought, they were held as property and frequently ill-treated. All the menial tasks were theirs in the upkeep of the home and the support of the

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[24]Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile,* 161–162; Galdames, *A History of Chile,* 7.

[25]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 25, 1551.

[26]Galdames, *A History of Chile,* 7.

[27]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 25, 1551.

[28]Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile,* 176–210; Galdames, *A History of Chile,* 7.

family, and on military campaigns they served as carriers for the army.[29]

The religion of the natives was a form of nature worship full of superstitions and fears. They believed in a supreme God called Pillán, who produced thunder, lightning, tempest, and earthquake. There were many lesser gods who aided or pestered them, as the case might be. Their sacred tree was the cinnamon which they burned when they wished to propitiate an angry deity. They believed in demons, ghosts, and all sorts of weird monsters, such as the *pihuchenes,* winged serpents, and the *chonchones,* animals having human heads. Their lives were guided by signs and omens. Galdames says that

> sometimes the direction of the clouds, the flight of a bird, the sudden step of a beast—these things that seem so natural to us—were sufficient to make them suspend a campaign or a feast.[30]

Interpretation of the signs and omens called for a priesthood. Such a one existed, whose ministers acted as both soothsayers and medicine men. In the former capacity they read signs and omens and detected secret crimes; in the latter, they cured the sick by elaborate ceremonies or placed the blame of his death on some "sorcerer" in the tribe—usually some poor and helpless individual or a personal enemy—who was promptly burned alive. Some historians believe that many of their religious rites called for human sacrifices and have produced what they consider archaeological evidence in support of that theory. This is vehemently denied, however, by Garcilaso de la Vega, the Incan historian, and Medina doubts that the practice was ever very extensive.[31]

The Araucanians believed in a future life and held elaborate funeral ceremonies, except in the case of warriors killed on the battlefield. They were burned. It was believed that in the after life they kept on fighting their foes and when cloud banks appeared in the sky, the Indians saw in their movements the dust of battle; in order that their warriors might more quickly reach the battle scene, they turned their bodies into ashes and blew them up into the air. Thus they joined Pillán, their great leader, at the earliest possible moment.[32]

Historians may differ on many characteristics of the Araucanian, but on one thing they are agreed—his ability to fight. When the

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[29]Galdames, *A History of Chile,* 8–9.

[30]*Ibid.,* 11; Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile,* 233; González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra,* 48.

[31]Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile,* 217–230; Garcilaso de la Vega, *Commentarios reales que tratan del origen de los Yncas,* Book I, 34.

[32]Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile,* 238.

Spaniards appeared in Chile, the Indians had never before seen a horse. At first they were terrified. Believing as they did in all kinds of monstrosities, they thought the horse and rider one animal able to divide itself at will. Even against such unearthly creatures, however, their courage never faltered. From the first encounter they fought valiantly. The Spaniards could drive them away temporarily, but they always came back. Valdivia acknowledged their courage in one of his letters:

> I give my word that in the thirty years I have been serving Your Majesty, and fighting against many nations, I have never seen such stubborn men for fighting , as were those Indians against us; and in the length of three hours I could not get into the one squadron with one hundred mounted men; and when we did get in a few times, there were so many men armed with spears and clubs that the Christians could not make their horses stand up against the Indians; . . . and seeing that the horses could not get in among the Indians, I threw my footmen against them; and when I got into their squadron, and we began to strike . . . they were routed.[33]

Again, in the same letter, he mentions that "they defended themselves against us savagely, packed together in squadrons like the Germans."

Ercilla, the poet, says that from childhood each Indian boy was trained in the use of one particular weapon—the one he showed the greatest natural dexterity in handling. This specialized training gave them an army of experts. He also comments on their fighting in squadrons, one of pikemen, one of bowmen, the pikemen going "shoulder to shoulder" to deliver their pikes at the enemy.[34]

The Chilean Indians used defensive as well as offensive weapons in their battles—a fact that makes them unique among the natives of the Americas. They possessed shields, helmets, and corselets of skins, so treated that they would turn the edge of a sword and—according to one chronicler—would deflect the ball from a Spanish arquebus.[35] Valdivia says that their helmets, or war-bonnets, were decorated with many-colored plumes like the ceremonial hats of priests and that no battle-axe, however sharp, could cut through them.[36]

The offensive weapons of the natives were the pike or lance, the war-club, the bow and arrow, and the *boleadora.* The *boleadora* was not used in combat since it was used for capture rather than for killing, and the arrow was so inaccurate and ineffective that

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[33]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.
[34]Ercilla, *La Araucana,* canto I.
[35]Medina, *Los aborijenes de Chile,* 129–130.
[36]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

it was of little use in fighting. The lance and the war-club, however, had proved efficient weapons in the hands of determined Araucanians until the coming of the Spaniard with horse and gunpowder. Even then they gave a good account of themselves.

Only during the campaigns of war did the Chilean natives become a united nation. Any chief could call an inter-tribal assembly if he felt that common interests were threatened. An arrow stained with blood sent by a fleet messenger from tribe to tribe called the assembly, where a supreme war-chief—the *toqui*—was elected. While the campaign lasted his word was law in all the tribes. Once it ended, each tribe returned to its own way of life.[37]

The Indians were quick to adopt Spanish methods of fighting. Lautaro—the native boy who tended Valdivia's stables, known to the Spaniards as Alonso—convinced the Indians of the mortality of both horse and rider and demonstrated to them the usefulness of the horse. Once convinced, they ceased killing the captured animals and tended them instead. So well did they take care of the animals that by 1568 they had several squadrons of horsemen, and by 1585 the *toqui*, Cadeguala, organized a regular cavalry.[38] They attempted to discover the secret of gunpowder, but that they were unable to do. Thinking that because it was black, it was connected in some way with the black men who were with the Spaniards, they captured a negro one day, roasted his body to a cinder and then ground him into powder. They were quite disgusted when the powder refused to ignite.[39]

In the end the Spaniards overcame the Indians by virtue of better weapons and better organization, but it took them more than three hundred years to do it. It was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century that the land of the Araucanians was incorporated in the national domain of Chile.

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[37]Galdames, *A History of Chile*, 9–10.
[38]Molina, *History of Chile*, II, 71.
[39]*Ibid.*, II, 73.

CHAPTER IV

The Journey from Perú to Chile

Francisco Pizarro had a legal right to "open to Valdivia the door" in the settlement of Chile. After Almagro's return to Perú and his abandonment of the land to the south, a royal *cédula*—countersigned by Francisco de los Cobos, secretary of the Secret Council of the King—had been given at Monzón in 1537, authorizing Pizarro to conquer and settle the territory known as Nuevo Toledo, including the province of Chile, since it had been abandoned by its former governor, Diego de Almagro.[1] It is probable that Pizarro wanted the authority as a precautionary measure without any intention of actually developing that country in the near future. Boundaries of those early grants were of necessity vague and indefinite and Pizarro, at the time the *cédula* was issued, was in great danger of losing his richest prize, Cuzco, because of an undefined boundary. In fact, many people still believed (1539) that the city lay in Almagro's province and that the death of the latter had been grossly unjust. Francisco de Bobadilla, the priest, whom Pizarro sent to negotiate with Almagro, had assured Almagro that the city lay in his territory, though later he reversed that decision.[2] In the face of such uncertainties, it was expedient for Pizarro to have authority over Nuevo Toledo as well as over Nueva Castilla. In the two years between the date of the *cédula* and Valdivia's request, Pizarro had made no attempt to occupy Chile and none of his lieutenants had requested that doubtful honor.

> In those moments in which many seekers after conquests and governments in America, in which each one of the captains who had aided Pizarro in his contest against Almagro was asking as pay for his services that he be permitted to lead expeditions into any one of the neighboring regions, there was none who wished to return to Chile.[3]

The task that Valdivia asked for himself was a gigantic one. Besides the natural hazards of conquest—which were great enough in Andean snow and coastal desert—there were two additional

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[1]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[2]Letter from Manuel de Espinar to Emperor Charles V, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, V, 259.

[3]Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile*, I, 206.

obstacles: the evil reputation of Chile and Valdivia's lack of money. A third appeared later in the person of Pedro Sancho de Hoz.[4]

Chile's evil renown was a direct result of Almagro's visit and, as seen later, was mostly erroneous. It would be unfair, of course, to expect Almagro's men to weigh carefully the potentialities of Chile while the prospect of owning Cuzco glittered before them. Gold so easily obtainable in Cuzco must necessarily outweigh the shadowy reward of the future fields of Chile, as yet unplanted. Also, the hardships and losses of the journey over the mountains, the cold rains that drenched them daily during their stay in the Aconcagua Valley, the absence of cities, the hostility and apparent poverty of the natives—all tended to obscure any future possibilities the land might possess. It seems that Almagro hesitated to go back, fearing that his entire investment would be lost, but the urging of his captains—especially that of Orgóñez, who had great influence over him—that Cuzco undoubtedly was his, finally persuaded him. Once the decision was made, it would again be unfair to expect Almagro and his men not to attempt to justify it; hence, the unsavory reputation of the land to the south. The reports brought back were disheartening enough to stop any but the most resolute from attempting conquest there.[5] Barros Arana says that

> after the return of Almagro, this country was the most discredited of the Indies in the minds of the *conquistadores*. The region was believed to be the poorerst and most wretched in the New World—a cursed land, without gold, of a cold and disagreeable climate, inhabited by savages of the worst kind, and incapable not only of enriching those who conquered it, but incapable also of even paying the cost which the conquest occasioned.[6]

Valdivia complained to Charles V that the place had

> got so evil a name that it was shunned like the plague; moreover, many of those who were friendly to me and were considered men of judgment did not hold me for such a one [man of judgment] when they saw me wasting the substance I had on an undertaking so far from Perú, and where the Frontier-Governor [Almagro] had not held on.[7]

The second obstacle in Valdivia's path—lack of funds—grew directly out of the first and was equally as stubborn to combat. Pizarro thought the whole project was foredoomed to failure and was not willing to risk *un maravedi*. Furthermore, he was not willing that Valdivia should keep the *repartimiento* and the mine that he had given him in Charcas, while he went on what Pizarro

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[4]The name of this Spaniard appears in different forms but the one which he used in signing documents has been used herein.

[5]Amunátegui, *Descubrimiento i conquista de Chile*, 181.

[6]Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile*, I, 206.

[7]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

considered a foolhardy expedition. Too many dissatisfied followers needed reward to allow so much wealth to remain in the hands of an absent lieutenant. Accordingly, Pizarro reapportioned the Valley of Canela to the three men previously mentioned and disposed of the mine without, as Valdivia wrote to Charles V, his "having any profit from it, nor did the Marquis give such toward the expedition."[8] The merchants of Cuzco, too, were doubtful of the success of a Chilean expedition. They had offered, even urged, their capital upon Valdivia in those days immediately following the battle of Las Salinas when so many exploring parties were going out from Cuzco, but at that time Valdivia was not interested in further conquest. His attention was occupied by Inés de Suárez. When his mind did turn again upon exploration, he found that the merchants had invested in the expeditions to the Chunchos and Chiriguanos under other captains and when he spoke to them of Chile, they doubtfully shook their heads.[9]

Pedro de Valdivia was not one to give up easily. He had won his argument with Pizarro in getting permission to attempt the enterprise and he resolutely set about the harder task of finding men and money. From the first, his plans envisaged colonization. He was not content, as Almagro had been, to equip a conquering force; he must carry, also, the tools of construction. His supplies included seeds, livestock, fowls, hoes, plows, spades—all the innumerable things demanded to establish new homes in an unsettled country. Valdivia prepared slowly. His personal property was converted into supplies or money and there is a tradition that Inés de Suárez sold her jewels to aid the project. A few friends were willing to risk something. At the end of two months he had gathered some fifteen thousand pesos—a small sum when a horse cost fifteen hundred or two thousand *pesos de oro*.[10] When discouragement was looming large on his horizon, help appeared from an unexpected quarter.

One of the merchants who had been most insistent on helping Valdivia after the battle of Las Salinas was Lucas Martínez Vegaso. He had been with Pizarro at the capture of Atahualpa and had received as his share of the ransom two hundred and four *marcos de plata* and six thousand, three hundred and twenty-five *pesos de oro*. He had sent the money to his brother, Francisco Martínez, in Panamá to be invested in merchandise. The brothers

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[8]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[9]Thayer Ojeda, "Los 'tejos' de Lucas Martínez Vegaso," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 12.

[10]Pedro de Rivera to Hernando Pizarro, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 82.

had made a fortune out of the goods brought to Perú. They had been the first approached by Valdivia but had refused his request for aid—apparently only to get a better bargain. When his enterprise seemed on the verge of failure, Lucas Martínez sent his brother to Valdivia with an offer of five thousand *pesos* for a half-interest in the profits of the expedition. Valdivia at first refused. Knowing, however, that ruin stared him in the face unless he could carry through the project in which he had already invested so much, a contract of partnership was finally signed with Francisco Martínez, October 10, 1539. It differed somewhat from the original offer. Martínez invested nine thousand *pesos* in horses and money in return for one-half of the expected gains. It also provided "that all losses and risks which shall be in it [the venture] from here on are to be at the risk of both."[11] Valdivia used his contract as security for borrowing some seventy thousand *castellanos* and when Martínez attempted collection of the debt in 1543 by going personally to Santiago, he found that Valdivia not only could pay nothing on his debt but that he owed an additional fifty thousand *pesos*. Martínez secured a dissolution of the company and finally (1545) received payment for part of the original loan.[12]

His financial difficulties somewhat relieved, Valdivia increased his efforts to find men. He sent messengers to those groups returning from unsuccessful exploration of surrounding territory and, though few joined him in Cuzco, he received promises from several that they would join him along the way. In Cuzco, too, more people began to take an interest. There, as in all frontier areas, were to be found some of those hardy souls to whom the reward itself counts less than the winning of it—restless, unsatisfied, always thirsting for further adventures, and proud to follow a leader of Valdivia's spirit. There was, also, a remnant of *Almagristas* that for political reasons felt they would be safer outside Perú. A few of Valdivia's personal friends were willing to join him, even though doubtful of the final outcome; and the priest of Cuzco offered to secure a priest for the undertaking for the sake of Christianizing the Indians. From the ranks of these, then, Valdivia gathered his small *puñado* of men that finally accompanied him, but he acknowledged to his king that

> I had much hardship to persuade the men I brought to it [Chile] . . . to come along with me (as many thought I was going to my destruction) . . .

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[11]Certificación de haberse desecho la compañía, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 5.

[12]*Ibid.*, 53–62; Thayer Ojeda, "Los 'tejos' de Lucas Martínez Vegaso," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 12.

and so up until today [September, 1545] for holding it I have had to buy the men I have with gold.[13]

By December, 1539, Valdivia's plans for departure were almost complete. He had received his commission from Francisco Pizarro in April, 1539, and for eight months he had bent every effort toward one end—the perfection of his plan for colonization in Chile. He had worked slowly and patiently, giving attention to the minutest details, and just as success seemed about to crown his efforts, an unlooked for threat—the most serious one yet—appeared in the person of Pedro Sancho de Hoz, who presented himself before Pizarro claiming to carry a commission from the king to conquer and colonize lands to the south.

Pedro Sancho de Hoz was no newcomer to Perú. He had fought in the battle of Cajamarca and participated in the first occupation of Cuzco. In the division of the Atahualpa ransom he had acted as assistant notary and, being an official, he had received four thousand, four hundred and forty *pesos de oro* as his share. Later, he served as Pizarro's secretary and had the task of officially recording the events of the Spanish conquest in Perú up to July, 1534—an assignment which would mark him as an educated man. He used his share of the ransom to good advantage and amassed a considerable fortune. In 1535, he resigned his position as Pizarro's secretary and announced his intention of returning to Spain to marry.[14]

Royal permission was granted for him to visit Spain for a period of eighteen months. From Perú he carried the royal *quinto*, always so welcome to Charles V. Upon his arrival in Spain, he married Doña Guiomar de Aragón, who seems to have been a very gay lady, and together they soon succeeded in spending his rather large fortune.[15] The fact that he carried "the fifth" seems to have given Sancho de Hoz recognition at court, and he was not slow to take advantage of it. His length of stay in Spain was extended four times by royal *cédula*. Charles V also sent instructions to the *cabildo* of Lima that Pedro Sancho de Hoz was not to be deprived of his Indians during his absence. Nor was that all. It seems that Pedro Sancho de Hoz had borrowed the tithes from the City of Lima and had given two silver pitchers as security for his debt. He had invested the money in livestock. During an Indian uprising, most of his hogs and other stock were either driven off or killed, and, since he was unable to repay the loan, the *cabildo* kept the

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[13]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[14]Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile*, I, 213; Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico*, 803.

[15]Medina, *ibid.*, 803.

pitchers. A royal *cédula* commanded the return of the pitchers or their equivalent in money.[16]

Finding himself in royal favor and ambitious to share the honors of the Pizarros, Pedro Sancho de Hoz presented himself before Charles V and asked leave to explore by ship the coasts of the Mar del Sur—at his own expense, of course—and to report on his discoveries, and to receive the governorship of any undiscovered and unclaimed lands he might find. He offered to outfit two ships—more if they were needed—with arms, people, sailors, supplies, and all tools and necessary equipment. Charles V, being as graciously receptive of the gold, glory, and territory gained for him by his *conquistadores* as Elizabeth of England was, later, of that gained for her by her pirates, agreed to the proposal, and on January 24, 1539, issued a *Capitulación y asiento* whereby he instructed Pedro Sancho de Hoz in the following manner:

> . . . that you navigate along the coasts of the Mar del Sur, where the Marquis Don Francisco Pizarro, Don Diego de Almagro, Don Pedro de Mendoza, and Francisco de Camargo have their governments, to the Strait and to the land that is of the other part of it, and in going and coming you will explore all that coast of the Sur and ports of it and will send us report of the land . . . and of ports of the sea . . . all at your own expense . . . and that, discovered that land of the other part of the said Strait or any other land that up to now has not been discovered, . . . it shall be done to you as to other persons who have made similar discoveries.[17]

Fifteen days later, the king conceded to Pedro Sancho de Hoz title of captain-general over "the people who go on the expedition and those found in the discovered territory." He also gave him power to send out lieutenants for further exploration. On the same day he extended the title to *gobernador interino*—a title to be replaced by that of *gobernador* after the king had received his report—and a few days later issued a *cédula* commanding the *cabildo* of Lima not to take from Sancho de Hoz his *ecomienda* of Indians during his absence.[18]

Pedro Sancho de Hoz arrived in Cuzco in December, 1539, well-backed by royal *cédulas* and feeling doubly secure in the friendship that Pizarro had formerly shown him. He was the swaggering, grand-stand type and did not fail to set all Cuzco agog with his tales of gay court life, royal favors, etc. When he learned of Valdivia's proposed expedition to Chile, he at once let the town know

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[16]Reales cédulas, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 13–17.

[17]Capitulación y asiento á Pero Sancho de Hoz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 16.

[18]Real cédula, February 8, 1539, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 20; *real cédula*, February 21, 1539, in *ibid.*, 24.

that he carried a royal commission as governor of certain territories to the south and that he would take command of the expedition. Valdivia might go as his lieutenant. Rumors spread swiftly and Inés de Suárez heard of his boasts. Unable to contain herself, she hurried to him to explain the sacrifices Valdivia had made to get the project under way. After listening to her story, he asked: "And what difference does it make to Pedro de Valdivia that his title of lieutenant should come from Governor Pizarro or from Governor Pedro Sancho de Hoz?"[19]

The question of who was to head the expedition was, without doubt, one for Francisco Pizarro to settle, and to him the horns of the dilemma were indeed sharp. If he allowed Sancho de Hoz to take command of Valdivia's men and supplies, he not only repudiated his own lieutenant but also lost any opportunity to share in the profits of the project; if he refused to allow it and the matter came to the attention of Charles V (Sancho de Hoz would see that it did), he feared that his standing at court—which had been none too good since the execution of Almagro—would be greatly impaired. Carlos Pereyra says that, confronted with the situation, "he settled the difficulty with good sense and few scruples."[20]

Pizarro asked the two men to come to his house for lunch on December 28. When they were seated in the dining room, he asked Sancho de Hoz for his credentials. Together he and Valdivia read the commissions. Valdivia was quick to see that no authority was contained therein by which Sancho de Hoz could legally take control of his expedition. The directions were explicit: to explore the sea, the coasts, the ports but "without entering into the confines and territory of those portions of land that are given in government to other persons."[21] It was only beyond the Strait of Magellan that no restrictions were placed upon his acquisition of territory. Pizarro, however, was fearful. One more *faux pas* like the execution of Almagro and Charles V might not only remove him from his governorship but even send him to join his brother, Hernando, in prison. He took the role of mediator. He pointed out to Sancho de Hoz the military prestige of Valdivia and his ability to lead men. To Valdivia he stressed the fact that Sancho de Hoz could bring more supplies and contribute materially to the success of the enterprise. And he ended by suggesting that the two men form a partnership. Whether or not he brought pressure to bear

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[19]Carlos Silva Cruz, "Pero Sancho de Hoz, el pretendiente," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 32.

[20]Carlos Pereyra, *Historia de la América española*, 34.

[21]Capitulación á Pero Sancho de Hoz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 16.

on Valdivia, as implied by Silva Cruz,[22] or gave Sancho de Hoz too much wine, as suggested by Medina,[23] Pizarro's idea triumphed. Before the two men left, a contract of partnership was drawn up. It provided that:

> . . . I, Pero Sancho de Hoz, say: I will go to the city of Los Reyes and from there I will bring to you 50 horses and mares; and more I say: that I will bring two ships loaded with necessary things that are required for the said expedition; and more I say: that I will bring two hundred pairs of shields to be given to the people that you, the said Captain Pedro de Valdivia, will have. . . . I say that I will finish this within the four months immediately following. And I, the said Captain Pedro de Valdivia, say: that in order better to serve Your Majesty in the said expedition that I have commenced, that I accept the said company.[24]

Much controversy has been occasioned by the uncertainty of the position in which Valdivia began his march to Chile. Did he go as lieutenant governor of Pedro Sancho de Hoz or of Francisco Pizarro? Or did Sancho de Hoz recognize the limits of his own authority and go himself as Pizarro's lieutenant and subordinate Valdivia to a still lower position? It is impossible to be sure. Francisco Pizarro assuredly gave Sancho de Hoz some kind of a *provisión* but its full contents are unknown. The document itself was probably destroyed by Valdivia in the Atacama desert after Sancho de Hoz's attempt to kill him, and it is only by frequent references to it, found here and there in other documents, that it is known to have existed. In it did Pizarro recognize the full claims advanced by Sancho de Hoz? Whatever position it accorded him was evidently dependent on his fulfilling the obligations of his contract with Valdivia, since in his *dejación* of the following year Sancho de Hoz stated that the *provisión* is of "no value or effect" because he "had not been able to fulfill that which he was obligated to do"[25] toward the company. However, at the time of Valdivia's departure from Cuzco the *provisión* was in effect and his status at that time was that recognized in the document. Don Joaquín Santa Cruz is convinced that Sancho de Hoz was acknowledged head of the expedition and that Valvidia went as second in command.[26] Silva Cruz supports the same view, saying that Valdivia

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[22]Silva Cruz, "Pero Sancho de Hoz, el pretendiente," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 32.

[23]Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico*, 913.

[24]Dejación que hizo Pedro Sancho de Hoz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 33.

[25]Dejación que hizo Pero Sancho de Hoz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 32.

[26]Don Joaquín Santa Cruz, "Problemas Históricos" in *Anales de la universidad*, January, 1902, 5–24.

in consideration of the success of his plan, had sacrificed the chief command of the expedition, in exchange for greater advantages with which to begin it.[27]

Gregorio de Castañeda, one of the witnesses at Valdivia's trial in Lima in 1548, said that "Pero Sancho was going as general, as the person who was contributing most wealth, and Pedro de Valdivia as lieutenant."[28] However, his is the only testimony to make this assertion, among the many witnesses interviewed; therefore, there is some question as to its weight.

On the other hand, Pedro Sancho de Hoz, himself, based his often-repeated claim to the government of Chile upon his *reales cédulas* except in one instance. When the *alcaldes* of Santiago, in 1547, asked him to present the credentials upon which he based his claim, he sent Juan Romero with the royal *cédulas*, saying they were all that had been left him

which they left me as something from which they thought I could not profit, and all the others they took from me in the first prison, being those from the Marquis Pizarro, *of whom I am lieutenant* [italicized by author].

Later in the same letter—which accompanied the royal *cédulas*—he referred to his powers as emanating from the king.[29] Crescente Errázuriz thinks that when the *cabildo* called Sancho de Hoz's hand, knowing as he did that his royal commissions gave him not even a shadowy claim to Chile, that he fell back on the provision by Pizarro, which he knew could never be produced. Even then—so continuously had he chanted the refrain of "authority from the king" that he forgot the basis he was using for his plea and reverted to his old claim.[30] It seems that if his claim had been a valid one, there would have been some members of the company who would have been acquainted with the contents of the provision and would have supported him on that basis. On the contrary, those who did support him always referred to the royal *cédulas*, of whose content they had heard but usually had not seen. There seems little reason for keeping Pizarro's provision secret if it unequivocally placed Sancho de Hoz in command, and in view of his former boastfulness it is difficult to believe that he would have refrained from showing it in those eight days that he remained in Cuzco.

Valdivia, so far as can be determined, spoke of the matter only once. In a letter to Hernando Pizarro, whom he thought a powerful person at court (in reality he was serving a twenty-year prison

[27]Silva Cruz, "Pero Sancho de Hoz, el pretendiente," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 32.

[28]*Declaración de Castañeda*, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 288.

[29]Proceso de Pero Sancho de Hoz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 155.

[30]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 91–92.

sentence for the death of Almagro), he mentions that he formed two partnerships in Perú—one with Francisco Martínez and one with Pedro Sancho de Hoz. He does not differentiate between them but writes as if both were commercial partnerships, made for profits. He mentions the *dejación* of Sancho de Hoz and the dissolution of the company with Martínez as if both were voluntary terminations of unsatisfactory business arrangements—Martínez's because he found no profit; Sancho de Hoz's because he was unable to fulfill his part of the contract.[31]

Whatever the positions of the two men, eight days after the contract was signed in Pizarro's house, the partners separated: Pedro Sancho de Hoz left for Los Reyes (Lima) to procure the supplies promised by him, while Valdivia made last minute preparations for the long journey that was to last an entire year.

The force of Spaniards that accompanied Valdivia to Chile is usually placed at one hundred fifty men, but that number includes all those who joined the expedition along the way. The nucleus of the expedition—those who left with him from Cuzco that January morning—was in truth a mere handful. Bernal Martínez, one of the number, said, years later, that Pedro de Valdivia left the city of Cuzco with only seven men.[32] Others have variously estimated the number from nine to twenty.[33] Many of these were young men, still in their twenties. Luis de Cartegena, Valdivia's secretary and scribe of the expedition, was only twenty-eight; Juan Gómez de Almagro, *alguacil mayor*, was twenty.[34] Luis de Toledo, a young nobleman from Seville, was twenty-three; Lope de Ayala, twenty; Hernando Vallejo, who died fourteen years later with Valdivia at Tucapel, also twenty; Bernal Martínez, twenty-three; and Pedro de Miranda, twenty-two. Only Alvar Gómez de Almagro, father of Juan and *maestre de campo* of the force, had reached full maturity. He was a brother of Diego Almagro but had taken no part in the civil war in which the latter perished. Francisco Pizarro did not trust him, however, and had appointed him *maestre de campo* with the intent of getting him out of the country. No priest

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[31]Pedro de Valdivia to Hernando Pizarro, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 82.

[32]*Información de Servicios de Juan Gómez*, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIV, 24.

[33]Adolfo Labatut, "Con menos aparato del que había menester," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 44; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 32.

[34]He was married to the daughter of Atahualpa, the Incan princess, Collca, who had been baptized by the Christian name of Cecilia. She, also, was going with the expedition, though she was expecting a child.—Crescente Errázuriz, "El idilio de una princesa Incasica," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 23.

accompanied the small force, though one had promised to join them at Arequipa.[35]

With these few gallant men went another—one who on more than one occasion turned out to be the savior of the group; who looked after the food, supervised the *yanaconas,* nursed the wounded, cheered the sick, and, in the end, saved the life of the leader—the only Spanish woman amid seven or nine or twelve or twenty Spanish men—Inés de Suárez. She had helped in the preparations for the undertaking from the very beginning. She had invested her money in it. She had attempted a settlement with Pedro Sancho de Hoz. When Pizarro asked Valdivia what he intended to do with Inés de Suárez when he left for Chile, Valdivia answered:

"I will carry her with me, if Your Honor will give her leave."

"And how will you manage that, if your wife is living?" was Pizarro's next question.

"Inés Suárez is my *criada,* Señor Marquis, as is my *maestre,* Alvar Gómez,"[36] was Valdivia's enigmatical rejoinder. And it was as *criada* that the gallant woman, who rendered such invaluable aid to the *conquistador* of Chile, received her license of departure and started on the long trek to the south.

The small group left Cuzco at dawn one January morning. Pizarro and other officials came out to see them off, while groups of the curious lined the *camino real de Atuncancha* down which the cavalcade must move. At the head of the column rode Alvar Gómez, the *maestre de campo,* his son Juan, and Luis de Toledo. Behind them came the *yanaconas,* the Indian carriers (a thousand, more or less)—the beasts of burden for the expedition. On their heads and shoulders rested bags of seeds, coops of chickens, a pig, a goat, hoes, spades, guns, ammunition, tools, and horseshoes. (Some of the heavier articles of iron were carried by the thirty pack horses.) They were kept in a well-ordered column by cries, curses, and blows from Bernal Martínez, Vallejo, and Lope de Ayala. Inés de Suárez, astride her white horse, closed the column of carriers, leading a pack-horse loaded with the indispensables of the expedition. In the second column came the horses and mules, their halters held by Indian men. They, too, were guarded by Spanish soldiers, while in the rear rode the standard bearer, Miranda;

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[35]Labatut, "Con menos aparato del que había menester," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 32; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* I, 33.

[36]Medina, "De como y por qué vino a Chile la primera mujer española," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 1.

behind him came the scribe, Luis de Cartagena; and, last of all, rode Pedro de Valdivia, an image of the Virgin tied to his saddle.[37]

Labatut gives the following description of the departure of Valdivia's forces:

> The slow movement of the column, almost motionless for the unhappy *yanaconas* of Perú; the absence of shining armor, proudly waving plumes, gaily colored banners and noisy trumpets; this coupled with a servile people, jaded, dust-covered, and sweaty, left the impression of a drove of slaves, guarded by some few horsemen of a low commandery, instead of an expedition that was marching to conquer one more kingdom for the Emperor of half the world—Charles V.[38]

Few details of the journey from Cuzco to Chile are available. The route selected was the one by which Almagro had returned. Loyal natives acted as guides and the few Spaniards who accompanied Almagro assisted Valdivia in checking the route. The unwieldy column, snail-pacing its way through the mountains, moved only about four leagues a day. The first night out, camp was made at Uropeza, where another Spaniard, Juan de Almonacid, joined the party. Intense cold and violent windstorms greeted the travelers as they moved toward the west shore of Lake Titicaca. Though the coastal route would avoid the highest mountain passes where Almagro's losses had been so heavy on his downward journey, yet Valdivia's force must reach high altitude before arriving at Arequipa (a distance of one hundred and forty leagues), a newly-formed town where supplies could be replenished.[39]

Misfortunes started early. Only a few days after leaving Cuzco, Alvar Gómez de Almagro, Valdivia's *maestre de campo,* fell from his horse one afternoon as he was riding at the head of the column. Men rushed to his aid and Inés de Suárez left her place and her pack horse to attend him. Their efforts to revive him were of no avail, and a few hours later, he died. It was a serious blow. The loss of any one man in a force as small as Valdivia's was a serious one, but in Alvar Gómez's death Valdivia lost not only a soldier but also the counsel of a mature and prudent man—one whose advice and authority were respected among the youths of the company.[40]

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[37]Labatut, "Con menos aparato del que había menester," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 32.

[38]*Ibid.*

[39]Luis Silva Lezaeta, "Salvadle, por Dios, señora," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 74.

[40]Información de Gaspar de Vergara, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XIV, 81; Silva Lezaeta, "Salvadle, por Dios, Señora," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 74.

The man appointed to fill the post left vacant by Alvar Gómez's death was Pero Gómez de Don Benito, only a common soldier, but one whom Valdivia knew to be loyal. He could also be useful in helping to plot the course, for he had made the trip with Almagro.[41]

Valdivia's loss was partly compensated for by those who joined his force along the way. On the very day that Alvar Gómez was buried, Francisco de Galdames became a member of the company. Juan Gallego and Antón Hidalgo joined it only a few days later.[42]

Another blow awaited the group as it neared Arequipa. Francisco Martínez, the merchant, who had accompanied the party with an eye to his business interests, was wounded in an encounter with the Indians. It was impossible for him to continue the journey. Valdivia appointed two men—Bautista Ventura, his brother, and Juan Almonacid—to carry him to Arequipa. Bautista was either to remain with him or put him on board ship and take him back to Perú—in the latter case he was to try to obtain reinforcements for Valdivia. Juan Almonacid, after seeing the wounded man safely into Arequipa, was to scour the surrounding country for men and return to the main force farther along the way.[43]

The company also made some gains in the vicinity of Arequipa. Juan Lobo, the priest who had promised to join the group, did so at Tacna where Valdivia had halted the slow-moving army to observe Holy Week. He had already built an altar and an ancient soldier was acting as *sacristán* when Juan Lobo rode into camp. He was accompanied by Alonso de Monroy, Juan de Cabrera, and Diego de Cáceres—the last-named bringing with him his Indian wife and baby.[44] Diego de Guzmán, a relative of Sancho de Hoz's wife, Francisco de Escobar, and Juan Romero, a boy only seventeen years old, rode into the encampment one night, weak from hunger and with their clothes hanging in shreds. Valdivia provided for them and took them into his force.[45] It was also there

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[41]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 37.

[42]Declaración de Francisco de Galdames, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIV, 29; Declaración de Juan Gallego, *ibid.*, 27; Declaración de Antón Hidalgo, *ibid.*, 37.

[43]Información de Bautista Ventura, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVII, 11; Don Carlos Vildósola, "Quién no anda ni mira derecho," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 92; Testimony of Juan de Almonacid, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 322.

[44]Don Domingo Amunátegui Solar, "Semana de pasión y misa de gloria," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 102.

[45]Labatut, "Con menos aparato del que había menester," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 32; Señora Amalia Errázuriz de Subercaseaux, "Gavilla de Pícaros," in *ibid.*, I, 82; Don Carlos Silva Vildósola, "Quién no anda ni mira derecho," *ibid.*, I, 92.

that the son of Juan Gómez and the princess Collca (Cecilia) was born.[46]

The days were becoming anxious ones for Valdivia. The groups from the Chunchos and Chiriguanos who had promised to join him had not yet done so. His force, which now numbered about twenty, was much too small to start the perilous journey across the desert. He watched in vain for reinforcements before he reached Tarapacá. They did not come. Arrived at that town, he resolved to wait there while Pero Gómez de Don Benito went back to Perú for help.[47] Also he hoped that some of those who had promised to meet him would redeem that promise. He was not disappointed. Small groups began to trickle in during April and May, until his force reached thirty-six. Finally, the group that he had been eagerly watching for—the soldiers from the Chunchos—arrived. They were seventy in number, tired, hungry, and with no supplies, but they were Spaniards and most were mounted. Their leader was the valiant Francisco de Villagra[48] who from that day rendered faithful service to Valdivia, whose loyalty to him never wavered, and whose wisdom saved him from many dangers. There were others among them who became notable in the early years of Chile: The Alderete brothers, Jerónimo and Juan Fernández, who had long been warm friends of Valdivia; Juan Jufré and Pedro de Villagra; Juan Bohón and Bartolomé Flores, both of German origin, who proved so valuable in the construction of Santiago; two priests, Diego Pérez and Rodrigo González Marmolejo, who became the first bishop of Chile; and many others.[49] It was this company that made possible the continuation of the journey to Chile. Without them, Valdivia must have turned back to share with Almagro the odium of failure.

Pero Gómez, Valdivia's *maestre de campo,* returned from his fruitless trip to Perú. He had found no men willing to come to Chile. With his arrival, Valdivia was ready to begin the march across the valley of Atacama. Before he started, however, he sent Juan Jufré to Potosí on a search for more men and Gaspar de Vergara to Porco on a like mission. Both were to rejoin him at Copiapó.[50]

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[46]Errázuriz, "El idilio de una princesa Incasica," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 23.

[47]Testimony of Pedro Gómez de Don Benito, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XXII, 230.

[48]The name of this *conquistador* is frequently given as Villagrán but the spelling in Medina's *Diccionario Biográfico* has been followed herein.

[49]Proceso de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* 553; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* I, 51.

[50]Probanza de méritos de Juan Jufré, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XV, 23; Declaración de Gaspar de Vergara, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XIV, 81.

Sánchez says that Valdivia's journey across the desert "is an epic not yet well-written. The historians have gathered a thousand details with respect to it but have not yet captured its spirit."[51] That there were almost insuperable hardships no one can doubt. The Indians had been warned by Manco Capac of the Spaniards' coming and had been advised by him to hide their food, gold, wool, and all other things that would aid the foreigners in their advance. The Inca, knowing the cupidity of the Spaniards, felt that if they found a country bare of gold and bare of food as well, they would return as Almagro had done. What he had not yet fathomed was that coupled with the Spaniards' love of gold, there was also a deep loyalty to their king that would lead them through many hardships to increase his empire, and that there was a sincere onviction among many that they were bringing the one true religion to a lost people. In Valdivia's small force both views were strong, and though they found the land so bare that Valdivia wrote his king that "the sheep were all eaten . . . and the gold and everything else they burned, not even sparing their own clothes, but left themselves bare,"[52] still the Spaniards marched on. They searched the abandoned *rucas* for a handful of beans, corn, a potato or a squash. They found little. But they did succeed in capturing a few of the natives who, put to torture, told them of the Inca's warning. The news only served to harden their resolution.[53]

During the long march, Valdivia formed a habit of sending out each day little groups of two, four, or more horsemen to scour the surrounding country, to break up any band of natives that might be forming, to search for food, and, above all, to keep a lookout for other Spaniards. He kept hoping for more aid. Sometimes he, himself, rode with these parties, leaving the main column under command of Pero Gómez and under the ever-watchful eye of Inés de Suárez.[54] No alarm was occasioned, therefore, when one morning, as they neared Atacama la Chica (Chiu-chiu), Valdivia rode on ahead with eight or ten men.[55] His main object, as always, was to find food, but there was a second one hardly less important. Rumors had come to Valdivia that Captains Francisco de Aguirre and Rodrigo de Quiroga were in the desert at the head of the remaining expeditionaries from the Chunchos and had been await-

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[51]Sánchez, *La conquista de Chile*, 9.

[52]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[53]*Ibid.*

[54]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 59.

[55]Declaración de Inés de Suárez, in Medina, *documentos inéditos*, XXII, 623.

ing him some two months.[56] He moved forward eagerly, fired with the hope of reinforcements. Nor was he disappointed. He found them at Atacama la Grande (San Pedro de Atacama), twenty-five of them—fifteen horsemen and ten arquebusiers. They had come through the desert without the loss of a single Spaniard or a horse, living off of the Indians and exploring the country as they came.[57] Besides feeding themselves, they had collected a considerable amount of maize from the natives and would not constitute an added drain on Valdivia's slender resources. Also they had captured natives and sent them to their chiefs with that oft-repeated theme that marked the advance of the Spaniards in every part of the New World: come to us in peace for it is impossible to resist the *conquistadores*. And there, as in other places, the Indians ignored the warning.[58]

Reinforcements of twenty-five men represented a real gain to Valdivia. His force would now reach above a hundred and thirty men when the main column joined him. While he tarried there waiting for his main force, two messengers arrived on tired, dusty horses, bringing him a message from Inés de Suárez: there was a new arrival in camp—the man from whom Valdivia had daily expected a message during the first four months of his journey, for whom he had kept a constant watch, with whom he had once signed a contract of partnership—Pedro Sancho de Hoz. But the manner of his coming was not one to inspire confidence and Valdivia, taking Aguirre and ten horsemen with him, rode all night in a hurried return to the main camp.[59]

Pedro Sancho de Hoz had left Cuzco soon after the conclusion of the contract of partnership with Valdivia, accompanied by a young relative of his wife—Juan de Guzmán. He was a brother of Diego de Guzmán, who went on to join Valdivia's company by land. The *repartimiento* of Sancho de Hoz lay near Los Reyes, and it was there that he hoped to raise enough money to purchase and equip the ships promised to Valdivia. Upon his arrival there, according to a story by Walker Martínez, he called the administrators of his estate together to learn his financial status. The disagreeable news had to be broken to him that he was not only without ready money but actually in debt. Some items of loss were read to him: "Three negroes killed in the Indian uprising of

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[56]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 60.

[57]Declaración de Rodrigo de Quiroga, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, X, 75; Declaración de Francisco de Aguirre, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 214.

[58]Declaración de Rodrigo de Quiroga, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, X, 76.

[59]Testimony of Francisco Aguirre, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 214.

Callao, 800 *pesos,* 7 *tomines;* . . . court costs with the *diezmadores* (of Lima), 453 *pesos,*" etc. Also he was threatened with a new lawsuit: Juan Nizardo, one of his administrators, faced with a warrant from Valladolid for five thousand *ducados,* had been compelled to borrow the money to pay it. Recently he had not been able to pay the interest, which was exorbitant, and the creditor, Domingo de la Presa, was bringing suit before the *alcalde,* Juan Tello. Sancho de Hoz hastened to see Juan Tello. The *alcalde* was very affable, thinking Sancho de Hoz an extremely wealthy and influential man because of the royal *cédulas.* When he discovered the truth, he had no scruples about calling an *alguacil menor,* a huge mulatto called Jerónimo, and sending the disconsolate Sancho de Hoz to jail.[60]

When finally he was able to gain his freedom, more than two months had passed since the signing of the contract—over half of the time allotted him to complete his part of the contract; furthermore, he had no money to buy or equip the promised ships. He could not borrow in Los Reyes for the people were convinced that he could not give *de comer* "to a chicken."[61] He certainly could not remain in that city without paying his debts. He had visions of the prison cell reclaiming him! What could he do?

During the days immediately following his release, Sancho de Hoz had gathered about him a small group of friends who, like himself, were seeking to better their condition. Antonio de Pastrana and Alonso de Chinchilla were veterans of conquest. Together they had followed their fortunes through Mexico, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Quito without finding the wealth they sought. They were ready for further seeking. Gonzalo de los Ríos and Antonio de Ulloa had come from Cuzco. Juan Ortiz Pacheco was Sancho de Hoz's *criado* and Juan de Guzmán was the relative before mentioned. One evening the group was gathered in a room and Sancho de Hoz asked their advice on his future plans. After some preliminary probing to find out the minds of the men he was addressing, Alonso de Chinchilla came out boldly with a plan to overtake Valdivia and his few men (Diego de Guzmán was already in Valdivia's camp and had sent back word of the small force that he had been able to gather so far) before they could reach Tarapacá, relieve Valdivia of the command of the expedition, and put Sancho

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[60]Don Joaquín Walker Martínez, "Al módico interés de un real por cada un peso," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 54.

[61]Señora Amalia Errázuriz Subercaseaux, "Gavilla de Pícaros," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 82.

de Hoz in his place. The others acquiesced in the plan.[62] Pedro Sancho de Hoz had taken the first step toward his own execution.

They were soon on the road and Sancho de Hoz early made it clear that he was not averse to using violence in getting rid of Valdivia. Gonzalo de los Ríos says that when he learned that Sancho de Hoz contemplated violence, he and the twenty horsemen whom he had brought from Los Reyes at his own expense withdrew from the rest of the group,[63] but Crescente Errázuriz suggests that one should not

> give entire credit to the word of Gonzalo de los Ríos, since that one seems not to have separated himself and his companions from Sancho, but to have remained with Chinchilla gathering people (along the way) since he arrived afterwards with him.[64]

It seems more likely that they followed the plan suggested by Señora Amalia Errázuriz:

> Sancho, Ulloa, López de Avalos, Juan de Guzmán and Ortiz Pacheco would go . . . into the limits of the city of Arequipa to determine there the definite plan; Pastrana, Gonzalo de los Ríos and Alonso de Chinchilla, going in roundabout way in search of soldiers, would join the others at the same place and there . . . they would deliberate and agree.[65]

In Arequipa Sancho de Hoz bought daggers for himself and some of his friends.[66] One day as they rode he seemed sad and thoughtful.

"Why are you so sad?" asked Alonso de Chinchilla.

"I am sad because I am thinking of how I must kill Don Pedro de Valdivia, because, if I do not kill him, I cannot become governor," was the answer.

Antonio de Ulloa, Juan de Guzmán, and Chinchilla pressed him for details. Soon they had concocted a plan: Sancho de Hoz, Antonio de Ulloa, and Juan de Guzmán were to hurry ahead, overtake Valdivia as soon as possible. As soon as they reached his camp, Sancho de Hoz would throw his arms around Valdivia's neck "as if in friendship" and while he held him helpless the other two

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[62] *Ibid.*

[63] Declaración de Gonzalo de los Ríos, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 566.

[64] Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 65, note.

[65] Señora Amalia Errázuriz de Subercaseaux, *"Gavilla de Pícaros,"* in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 82.

[66] Declaración de Gonzalo de los Ríos, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 566.

would stab him in the back. Chinchilla would stay with the rest of the group, gather as many men as possible, and join them later.[67]

The conspirators did not reach Valdivia as early as they expected. Though his way had been slow and he had purposely lingered hoping for added numbers, Arequipa long had been left behind; Tarapacá had been passed; Villagra and his seventy men had already joined the company; and part of the desert country lay behind them before Pedro Sancho de Hoz made his appearance in camp.[68]

He came in the night—as was to be expected of one coming with his purpose. The sprawling encampment lay near Atacama la Chica—a small oasis fed by the Loa River, resting after a slow, hard day. Valdivia was not there, but the would-be murderers had no way of knowing that the quarry was beyond their reach. Few of his own soldiers even were aware of his absence. Reconnoitering parties were too often late in their return to be given much attention. Only his *maestre de campo* and those who guarded his tent knew that Inés de Suárez slept alone that night.[69]

Sometime during the night she was awakened by a hand passed roughly over the bedclothes, and an unknown voice saying, "¡Aquí!"

"Who is it? What are you looking for? Who are you?" were her successive questions.

A stunned silence followed her demand for a moment; then, the same voice, wavering slightly, said:

"Where is the captain?"

Instantly, Inés de Suárez was on the alert. Springing from her bed with a cry, she demanded in a loud voice:

"What do you want? Who are you? Tell me who you are!"

Her scream and the ensuing questions in a high voice awakened those sleeping near Valdivia's tent. Men came running. Guards, half-dressed, but with sword in hand, appeared. It was clear to Sancho de Hoz that his plan was frustrated for the time being, and he answered her:

"Señora, I am Pero Sancho de Hoz."

"Why, Señor, should such a man as you enter a strange house? It seems bad to me!"

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[67]Inés de Suárez, in Proceso de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 625.

[68]Declaración de Juan Godínez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 483.

[69]The facts related concerning Sancho de Hoz's arrival in camp can be found in numerous declarations of witnesses in the Proceso de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI and XXII; and in many of the individual declarations in Volumes XIII and X of the same collection. Unless otherwise indicated, this narrative follows the testimony of Inés de Suárez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 623.

"As I am one serving the captain, it should not seem strange to you," was his surprising answer.[70]

Inés de Suárez was not deceived by his smooth words—especially when she noted that he was accompanied by Antonio de Ulloa and the Guzmán brothers,[71] with daggers thrust into their *calzas*. Their intent was clear, but she pretended to be relieved by his answer and served them supper. Afterward, she had a soldier conduct them to a sleeping place.

Juan Fernández Alderete, whose tent was pitched close to Valdivia's, had heard the conversation and came over "to see who was sick." Pero Gómez de Don Benito was there, and Inés de Suárez and the two men talked late into the night, trying to decide what course to follow.[72]

It was a critical situation. The significance of Sancho de Hoz's actions of the past few hours was not lost upon the three. It was clear that he had come to take by unlawful means the leadership that he could not legally claim. His contract with Valdivia had allowed him four months to gather his supplies and equipment and rejoin Valdivia. The time had long since expired and, seeing his chance at partnership in the expedition gone, Sancho de Hoz had resolved to remove Valdivia and take full leadership plus the lion's share of whatever wealth the expedition might find. The first attempt at removal had been by assassination. What would the next one be? (For none of the three friends doubted that there would be another.) Would it be civil war, such as Perú had known? They had no way of knowing how many supporters Sancho de Hoz had in camp. Diego de Guzmán had already joined him. Were there others? Were the two men who had come into camp with Diego de Guzmán implicated? There was no way to tell. If they who watched over the expedition in Valdivia's absence should ignore the incidents of the night and leave Sancho de Hoz and his friends at liberty, the conspirators might—by pointing out the favored position of Sancho de Hoz at court and by dangling promises of lucrative reward before the troops—be able to foment a successful rebellion before Valdivia's return. On the other hand, if they quietly took the conspirators out and hanged them—as they justly deserved—such an action might in the future prove embarrassing to both them and their chief because of the unquestioned favor in

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[70]Don Emilio Vaisse (Omer Emeth), "Cuando vuestras mercedes le echen los brazos," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 145.

[71]Several of the witnesses also add Diego López de Avalos to the group, but Inés de Suárez omits his name.

[72]Declaración de Juan Fernández Alderete, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 600.

which Sancho de Hoz was held by Emperor Charles V. Unable to come to any conclusion satisfactory to all three, they decided to put the matter into the hands of Valdivia. They called two soldiers on whose loyalty they could rely—one was Juan Jiménez; the other remains unknown to history—and urged them to ride with all possible speed to carry the news to Valdivia.[73]

The following morning, excitement pervaded the camp. News of the events of the night before had gone swiftly from soldier to soldier, and many gathered around Valdivia's tent for details. Sancho de Hoz and his friends mixed with the crowd, apparently at ease and trying to ascertain if possible the attitudes of the men. Pero Gómez, evidently with the intent of keeping the men in action and of moving as far as possible along the road toward Valdivia, put the camp on the march early.[74] Nothing was heard from the conspirators during the morning hours because they were expecting the momentary return of Valdivia. But when they learned from the soldiers that Valdivia was at Atacama la Grande, some thirty leagues away, they began to perceive that no immediate return threatened them and promptly began to sow the seeds of dissension among the troops. They spoke disparagingly of Valdivia's position as lieutenant and suggested that, since Sancho de Hoz had authority from the king, he should be the leader of the expedition. Juan de Guzmán approached Juan Godínez and frankly asked his support for Sancho de Hoz in exchange for the post of *alguacil mayor*. Godínez not only refused the offer but threatened to report the whole matter to Valdivia if another word was said.[75]

His threat was not enough to quiet the agitators. When camp was pitched that night, Sancho de Hoz, prodded by his co-plotters, approached Pero Gómez de Don Benito and said, in what he tried to make a firm voice:

"*Señor maestre,* this camp site is poorly chosen. See that such a thing doesn't happen again!"

"And who are you to say this to me," demanded the amazed *maestro de campo.*

"I am . . . " began Sancho de Hoz, importantly, but before he could go further, Pero Gómez interrupted him in no uncertain tone:

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[73]Declaración de Francisco Galdames, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XXI, 535.

[74]Declaración de Pero Gómez de Don Benito, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XXII, 226.

[75]Declaración de Juan Godínez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XXII, 483; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* I, 76; Rodolfo Lenz, "¡No me lo digais otra vez . . . !" in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 153.

"Shut up! I am in command here by the order of Captain Pedro de Valdivia. I recognize no authority but his," and giving Sancho de Hoz a shove, he added, "and if you speak to me again in this manner, I will hang you to the nearest tree."[76] The would-be leader and his fellowers slunk away. Order was restored at once. The stolid Indians went on about their task of setting up the tents and an hour later the tired camp lay tranquil under the desert sky.

Valdivia, Aguirre, and Valdivia's escort of ten horsemen rode all night that night and reached the camp next day before noon.[77] Pero Gómez sent Jerónimo de Alderete and Juan Gómez de Almagro out to meet Valdivia to apprise him of all that happened since the first messengers left the camp. The *maestro de campo,* himself, kept a close eye on Sancho de Hoz, riding not far behind him all the morning. When Valdivia came into view, Sancho de Hoz rode toward him, pale and fearful. Valdivia also was pale but instead of fear, determination shone in his eyes. Pero Gómez rode up just as the two met, drawing his sword in military salute. Valdivia returned the salute, also drawing his sword. Sancho de Hoz, faced by two men with drawn swords, could only murmur:

"Señor Pero de Valdivia . . . "

The *conquistador* eyed the unhappy man a minute, smiled disdainfully, returned his sword to its place, and said:

"You repay badly, friend Sancho, the affection that the Marquis Pizarro and I hold for you."

And the confident leader passed on, leaving the man who had attempted his murder standing alone to face the derisive looks of those reckless adventurers who could forgive anything but cowardice.[78]

The snake-like column moved on to Atacama la Grande where Rodrigo de Quiroga and his men waited. Once there, Valdivia held a trial for the men who had attempted to kill him. Errázuriz says of it:

It would not require the work of the Romans to prove the guilt of Pero Sancho de Hoz and his companions. And the first idea of Valdivia seems to have been to make a warning, not with Sancho de Hoz—whom from the first he had been content to keep prisoner in the custody of five loyal soldiers—but

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[76]Rodolfo Lenz, "¡No me lo digais otra vez . . . !" in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 153.

[77]Declaración de Francisco de Aguirre, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XXI, 214.

[78]Don Federico Puga Borne, "¡Os acordareis de mí, señor capitán:" in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 162.

with the others: he planned to hang them and even "had the gallows made for that purpose." But in the end, acceding to the supplications of the priests and of others of his companions, he pardoned them.[79]

The pardon, however, was not an unconditional one. The men must return to Perú without arms and without horses.[80] Juan Gómez de Almagro was to put them on the road next morning at daybreak and to see that they did not turn back. Three of the men—the Guzmán brothers and Juan de Avalos—accepted the sentence eagerly and did finally make their way bak to Perú, where at least one of them—Juan de Guzmán—became implicated in the assassination of Francisco Pizarro, and was executed.[81]

To Pedro Sanchez de Hoz no prospect could be more horrible than that of returning to Perú, where his creditors, backed by the terrible *alcalde* of Los Reyes, Juan Tello, were only awaiting a chance to clap him back into prison. Soon after dark on the night before the pardoned ones were to start the return march to Perú, he sent Juan Romero, the youth who had joined Valdivia's camp in company with Diego de Guzmán, to beg of Valdivia an interview for Sancho de Hoz. Against the advice of Inés de Suárez, the leader granted it. Upon arrival in Valdivia's tent, Sancho de Hoz grovelled at the feet of the *conquistador* and refused to rise unless the chief would pardon him, promising to continue the journey as an ordinary soldier if only he were allowed to continue it at all. Valdivia, being a generous man, was touched, and in spite of the protests of his closest friends, allowed his one-time partner to remain in his force, though he was to be guarded.[82]

Antonio de Ulloa also obtained permission to remain by turning state's witness, so to speak, and acquainting Valdivia with the whole plot of assassination.[83] He was a nobleman and seems to have completely won Valdivia's confidence—so much so that he was allowed to go without guards and, some time later, was sent as Valdivia's emissary to Perú and Spain. The trust, however, was misplaced and he came near ruining Valdivia.[84]

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[79]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 77.

[80]Declaración de Juan Alvárez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 240; Declaración de Francisco de Galdames, *ibid.*, XXI, 536.

[81]Declaración de Diego García de Villalón, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 268.

[82]Don Clemente Díaz León, "La primera horca," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 169.

[83]*Ibid.*, 173.

[84]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

There was another prisoner in the improvised jail or guardhouse who did not fare so well as the others. He was Francisco Escobar and had been confined because of an act of insubordination toward Captain Villagra during Valdivia's absence. In the momentary glow of good feeling resulting from Valdivia's pardon for the conspirators, he also commanded that Escobar be released. Pero Gómez, followed by several idlers, went out to release him. As the *maestre de campo* turned away after removing his shackles, Escobar threw himself upon him with a dagger and succeeded in wounding him in the back. Those who had followed Pero Gómez seized him before he could do more harm and he was put back in confinement. For this offense, however, Valdivia stubbornly refused to pardon him though the priests, Villagra, Inés de Suárez and even Pero Gómez, himself, interceded for the guilty one. To all their pleas he returned the same answer:

"I can pardon the crimes and treason against my person . . . but not transgression against the authority of my captains."[85]

A scaffold was built and at seven o'clock the next morning, drum beats and the sound of a trumpet called the camp to witness the grim execution of justice. The negro, called Domingo, tied the rope to the "tree of justice" while Juan Valiente, another negro, said in the voice of a town crier:

> This is the justice that His Majesty commands the illustrious Señor Pedro de Valdivia, lieutenant and captain-general of the most distinguished Marquis Don Francisco Pizarro, governor of this realm, to make in his royal name, to this man Francisco Escobar, as a traitor and a rebel against the royal service, commanding that he be hanged by the neck until he surrenders his soul and dies naturally, in order that he be punished and be to others an example. Whoever acts in this manner shall pay in this manner.[86]

The condemned one mounted the scaffold, and a second later his body hung in space—for a second only. His heavy weight snapped the rotten rope, and he fell in a lump in the sand. The cry of "pardon!" rang from mouth to mouth until the whole group took it up and Valdivia was forced to acquiesce in the popular demand. Escobar's dream of wealth and adventure was over, however, and he at once set out for Spain to enter a Franciscan monastery.[87]

Pedro de Valdivia had pardoned Sancho de Hoz from death and from a return to Perú—partly out of his own generous nature and partly because he felt sure that his former associate would

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[85]Díaz León, "La primera horca," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 174.

[86]*Ibid.*, 175.

[87]*Ibid.*, 175.

intrigue against him both in Perú and in Spain. And he did not belittle the influence of the former courtier with Emperor Charles V. But if he felt safer to have Sancho where he could keep an eye on him, he also thought it would be to his advantage not to be tied to him by contract—even an unfulfilled one. Also he wanted him divested of whatever titles the king might have bestowed upon him, and his prestige thus lowered in the eyes of the common soldiers. He was especially anxious to take every precaution before entering the last and worst part of the Atacama desert that lay between him and the Copiapó Valley. Just how much pressure Valdivia brought to bear upon Sancho de Hoz directly or indirectly through friends, it is impossible to determine, but on August 8, in the little village of Atacama, Pedro Sancho de Hoz signed a *dejación,* witnessed by Juan Bohón and Alonso de Monroy, at his request, releasing Valdivia from the unequal partnership. He asked for just payment for what horses and supplies he had furnished. Valdivia, in his turn, promised to give *"de comer"* to Sancho de Hoz in accordance with the quality of his person and to pay a just price for the horses and supplies.[88] Four days later, Sancho de Hoz renounced the *provisión* given him by Francisco Pizarro (apparently Valdivia took possession of it and destroyed it, since it has never come to light), and renounced all the titles and privileges given him by Emperor Charles V, declaring himself *"en su libre soler, e de su espontánea voluntad."*[89] Valdivia was gracious in his acceptance of the *dejación.* Though he kept Sancho de Hoz under guard, he released him from his manacles and allowed him comparative freedom of action.

Valdivia then sent for a portion of his army that he had left at Atacama la Chica under the command of Juan Gómez and, gathering his clumsy force together, he was ready to enter the great desert.[90]

The hardships that Valdivia's force had endured thus far sank into insignificance beside those that now beset them. There was a constant scarcity of food and water for both man and beast. The Indians here as in the country already traversed had hidden their food and deserted their dwellings. Often the Spaniards found a fire still smouldering on the floor of a *ruca,* but there would be no sign of the inhabitants, and, worst of all, no food—

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[88]Dejación que hizo Pero Sancho de Hoz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 32.

[89]*Ibid.*

[90]Probanza del capitán Juan Gómez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XI, 541.

not even a pod of beans, a sweet potato, or an ear of corn remained. Valdivia sent out foraging parties, one after the other, during the day, but the results were much the same. There is a legend that when the camp was reduced almost to its last meal, Inés de Suárez rode out one morning on her white horse to see if her luck was better than that of the men. As she watched with hunger-sharpened eyes for any movement of life, her horse paused before a *tuna* plant (prickly pear) and gingerly seized one of the apples in his teeth. Inés watched in amazement. She saw him eat another and another. Leaping from his back she gathered as many as she could, rode hurriedly back to camp and acquainted the men with her discovery. Soon foraging parties were bringing in huge quantities, and from that day it was the main source of sustenance for the Spaniards. True, their strength was reduced on such watery diet, but it made possible the preservation of the breeding flocks. Another item in its favor was that it served to allay somewhat the ever-present thirst that could not be completely assuaged until they reached Copiapó.[91]

The thirst was even harder to bear than the hunger. The constant cloud of dust raised by the herd of stock rendered their thirst more agonizing. One night when the day had been more harrowing than usual and the ragged camp choked in a moistureless dust cloud, the priests attempted mass but the dry throats refused to respond. Suddenly Inés de Suárez called an Indian to her. She sent him for a spade and when he returned she pointed to a certain spot and bade him dig. The parched crowd around her must have thought that thirst had driven her mad, but it was only a matter of minutes until her wisdom was proved. Dampness appeared in the sand; the moisture increased; and at a depth of one *vara* water appeared. Eager hands now joined in the work and soon water, sweet and cool, flowed forth to quench the awful thirst not only of the human beings, but also enough for the animals.[92] Whether the keen eye of Doña Inés had seen evidence of moisture in the soil or the voice of the Virgin had directed her, as Mariño Lovera believes, is immaterial. It was enough that there was water. The pool was called *Jagüey* Inés and still exists as a monument to that lady's sagacity.

Added to the woes of hunger and thirst were those of climate and topography. Fierce winds whipped fine dust and sometimes stinging sleet against the faces of the travelers, and the dreary hills rose to greet them in endless succession. Just as it seemed

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[91]May, *The Conqueror's Lady*, 217.

[92]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 39.

that the herds must be eaten if the party was to survive, the green valley of Copiapó came into view.

The Copiapó Valley marked the southern boundary of Pizarro's claim and here Valdivia took formal possession of the land lying to the south in the name of his king, Charles V. Hoping to destroy the evil reputation of the country given it by Almagro's men, he refused to call it "Chile," but named it Nueva Estremadura in honor of his native province in Spain.[93] He, then, entered into a long harangue to the curious natives gathered about. He told them the purpose of his coming—to instruct them further in the Christian way of living as Almagro had begun it—and invited them to come in peace to the Spaniards and serve them even as the Incas of Perú had done. At his order, a large wooden cross was erected, and the Spaniards bent their knees before it, but when they attempted to induce the Indians to worship likewise they met a stolid resistance. The strange procedure had little meaning to the natives beyond bringing back a memory of the white faces and bestial atrocities of Almagro and his men. The Spaniards, however, were giving thanks that God had brought them to the promised land.[94]

The army rested at Copiapó approximately two months. Valdivia ordered Luis de Cartagena, the scribe, to write an account of all that had happened. There was a period of recuperation and general rejoicing in which Mariño Lovera says the horses joined because they recognized the end of their labors and hardships.[95] During the rest period Valdivia's last reinforcements joined him. Gonzalo de los Ríos, the old friend of Sancho de Hoz, and his twenty horsemen arrived—among them Chinchilla.[96] The two captains that Valdivia had dispatched from Tarapacá—Juan Jufré and Gaspar de Vergara—rejoined the main force but without any new recruits. Juan de Almonacid, the man Valdivia left in Arequipa to help care for Francisco Martínez, and Gaspar de Villarroel also appeared.[97]

Valdivia's army now reached the hundred and fifty men—*mas o menos*—that he gave as the number in his force in a letter to Emperor Charles V.[98] It was his statement that led many of the earlier historians to consider that the full number left Cuzco with him.

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[93]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[94]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 39.

[95]*Ibid.*

[96]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 130; Declaración de Gonzalo de los Ríos, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 566.

[97]Testimony of Juan Almonacid, in Medina, *Documents inéditos*, XXII, 322.

[98]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

If the Spaniards had illusions about having reached the Promised Land, as Mariño Lovera states, those illusions were soon rudely dispelled. Though gnawing hunger and arid thirst no longer depleted their strength by day and disturbed their rest by night, dangers equally serious arose to threaten the success of the expedition: a renewal of dissensions among the Spaniards and the ever-growing hostility of the natives.

The presence of the twenty horsemen under Gonzalo de los Ríos and that of Alonso de Chinchilla gave Sancho de Hoz courage to begin anew his efforts to foment rebellion. He was presumably under guard, but since his signing of the *dejación,* he had been allowed almost complete freedom of movement, though he was not allowed to carry arms. Inés de Suárez had warned Valdivia, pointing out to him certain suspicious little incidents. Valdivia dismissed her warnings lightly and accused her of seeing things "larger than they are." He placed the blame for the former conspiracy on the Guzmán brothers and felt that since they were gone, Sancho de Hoz would prove a loyal soldier. Also he pointed out the fact that he carried no arms. Inés remained unconvinced and informed the *conquistador* that by refusing to see what lay before his eyes, he put upon her and his other loyal friends the work of protecting him.[99]

Not long after Inés' warning, Valdivia asked Pero Gómez, his *maestre de campo,* his opinion of Sancho de Hoz. It corresponded alarmingly with that of Inés de Suárez. He informed Valdivia that Juan Salguero, the soldier who was nominal guard for Sancho de Hoz, had told him that on the preceding afternoon six or seven soldiers had gathered around Sancho de Hoz and had been in earnest conversation with him for several hours. Also Juan Romero, the youngest Spaniard of the group—a hunter of birds and a reader of omens—had assured Valdivia that a conspiracy was afoot because a rabbit that he killed had "quivered three times before dying."[100]

Juan Ruíz Tobillo was one of the soldiers that had attached himself to Sancho de Hoz. He was a former Almagrista and had refused to accompany Valdivia when he left Cuzco, giving as an excuse that he never wanted to return to Chile.[101] He had joined the party somewhere *en route* with some of Sancho de Hoz's men—probably at the same time as Pastrana and before the arrival of Chinchilla—but both he and Pastrana had managed to remain

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[99]Pedro Subercaseaux, "Las brujerías de Juan Romero," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 182.

[100]*Ibid.*

[101]Labatut, "Con menos aparato del que había menester," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 44.

unsuspected when Sancho de Hoz and his men were tried. Confronted by the hardships of the desert, he had grown more careless of his speech, pointing out to the men the poverty of Chile. He was heard to assert that the whole territory would not give "*de comer*" to thirty men.[102] Upon arrival of the army at Copiapó Juan Ruíz openly advocated a return to Perú. He reproached Sancho de Hoz in the presence of his guard for his failure to kill Pedro de Valdivia and said:

"If I should have had it to do, I should have already destroyed Pedro de Valdivia."[103]

The guard, Alonso de Salguero, reported the incident to Valdivia. Seeing that he could no longer ignore such manifestations, Valdivia conferred with Pero Gómez and the *maestre* advised action. That afternoon Juan Ruíz was put in custody, and that night at midnight he was taken out and hanged.[104]

The prompt punishment of Juan Ruíz quelled the more open demonstrations but the whispering campaign went on. Pastrana made subtle allusions to the harsh punishments meted out by Valdivia, to his "pretensions" of authority, and to the favor in which Charles V held Sancho de Hoz. Sancho de Hoz still gathered his little group around him for long discussions. And, then, one afternoon—like lightning from the blue—came an incident that settled effectively dissension within the Spanish ranks for the remainder of the journey: Valdivia was absent from camp on a reconnoitering expedition. Alonso de Chinchilla, Gonzalo de los Ríos, and the fifteen or twenty horsemen rode into camp, doubtless expecting to find Sancho de Hoz at the head of the expedition. Instead they found him under guard. Learning, however, that Valdivia was absent, Chinchilla boldly announced that he had come to kill the chief and asked for support. Pedro Sancho de Hoz could hardly contain himself for joy, and said, "Now is come my *maestre de campo*, Alonso de Chinchilla." Inés de Suárez heard his words and, realizing the seriousness of the situation, gave command "as if she were the supreme authority" that Chinchilla be taken prisoner and held incommunicado until Valdivia's return. Happily for the success of the enterprise, she was obeyed without question. The sluggish column did not cease its slow march, and twenty-four hours later Valdivia, informed by messenger of the incidents of the afternoon, was back in camp.[105]

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[102]*Ibid.*

[103]*Ibid.*

[104]*Ibid.*

[105]Declaración de Inés de Suárez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 623; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 135.

Valdivia gave Chinchilla his choice of returning to Perú or of continuing with the army. But he warned Chinchilla that if he decided to continue on the journey, he would have to walk with care or he (Valdivia) would have him horsewhipped. Chinchilla eagerly accepted the permission to go on; furthermore, he became so eager to convince Valdivia of his future loyalty that he disclosed to him all the details of the plot so carefully laid in Perú for Valdivia's assassination—a cowardly procedure that lost him the confidence of his former associates without gaining him that of Valdivia.[106] Sancho de Hoz was put back in irons and both he and Chinchilla were closely guarded from Copiapó to Mapocho.

Restoration of order in the Spanish ranks had been achieved but the hostility of the natives increased from day to day. Remembering the indignities that Alamagro had heaped upon them, they resolved to turn the invaders back. Though rarely seen, they hung on the flanks of the slowly-advancing column and picked off man or beast that fell too far behind or became separated from the main force. Occasionally they left fly a fleet of arrows into the Spanish ranks, wounding Spaniards, Indians, or horses. Juan Godínez was wounded in this manner[107] and so were Francisco de Villagra and Juan de Carmona. Francisco Rodríguez, who "had left the road to see a fruit called *chahar,*" was killed—a serious loss for that small group.[108] The horses and Indians killed constituted almost as serious a loss as the Spaniards. They were indispensable to the success of the venture—the horses were both means of transportation and weapons of war, while the Indians were the beasts of burden. Many instances of death among the Indians are cited by witnesses, but how much duplication there is of the same event, it is impossible to determine. Juan Godínez notes the loss of many Indians, two horses, and a mule.[109] Pedro de Miranda says that the Indians killed "one Spaniard, many horses and *piezas (yanaconas),*"[110] and Sánchez de Morales says "they killed un *criado* of this witness . . . called Uteache, an Indian man from Perú."[111]

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[106]Both of the immediately preceding citations bring out these facts.

[107]Declaración de Juan Godínez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XII, 70.

[108]Declaración de Diego Sánchez de Morales, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* X, 91; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* I, 138.

[109]Declaración de Juan Godínez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XII, 70.

[110]Declaración de Pedro de Miranda, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XVI, 212.

[111]Declaración de Diego Sánchez de Morales, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* X, 91.

Valdivia continued his practice of sending out small parties of horsemen to reconnoiter, to search out a road ahead, and to bring in food. One morning Pero Gómez de Don Benito rode out with a few horsemen to pick out a road for the following day. About five leagues from camp he encountered a large number of Indians defending a narrow pass. Pero Gómez attempted to take it, thinking that Indians could not stand up against his horsemen. But so stubbornly did the natives hold the pass, throwing in fresh forces recklessly, that the fighting raged all day without the Spaniards' being able to dislodge the Indians. When night came, Pero Gómez sent Santiago de Azoca to report the situation to Valdivia and to get reinforcements. The next morning, however, before aid could arrive, Pero Gómez and his men routed the Indians by choosing another road and attacking them from the flanks.[112]

Each successive valley that the Spaniards crossed presented a similar picture. Every foot of the way was contested. The Indians held ground stubbornly and gave grudgingly. At Coquimbo an additional misfortune occurred which, if it had happened before crossing the desert, would probably have put an end to Valdivia's expedition. Four hundred of the *yanaconas* fled from the Spanish camp to join the natives.[113]

In the valley of Aconcagua, called Chile by Almagro's men, the already fierce resistance of the Indians became fiercer. Here the great *cacique,* Michimalongo,[114] set himself wholeheartedly to the task of running the Spaniards from the country. He refused all gifts from Valdivia and, likewise, all summons to appear before him. His greetings for the invaders were carried only by arrow, or pike, or lance. He fortified strategic passes and poured a rain of arrows from narrow defiles. His resources were not great enough, however, to stop the handful of men traveling under the protection of St. Iago. Don Hugo Silva has this to say of Valdivia's journey from Copiapó to Mapacho:

> [It] was a series of encounters and of combats between the natives and the advancing explorers in charge of captains like Francisco de Aguirre, Pero Gómez de Don Benito, Rodrigo de Quiroga, Francisco de Villagra and others; in these encounters the natives died in great numbers, but they also caused death to the Spaniards, to many *"piezas"* of Indians and horses, to say nothing

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[112]Probanza de méritos de Santiago de Azoca, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XII, 38; Declaración de Pero Gómez de Don Benito, *ibid.,* XII, 53.

[113]Pedro de Valdivia to Hernando Pizarro, September 4, 1545.

[114]There are various spellings of this chief's name but that used by Crescente Errázuriz is used here.

of numerous wounds. It had not been, then, a triumphal entry of the Castillian troops; on the contrary, they evidenced fatigue and only consoled themselves with the expectation of finding soon a site where they could assuredly place their tents permanently.[115]

After eleven months of weary travel, constant danger, and staggering hardships, the small *puñado* of Spaniards found that spot "where they could pitch their tents permanently" in the valley of the Mapocho River, December, 1540.[116]

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[115]Don Hugo Silva, "El primer milagro en tierra chilena," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 191.

[116]The following is a list of the men who reached the Valley of the Mapocho with Valdivia, according to Tomás Thayer Ojeda, *Los conquistadores de Chile*, Tomo I; also found in Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 147.

Francisco de Aguirre
Juan de Almonacid
Pero Alvarez
Rodrigo de Araya
Francisco de Arteaga
Juan de Avalos Jofré
Lope de Ayala
Santiago de Azoca
Juan Benítez Monge
Juan Bohón
Juan de Bolaños
Juan de Cabrera
Alonso del Campo
Juan Martín de Candia
Juan de Carmona
Alonso Caro
Luis de Cartagena
Francisco Carretero
Antonio Carrillo
Gaspar de las Casas
Martín de Castro
Diego de Céspedes
Pedro Cisternas
Alonso de Córdoba
Juan Crespo
Gabriel de la Cruz
Juan de Cuevas Bustillos y Terán
Juan de Chaves
Alonso de Chinchilla
Diego Delgado
Antonio Díaz de Rivera
Bartolomé Díaz
García Díaz de Castro
Mateo Díez
Pedro Domínguez
Pero Estéban del Manzano
Juan Fernández de Alderete
Bartolomé Flores
Juan de Funis
Juan Galaz
Francisco de Galdames
Juan Gallegos de Rubias
Pedro de Gamboa
Ruy García
Diego de Cáceres
Gerardo Gil
Juan Godínez
Juan Gómez de Almagro
Pedro Gómez de las Montañas
Juan Gómez de Yébenes
Juan González
Pedro González de Utrera
Don Rodrigo González Marmolejo (priest)
Juan Gutiérrez
García Hernández
Francisco Hernández Gallego
Juan de Herrera
Pedro de Herrera
Antón Hidalgo
Juan de la Higuera
Martín de Ibarrola
Pascual Jenonés
Juan Jiménez
Ortún Jiménez de Vertendona
Juan Jufré
Lope de Landa
Francisco de León
Pedro de León
Juan Lobo (priest)
Bartolomé Márquez
Bernal Martínez
Pero Martín Parras
Pedro de Miranda

Alonso de Monroy
Alonso Moreno
Salvador de Montoya
Bartolomé Muñoz
Juan Navarro
Juan Negrete
Alvar Núñez
Diego Núñez
Francisco Núñez
Lorenzo Núñez
Juan Núñez de Castro
Olea
Juan de Oliva
Domingo de Oribe
Diego de Oro
Juan Ortíz Pacheco
Martín de Ortuño
Juan Pacheco
Antonio de Pastrana
Luis de la Peña
Alonso Pérez
Diego Pérez
Santiago Pérez
Juan Pinel
Don Francisco Ponce de León
Rodrigo de Quiroga
Francisco de Rabdona
Juan Rasquido
Francisco de Riberos
Gonzalo de los Ríos
Francisco Rodríguez
Juan Romero
Juan Ruíz
Gabriel de Salazar
Alonso de Salguero
Alonso Sánchez
Rodrigo Sánchez
Diego Sánchez de Morales
Pero Sancho de Hoz
Don Martín de Solier
Inés Suárez
Antonio Tarabajano
Luis Ternero
Luis de Toledo
Hernando de la Torre
Antonio de Ulloa
Francisco de Vandillo
Juan Valiente (negro)
Hernando de Vallejo
Sebastián Vázquez
Marcos Veas
Diego de Velasco
Jerónimo de Vera
Juan de Vera
Gaspar de Vergara
Francisco de Villagra
Pedro de Villagra
Gaspar de Villarroel
Antonio Zapata
Juan Zurbino

Trazado hecho por el alarife Pedro de Gamboa, para la ciudad de Santiago, y distribución de los primeros solares, según investigaciones practicadas hasta el año 1929 por el señor Don Tomás Thayer Ojeda.

1. Pedro de Valdivia.—2. Fco. de Villagra.—3. Diego G. de Cáceres.—4. Pero Gómez.—5. Rodrigo de Quiroga.—6. Juan de Oliva.—7. Juan de Riveros.—8. Iglesia Mayor.—9. Antonio de Pastrana.—10. Alfonso de Escobar.—11. Pedro de Miranda.—12. Francisco de Aguirre.—13. Anton Hidalgo.—14. García Hernández.—15. Rodrigo de Araya.—16. Molino de Flores.—17. Juan Fernández de Alderete.—18. Molino de Araya.—19. Ermita de Santa Lucía.

CHAPTER V

Santiago's Early Years: 1541-1543

It was the thirteenth day of December, 1540—Santa Lucía's Day—when the Spaniards first looked down upon the valley that was to become the site of Chile's future capital. When Valdivia turned to them and said, in effect, "this is the place," his words must have been most welcome ones to those travel-weary souls—not alone because they meant rest but because the spot chosen was one that commanded their admiration. The Mapocho Valley was indeed a beautiful sight to the *conquistadores*. They arrived in midsummer and the lush greenness of the plain below gave ample proof of the fertility of the soil. The two arms of the Mapocho River made available water for both irrigation and domestic use. There was plenty of wood for building purposes. And perhaps its most important asset in the eyes of the men who had fought the natives almost daily since entering the Copiapó Valley, the place was easily defensible. Toward the east and forming a triangle with the converging branches of the Mapocho River rose the forbidding rock called by the Indians Huelén *(Sorrow)* but renamed by the Spaniards Santa Lucía, in honor of the day of their arrival. The hill could be easily fortified. Also there were other small hills about that could be used as watch-towers, while the arms of the river would serve as something of a barrier, though not a formidable one. The possession of the valley, however, was not to be obtained without further effort.[1]

Valdivia had sent to the Indian chiefs many gifts and messages explaining the coming of the white men and their invincibility, and asking the Indians to come in and serve them peacefully as had the Incas of Perú. The Indians not only had dared to ignore the warnings and the requests—while keeping the gifts—but had united in a solid front under Michimalongo to prevent the Spaniards from advancing further. A great army of natives hastened to attack the Spaniards in the Mapocho Valley. Valdivia prepared to meet them—"before everything else with the *oración,* which always holds first place among all the munitions and military strategems."[2]

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[1]Fernando Thauby, "La fecha en que fué fundada la ciudad de Santiago," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 196.

[2]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile,* 46; Don Hugo Silva, "El primer milagro en tierra chilena," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 191.

The fight was long and furious. The Spaniards rode forth with full confidence in the horses under them and St. Iago over them—to say nothing of the good swords in their hands. The natives, however, had confidence, too, in the sheer force of numbers, if nothing else, and poured reinforcements so quickly into each breach cleaved by Spanish swords that St. Iago's children found themselves in dire straits. Though each individual of the Spanish party added new laurels to his wreath of heroism that day, though each arm grew tired from hacking right and left at enemy hordes, and though Indian dead littered the countryside, it seemed as if at last the natives would make good their boast of throwing the invaders out. The Spaniards were forced to give ground. Just as it seemed that all was lost, the Indians suddenly threw down their arms and fled precipitately. Valdivia and his force could not understand. They were not men, however, to stand wondering and fail to take advantage of any luck or miracle that came their way. They set out in pursuit and managed to take some prisoners, both on that day and succeeding days. From the captured ones they heard a strange story: Just as victory was within the grasp of the natives, the sky above them opened and a man on a white horse descended, with a naked sword in his hand, and he began to lay on the Indians so heavily that they were not able to stand up against the onslaught. They were forced to flee. Valdivia had all of his best warriors brought before the prisoners that they might identify the man, but each time that one passed, the Indians shook their heads and said that the man from the skies was much superior. There remained only one solution to the Spaniards: St. Iago, the patron saint of Spanish armies wherever they fought, had once more come to the aid of Spanish arms. So deep was their gratitude that they resolved to name the intended city "for the glorious Apostle Santo Iago!"[3]

The proposed city could not be laid off and established until the surrounding country had been conquered and the Indians pacified. Valdivia, therefore, pitched a temporary camp at the foot of the towering rock of Santa Lucía. A small hermitage was erected where the image of the Virgin Mary that had come all the way from Cuzco on the conqueror's saddle was hung and where a daily mass was held. A system of patrols was worked out whereby each man took his share of different kinds of duty. Each day the camp—women, children, and baggage—was left under the protection of some twenty horsemen, while the re-

[3]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 46; Hugo Silva, "El primer milagro en tierra chilena," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 191.

mainder of the force was divided into four groups and sent in different directions. Their instructions were: to return to camp at nightfall in time for the *toque de oracíon* which always sounded thirty minutes after the soldier, La Torre, standing on one of the rocks of Santa Lucía hill, announced by bugle-call the end of the day's work;[4] to treat kindly any natives that were captured and to send them to their *caciques* with the message that the Indians should come in and hear the *requerimientos* that Valdivia wished to read to them. One of the chief arguments they were to use in convincing the Indians to come in was that the Incas of Perú, to whom the Mapochinos paid tribute, were already serving the Spaniards. If they with their great wealth and superior organization had been helpless before the white man, what hope had the natives of Chile?[5]

The strategy of dividing the Spanish forces soon began to bear fruit. As the Indians fled from one group, they ran into another, and thus conceived the idea that the foreigners were in greater force than they had at first thought. Valdivia wrote Charles V that "owing to the diligence with which I moved about it [the country], since they believed the Christians were many, most of them came in and served us peacefully."[6] Events were later to prove that the intentions of the natives were not so peaceful as at first believed, but for several months they aided the Spaniards in building their houses of logs and clay.

Work on the city of Santiago started in February, 1541, and foundation ceremonies were held February 12.[7] The ceremony was an impressive one. The whole camp was gathered to witness it. Pedro de Valdivia, dressed in full armor, mounted upon his horse, and carrying in his left hand the standard of Castile, was followed by his captains in tracing at full gallop

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[4]Sarah Hübner, "Las princesas de Talagante," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 202.

[5]Thauby, "La fecha en que fué fundada la ciudad de Santiago," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 196; Pedro de Valdivia to Hernando Pizarro, September 4, 1545.

[6]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[7]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 67. Note: Valdivia, in two of his letters to Emperor Charles V (September 4, 1545, and October 15, 1550) gives the founding date as February 24. Thayer Ojeda gives as a possible explanation of the discrepancy that the designation of a townsite and inauguration of laying off town lots might have begun on February 12, while the "raising of the tree of justice"—always the final act in the founding of a town—might have been delayed until February 24. There is also the possibility of an error in the re-writing of the acts of the *cabildo* in 1544 after the destruction of all records by the Indians in September, 1541. At any rate, the city of Santiago has accepted February 12 as the authentic date of its birth.

a large circle upon the plain. They then brought their horses to a stop in the center of the imaginary circle and Valdivia, in a loud, clear voice so that all could hear, took possession of the townsite in the name of his king. He called on any person or persons who would dispute his right to the site to appear before him and announced that he would defend it with arms and over it would lose his life. He repeated the challenge three times. Naturally nobody appeared to contest him, and he dismounted, cut some branches from nearby trees, pulled up a few blades of grass, picked up some earth, drank of the water brought to him from the Mapocho River, passed the water among his captains, and tossed what was left into the air. His next act was to plant where he stood a large cross constructed of two limbs, before which he and all his followers knelt in thanks.[8]

Only one of Valdivia's captains was absent from the foundation ceremony. It was the German, Blumenthal (Bartolomé Flores). The day of the ceremony fell on Saturday. Friday night Flores and his men did not return from their daily reconnoitering. Valdivia was worried but because of the preparations for the founding of the city, he did not send out a search party, thinking that the men would come in. The day of the founding passed. The hour for mass on the following Sunday passed, and still no word had come from Flores. Valdivia was on the verge of sending out a party, but as he and Inéz de Suárez prepared to eat their noonday meal, in walked the truant captain. He had a strange tale to tell.

In the Poniente Valley, where he and his men had been exploring, the Spaniards had had to give battle to the natives under the local chief, Talagante. In one such battle, a son of the *cacique* had fallen prisoner to Flores who, in accordance with Valdivia's instructions, had returned him unharmed to his father. The old chief was so pleased that he had sent Flores an invitation to visit his camp. Flores went and much to his surprise and consternation the *cacique* presented him with four of the native princesses—one of whom was Talagante's heiress—for wives. Flores, being a good Catholic, was much embarrassed, but not knowing how to refuse so generous an offer, he had brought the four princesses to Inés de Suárez "for her service and to be instructed in the mysteries of the holy Catholic faith."[9] Valdivia, much amused, excused the absence of his captain and Doña Inés took charge of the princesses,

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[8]Don Rogelio Ugarte, "La planta primitiva de la ciudad de Santiago," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 210.

[9]Sarah Hübner, "Las princesas de Talagante," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 202.

who were subsequently baptized and whose progeny became a famous part of Chilean society—the Lisperguer family.

The following week the actual work of building a town started. Parallel streets—nine in number—stretched from the base of Santa Lucía Hill westward through fourteen blocks. The streets were twelve *varas* wide and the blocks were one hundred thirty-eight *varas* on the side. Each block was divided into four lots *(solares)*. One whole block was reserved for a plaza, on the western side of which the church and parish house were located. The government house and the prison were placed on the north side of the plaza. The lots were assigned to the officers and men who planned to make their home there.[10] The first houses were built of wood and clay with roofs of straw.

The man who superintended the work of laying off the town, erecting the houses, building *acequias,* and distributing water was a one-eyed soldier named Pedro de Gamboa. He had held the same position *(alarife)* in Perú where he had lost his eye fighting against the natives. By authority of a *real cédula* issued in 1523, he had permission to practice his trade in any Spanish colony. He held the post many years in Santiago. During the starving period of that city, following the destructive raid of the natives in September, 1541, he was paid—by order of the *cabildo*—with goods collected from individual citizens, since the city treasury was completely empty.[11]

Scarcely a month after the founding of the city a municipal government was set up in the form of a *cabildo,* or *ayuntamiento.* Valdivia appointed the first officers on March 7, 1541. They were: two *alcaldes*—Francisco de Aguirre and Juan Jufré—to administer justice; six *regidores*—Juan Fernández Alderete, Juan Bohón, Francisco de Villagra, Don Martín de Solier, Gaspar Villarroel, and Jerónimo Alderete—to carry on the city government; a *mayordomo*—Antonio Zapata—who with the *procurador*—Antonio de Pastrana—was to put into execution the will of the *regidores.* Luis de Cartagena was secretary or scribe.[12] It is hard to understand why Valdivia appointed Pastrana and Solier since they had been supporters of Pedro Sancho de Hoz on the way to Chile, though it is true that their support had been more in the nature of a whispering campaign than in outspoken words or overt acts. There is no doubt, however, that Valdivia knew their sentiments, but perhaps he hoped to win their support for him-

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[10]Luis Galdames, *A History of Chile,* 40.

[11]Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile,* I, 223; Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 71, 103.

[12]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 67.

self and away from Sancho de Hoz by including them in the government. If such was his hope, it was doomed to failure.

On March 11, the first meeting of the *cabildo* was held in a room set aside for that purpose until a suitable house could be built. It was there that the newly-appointed officials took the oath of office. Luis de Cartagena describes their induction thus:

> In the presence of me, the said scribe, standing together, the officers . . . all together and each one separately, they swore to God and the Sainted Mary and by the words of the four sacred apostles, putting their hands on a token cross that the said Señor Lieutenant had there with him, that they would use with all diligence, fidelity, and good conscience the said offices, which he was thus giving and confiding to them in the name of his king and natural lord.[13]

The two months following the creation of the *cabildo* were given over by that body to mere routine matters. Pedro de Gamboa, who had already been acting as *alarife* in the construction of the town, was appointed to that post with an annual salary of fifteen hundred *pesos*. Juan Gómez was continued in his post as *alguacil mayor*, and a negro slave called Domingo, belonging to Juan Negrete, was appointed town crier "because all the Spaniards . . . are gone to war, and it is not just to embarrass one of them with such an office."[14] In May, however, the *cabildo* made itself responsible for an act which in Francisco Pizarro's eyes—if he had known of it—was nothing less than insubordination: it elected Pedro de Valdivia governor and captain-general of Chile, subject only to the authority of his king, automatically severing all connection with Perú.[15] The reason given for such action was the receipt of certain reports from Perú.

Early in May rumors began arriving in Chile that Francisco Pizarro was dead, that the Indians had driven all Spaniards from Perú and that the tribes were sending around the blood-stained arrow preparatory to falling on Santiago in overwhelming strength. Those reports were carefully emphasized by several of Sancho de Hoz's friends including the *procurador* of the town, Antonio de Pastrana. The group also cleverly pointed out that if it were true that Pizarro was dead, then Valdivia no longer had any right to the powers he was exercising, since he came to Chile only as Pizarro's lieutenant. And they never failed to leave the thought that there was one among them who carried a royal

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[13] *Ibid.*, 68.
[14] *Ibid.*, 71, 72, 73.
[15] *Ibid.*, 74.

commission and could competently fill the place until such time as the king should make his will known—Pedro Sancho de Hoz.[16]

Such maneuvering on the part of Sancho de Hoz and his friends alarmed the men who had come to Chile under Valdivia's banner. They naturally expected as a reward for their coming *repartimientos* and *encomiendas*. If Sancho de Hoz should succeed to the leadership, his followers—who had escaped much of the hardship and all of the responsibility of the journey—would receive the choice lands and the largest number of Indians. Knowing Valdivia, they knew, too, that Sancho de Hoz could take that leadership only after Valdivia's death and they did not doubt that the plans of Chinchilla and Pastrana included the assassin's dagger. There was also a fear that if reports of a concerted attack by the Indians should prove well founded, such an onslaught might find the Spaniards divided among themselves and give the Indians an easy victory. It seemed necessary, then, in the eyes of the men who accompanied Valdivia that the newly-founded town should have a duly-elected governor, about whose title there could be no quibbling, and behind whom the people could unite their forces against the hostile natives. "It is not strange, therefore," Crescente Errázuriz has written, "that immediately, the tenth of May, the *cabildo* met with the exclusive object of treating this subject."[17]

If Barros Arana may be credited, the *cabildo* certainly held powers wide enough to encompass the business at hand. He wrote of it:

> The laws and traditions of municipal liberties of the middle ages assured the Spanish *cabildos* great independence. . . . The *cabildo* named freely each year the individuals who were to compose the body the following year; elected the *alcaldes* . . . and in case of the death of a governor, when no person had been designated to replace him, the *cabildo* could elect him. . . . In the most serious cases that arose, this body convoked the *vecinos* held as honest men in the neighborhood, and settled with them in a *cabildo abierto* . . . many problems not covered by the laws.[18]

In the crisis of 1541, the *cabildo* of Santiago felt justified in using these powers.

At the May 10 meeting of the *cabildo* the rumors concerning the death of Pizarro were duly weighed and the conclusion arrived at that "for the benefit and advantage of the subjects" and "the conservation of this land" it would be expedient to elect

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[16]Don Alejandro Vicuña, "Una elección 'popular' en 1541," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 225.

[17]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 161.

[18]Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*, I, 225.

Pedro de Valdivia governor and captain-general of Chile in the name of the king "until such time as Your Majesty, informed of everything, should command that which is more useful to your service." They then commanded Antonio de Pastrana, *procurador* of the city, "to make a request (apparently a routine procedure) in which he should ask the gentleman of this *cabildo* to elect the said lieutenant to be governor and captain-general in the name of His Majesty."[19]

Pastrana did not relish the duty assigned him. The proposed election was gall and wormwood to him. He had approached several *vecinos,* including the priest, Juan Lobo, with the suggestion that Sancho de Hoz—too weak to be more than a tool for Pastrana and Chinchilla—be made governor, or at least provisional governor, but had received evasive answers.[20] Compliance with the command of the *cabildo* meant indefinite postponement of his ambitions. For two weeks, therefore, he procrastinated, thinking that the popular hysteria, which he had helped to build up, would subside. He was mistaken.

In the latter part of May Valdivia and his men went out against the Indians under Michimalongo. Many prisoners were taken by the Spaniards. Some of them boasted proudly that soon there would be no Spaniards in Chile, for they would kill them as surely as Almagro's son had killed Pizarro in Perú. Valdivia had these put to torture and they confessed that

> . . . the day before they were taken, there had come two messengers from the valley of Copiapó, sent by the chiefs, Gualimia and Galdiquín, . . . to make known to the said Michimalongo that the same day that they were dispatched, messengers had arrived from the *cacique* of Atacama, who crossed the desert in seven days, with news that the son of the *adelantado,* Don Diego de Almagro . . . had killed in the city of Pachacama the marquis and governor, Don Francisco Pizarro . . . and that they had commanded that the messengers come in nine days, as they had done, in order to arrange to kill the Christians that were here . . . and that they could be assured that if they killed us, that more Christians would not come to this land, and that they should tell this to all the Indians and *caciques* of this land so that they would make war with more determination.[21]

Something like panic swept the newly-founded town. Pastrana was forced to act and on May 31, he called a meeting of the *cabildo* to which he presented a request for the election of Pedro de Valdivia as governor and captain-general. In support of his request he submitted the report quoted above and added that he

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[19]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 74.

[20]Alejandro Vicuña, "Una elección 'popular' en 1541," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* I, 225.

[21]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 75.

believed the report. Luis de Cartagena, the scribe, took a roll-call vote and Valdivia was unanimously elected. A committee composed of Bartolomé Flores, Gaspar de Vergara, Luis de la Peña, and Fernando de la Torre was appointed to accompany Luis de Cartagena to Valdivia's house.

Valdivia feigned deep surprise at the committee's visit and the request and asked for a copy of the petition to be left with him so that he might study it and be able to answer in a manner "most befitting the fidelity and obedience that he owes to Your Majesty and to the governor and marquis, Don Francisco Pizarro, his lord."[22]

June 2, the *cabildo* met to receive Valdivia's answer. He refused the position they offered, saying:

> I have no desire but to serve His Majesty in that which I have commenced and have in hand, until I die. . . . I do not know if by it His Majesty will be dis-served—he whom I desire to serve with that fidelity and obedience which I owe as his subject and vassal—nor if to me would be imputed presumption before the gentlemen—president and *oidores*—of his royal council . . . of the Indies . . . as to the danger which might happen to my person, being true the death of the marquis and governor, my lord, I am well satisfied that all the subjects of His Majesty that are serving with me are so loyal that there is nothing to fear . . . and I owe so much to the marquis, my lord, and have received from him such signal favors, and he is so satisfied with my submission in his service that in no manner shall I accept such an election . . . and this is my reply, begging that you gentlemen will pardon me, since so just are my excuses.[23]

There is little doubt that Pedro de Valdivia wanted to be governor of Chile. There is no doubt at all that his friends wished to see him in that position. Also it is obvious that it would have been advantageous for the colony. Not only the distance from Perú, but the nature of the terrain over which a land journey must be made and the strong south winds which imperiled a sea voyage made communication with Valdivia's lord extremely difficult, without the added hazard of hostile Indians. Since Pizarro must eventually confirm the *repartimientos* and *encomiendas* made by Valdivia, a feeling of insecurity haunted those who had received them. How soon would they be able to get them approved? Much time and money must be spent either in going or sending someone to Perú. Besides, in mining the gold—the Spaniards had no doubt they would find it—it would be necessary to set aside Pizarro's share as well as the king's *quinto*. And most fearsome of all was the knowledge that as soon as Chile became a thriving colony, one of Francisco Pizarro's ambitious brothers or another

[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Ibid.*, 80.

relative might persuade the marquis to grant him the governorship of Chile—in which case there would doubtless be a reapportionment of land and Indians in favor of the men accompanying him.[24]

Valdivia's refusal to accept the post arose, then, not from unwillingness to assume the office but from a fear that the means by which he gained the office might be frowned upon in Spain and Perú. The *cabildo* of Santiago was his own creature. He had appointed its members in disregard of a royal decree of June 26, 1526, which had ordered that *cabildos* should be named by the *vecinos* of a town unless this power had been expressly given to the founders of new settlements.[25] It was true that most *conquistadores* had ignored the decree without encountering punishment, but Valdivia was only a lieutenant governor and might not Emperor Charles V view the whole matter as presumptuous, both on his part and on the part of the body he had created? Perhaps it would be regarded merely as a ruse whereby he gained the power he wanted. Also his relations with Francisco Pizarro were in question. Although Valdivia doubtless wished to break the political tie that bound him to the marquis, he was not willing to become a rebel to do it. There is ample proof that Valdivia possessed a far greater degree of loyalty to the man whose lieutenant he was than was being displayed in many parts of the New World at that time. He repeatedly mentioned his obligations to the marquis and long after the news of Pizarro's death reached Chile, he sent a plea to Charles V that the king should bear Pizarro's children in mind, "granting them such favors that they may support themselves as their father's children."[26]

Pastrana was quick to see Valdivia's dilemma and quick to take advantage of it. If the *conquistador* could be forced to accept the governorship he would possibly find himself in an embarrassing position. At the same time the *cabildo,* where Pastrana had at least one supporter in Martín Solier, would be strengthening its position and might in the future prove useful to the friends of Sancho de Hoz.[27] He at once became as zealous for Valdivia's acceptance of the post as he had formerly been lax in his efforts. When the *cabildo* met again on June 4, he replied to Valdivia's refusal by saying:

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[24]*Ibid.*, 82.

[25]Luis Silva Lezaeta, *El Conquistador Francisco de Aguirre*, 60, n.

[26]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[27]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 166–167.

. . . the excuses and causes that he gave are not legitimate, nor should they be admitted, since Your Honors as *cabildo* have the voice of His Majesty in this matter, and can make the said election. And it is . . . very necessary.[28]

He urged that another request be sent to Valdivia. The *cabildo* agreed and the second petition was sent.

Again Valdivia refused (June 6). He cited his former reasons and concluded his refusal with the pledge to discharge his duties with the greatest care "as I owe it and am obligated to the governor, Don Franscisco Pizarro, my lord." The answer made Pastrana extremely angry. He characterized Valdivia's excuses as "impertinent" and deplored the danger to which he was subjecting the people who had come with him. In the face of the *conquistador's* stubbornness, however, there was only one recourse left: he could call in the *vecinos* in a *cabildo abierto*.[29]

One June 10, the negro town crier, Domingo, went through the streets of Santiago ringing the little bell with which he generally called the people to mass. The curious townspeople were soon gathered on the plaza where Pastrana told them the purpose of the gathering. He then commanded Luis de Cartagena to read the *cabildo's* petitions to Valdivia and his answers to them, which the scribe did in a loud voice so that none might miss the reading. Pastrana then demanded to know their will. Ninety of them surged forward to sign a third petition that Valdivia become their governor. Only Sancho de Hoz and a few of his friends held back. Many who could not write had others sign for them.[30]

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[28]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 82.

[29]*Ibid.*, 87.

[30]*Ibid.*, 88. The following is a list of the names of those who signed the petition for Valdivia to become governor:

Francisco Aguirre
Juan de Avalos Jufré
Juan Fernández Alderete
Don Martín de Solier
Juan Bohón
Francisco de Villagra
Jerónimo Alderete
Gaspar de Villarroel
Juan Gómez
Antonio de Pastrana
Alonso de Chinchilla
Antonio Tomé Vasano
Gabriel de la Cruz
Garei Díaz
Bartolomé Márquez
Juan Negrete
Juan Bolaños
Salvador de Montoya
Alonso de Córdova
Francisco Carretero
Pereztéban (Pero Esteban del Manzano?)
Juan Ruíz
Juan Ortiz
Juan Galaz
Martín del Castro
Pedro Martín
Juan Gutiérrez
Diego Núñez
Pascual Ginoves
Lope de Landa
Pedro Gonzales
Francisco de León
Juan Carreño

The next day Pastrana presented the petition to Valdivia in front of the whole town just as everybody was leaving mass.[1] The *conquistador* asked again for time to consider. The people hoisted him on their shoulders and carried him on a sort of triumphal tour through the streets. Valdivia angrily demanded to be put down. He was deposited in front of his house and went in, closing the door behind him. As he entered the house, the remark was heard on the streets that if he really did not want the post there were others who would take it. Some of Valdivia's friends followed him in and repeated the remark to him. That seemed to decide him. He went back to the door and halting the dispersing crowd, accepted their election of him, saying:

. . . since you have seen my replies, and not being satisfied with them, put before me that in accepting that which they ask of me I serve His Majesty more than in rejecting it, and because I believe it is thus, since all of you in one voice say it, and I alone am the one who contradicts it, I might be mistaken, and because here at the present I have no wise man with whom I can take counsel and to tell me in this case that which is most beneficial to His Majesty, and my wish is not to err in it under the protest that I have pre-

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Juan Xeres
Rui García
Santiago Pérez
Juan Jufré
Rodrigo de Quiroga
Gil Gregorio de Avila
Juan Pinel
Juan Crespo
Juan Cabrera
Juan de Zurbano
Alonso del Campo
Luis de la Peña
Pedro Domínguez
Juan de Vera
Jerónimo de Vera
Pedro de Gamboa
Juan Godínez
Pedro de Miranda
Marcos Veas
Don Francisco Ponce de León
Diego de Céspedes
Alonso Salguero
Juan de Chávez
Francisco de Arteaga
Santiago de Acosa
Rodrigo de Araya
Martín de Ibarrola
Gaspar de las Casas
Pedro de León
Juan Pacheco
Rodrigo Gómez
Bartolomé Flores
Hernando Vallejo
Pedro Gómez
Juan Lobo
Antón Hidalgo
Lope de Ayala
Gabriel de Zalazar
Antonio de Ulloa
Bartolomé Múñez
Pedro de Villagra
Juan de Cuevas
Antón Díaz
Francisco Galdames
Alonso Sánchez
Juan de Funes
Juan de la Higuera
Diego Pérez
Luis de Toledo
Alvar Núñez
Alonso Pérez
Pedro Cisternas
Francisco de Riberos
Juan Alvarez
Giraldo Gil
Francisco de Rabdona
Pedro Gómez

sented here . . . I accept the post of governor, elected by the *cabildo* . . . and by all this city of Santiago del Nueva Estremadura in the name of His Majesty and thus I will entitle myself until His Majesty sends to command something else.[31]

Valdivia then went to Luis de Cartagena and asked him for a statement that

. . . this election is not by my wish; and since I do not know if in doing it I am doing a dis-service to my king, that everyone be witness for me how I accepted it so that neither danger nor loss of honor should come to me nor to the loyalty which I owe to the services of His Majesty, whose subject and vassal I am, nor to the obedience . . . that I owe to the illustrious marquis and governor, Don Francisco Pizarro, if he lives.[32]

Both the *cabildo* and the *oficiales reales* sought further to protect Valdivia from any royal wrath by immediately sending reports to the king on the events of the day. The tenor of both documents was that

because of news from the Indians of Diego de Almagro, *el mozo*, having killed the Marquis Pizarro in the provinces of Perú, that all the people of this city have elected for our governor and captain-general, in the name of your Majesty, the captain, Valdivia.[33]

Soon after his election to the governorship, Valdivia took some eighty men and rode out from Santiago. Mariño Lovera says that the object of the expedition was "to know the secret of the earth, and that which it had in it, equally of gold or of silver, and other things of value."[34] No doubt he was partially correct for the hope of finding gold had been one of the factors that had sustained Valdivia's men through the hardships of the desert. It had been necessary for the *conquistador* to restrain them from a frantic, wasteful search for the precious metal on their immediate arrival in the Mapocho Valley and to insist on the establishment of the town before anything else. With that job done, exploration would naturally follow. There were, however, at least two other reasons for his going: he had received news only a little while after his election that Michimalongo, the Indian *toqui*, was fortifying some strategic positions and he wished to investigate that report;[35] and he wanted to look for a suitable spot to build a brig with which he could communicate with Perú by water.[36]

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[31]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 89–90.

[32]*Ibid.*, 94.

[33]Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 69–70.

[34]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 53.

[35]Don Carlos Mandiola Gana, "El oro de Malga-Malga," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 235.

[36]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

Valdivia soon found that the report concerning Michimalongo had not been exaggerated. A strong position had been taken by the natives from which it proved difficult to dislodge them. One Spaniard—Rodrigo Sánchez—was killed in the fray and many were gravely wounded. Spanish arms and horses finally cast the die in favor of the *conquistadores* and Rodrigo de Quiroga added the crowning glory by capturing none other than the *toqui* himself.[37]

Michimalongo was not able to offer the Spaniards a ransom such as Atahualpa had offered them in Perú, but he proffered them the best the country afforded. In return for his freedom, he agreed to lead them to the mines of Malga-Malga (Marga-Marga) from which the Mapochinos extracted gold to pay their tribute to the Incas of Perú. The proposition was eagerly accepted by the Spaniards. Fulfillment of their dearest dreams seemed imminent. Chile, the land of poverty, of icy desert, and of inhospitable mountains seemed about to reward the faithful!

The native chief was as good as his word. The mines were only a short distance from the Spanish encampment and in a few hours the *conquistadores* were examining the ore and the instruments used by the Indians for its extraction. The joy of the Spaniards was boundless. Mariño Lovera says they immediately began to act

> as if the gold were in their pockets. . . . They gave no thought to anything except to think if they would have so many sacks and bags in the country as would be needed to carry so much gold; and they thus started to put on airs as rich people, thinking that in a short time they would go to Spain to establish a family estate or even an earldom and castles of gold, commencing from then to build them of air.[38]

Work in the mines was begun immediately. One hundred *yanaconas* were brought from Santiago, while Michimalongo offered the Spaniards his own mine laborers—twelve hundred men and fifteen hundred women. Valdivia accepted the men but refused the women. As superintendents of the work he left two Spanish soldiers who had been engaged in mining in Perú—Pedro de Herrera and Diego Delgado—and to guard the mines from Indian attacks he left fourteen or fifteen soldiers under the command of Gonzalo de los Ríos.[39] Seeing the work well under way, Valdivia went on to achieve his third objective: location of a convenient place to build a brig so that he might establish communications with Perú by water.

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[37]Información de servicios de Rodrigo de Quiroga, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVI, 117, 118, 129, 138, 144, 155, 205.

[38]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 53.

[39]*Ibid.*, 55.

He found such a spot at the mouth of the Canconcagua Valley, on a point called Concón, where there was plenty of the necessary wood. Twelve men set to work building the vessel, while Valdivia and eight horsemen protected the group from any lurking bands of Indians. Everything progressed smoothly and the brig was almost completed by the first week in August (1541). Work at the mines was going well also, and it seemed as if at last fortune was going to smile on the efforts of the *"puñado de gente"* when real disaster struck.

One night at midnight a messenger arrived at Valdivia's tent from Captain Alonso de Monroy, whom Valdivia had left in Santiago as his lieutenant governor. The message told of a plot just discovered among Sancho de Hoz's friends to kill the governor, take the gold already extracted, seize the brig, and go back to Perú to join the forces of the young Diego de Almagro.[40] Valdivia left at once for Santiago after cautioning the horsemen he left behind to guard well the brig and keep a sharp lookout for Indians.

On his arrival in Santiago, Valdivia was inclined to make light of the story that Monroy and others told him: one afternoon as Juan Gómez, the youthful *alguacil mayor,* was crossing the plaza, Pastrana approached him and asked,

"Have you heard from the governor, Señor Juan Gómez? They tell me that the mines have already produced a great amount and that the brigantine is practically completed."

"That news has arrived, *Señor mío,*" answered Juan Gómez, "and God grant that it be true so that we may breathe freely soon."

The young man excused himself and went on his way.

That night several men gathered in the house of Monroy, among them Sancho de Hoz, Chinchilla, Pastrana, and Martín de Solier. During the evening, Martín de Solier and Chinchilla got into an apparently violent quarrel over the color of a certain horse. Others present attempted to pacify them but their words grew more insulting and suddenly one of them overturned and extinguished the candle that lighted the room. There was a general dispersion of guests and Inés de Suárez sent a *criada* for another candle. But when the light was brought, a curious scene met the eyes of the beholders: Sancho de Hoz, dagger in hand, was held off by Alonso de Monroy who had a vise-like grip on his wrist; Chinchilla and Juan Gómez were engaged in a sword battle, while Juan

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[40]Declaración de Luis de Toledo, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 342; Inés de Suárez, *ibid.,* XXII, 325; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

Lobo, the priest, weaponless, backed into a corner, covered himself as well as he could with a three-legged stool and parried the blows of Antonio de Pastrana's weapon. Martín de Solier had disappeared.

Much embarrassment ensued on the part of the conspirators at the appearance of the light but they attempted to pass the incident off as one of mistaken identities and Valdivia's friends accepted the explanation. Things gradually got back to normal and soon the curfew put an end to the gathering. Thirty minutes later Monroy had a messenger on his way to Valdivia.[41]

Valdivia had arrived in Santiago about midday and all afternoon his friends tried to convince him of the implications of the events of the evening before. Apparently, the governor was unwilling to believe that a real plot existed just when the future of the little colony looked so bright. At sunset he left the room, still unconvinced, but just as he started across the plaza he saw two horsemen approaching. Their horses plainly showed the effects of a hard journey and only the constant prodding of the riders kept them at a jaded gallop. Even as he watched, one horse and rider fell. Curious bystanders rushed out and grabbed the reins of the other. The tired men were Gonzalo de los Ríos, captain of the guard at the mines, and Juan Valiente, the negro, and the news they brought was that the twelve hundred natives working in the mines had risen and killed the *yanaconas* and the Spaniards; they had gone on to Concón, hurled much of the gold into the sea, killed the Spaniards there, and burned the brig. Only they survived the awful catastrophe.

Most of the inhabitants of Santiago were gathered about the men before their story was finished and grief swept the town at the report of the new misfortune. In the midst of the general consternation, a horseman rode by at a gallop giving every evidence of joy and mirth, laughing and jingling some harness bells. Valdivia, in anger, demanded the rider's apprehension. It was Alonso de Chinchilla. The governor commanded that he be kept incomunicado in the house of the *alguacil mayor*, Juan Gómez, until he (Valdivia) could ride to Concón to investigate the tragedy there.[42]

While Inés de Suárez cared for Gonzalo de los Ríos and Juan Valiente, Valdivia gathered forty of his most trusted men and

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[41]Gana, "El oro de Malga-Malga," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 235.

[42]*Ibid.*, 242; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

left for the coast. The town was left under the care of Monroy, and Juan Gómez was cautioned to guard his prisoner well.

The journey of the governor was a speedy one. He found the report of the two men only too true. The brig lay in blackened ruins and signs of carnage met his eye on every hand. There were many evidences, too, that the trouble was not over, and he hurried back to Santiago to ready the town for an attack that he felt sure lay not far ahead.

During Valdivia's absence Juan Gómez carried Chinchilla a lunch tray sent him by Pastrana. As the prisoner wolfishly tore a tortilla in two, a small note fell out. Both men grabbed for it but Juan Gómez got it. It read: "Do not confess because nothing is known." Chinchilla, with a sudden leap, grabbed the note from Juan Gómez and swallowed it. His destruction of the evidence did not prevent Monroy from arresting and imprisoning in separate houses Pedro Sancho de Hoz, Don Martín de Solier, Sebastián Vázquez, Martín Ortuño, Bartolomé Márquez, and Antonio de Pastrana. In an effort to get to the bottom of the plot, he applied "third-degree" methods to Bartolomé Márquez.[43] After a few lashes by Domingo, the negro town crier, Márquez was ready to tell everything and Luis de Cartagena was there to take his testimony. Similar tactics were employed with the others, and when Valdivia returned he was confronted with seven signed confessions admitting that Sancho de Hoz and his followers had planned to kill Valdivia, take the brig by force, and return to Perú to join the forces of the young Almagro. They also admitted that the plot had existed since they left Lima and they had been waiting only for a favorable opportunity to execute it. The building of the brig had afforded what they thought was the opportunity.[44]

The proof of the intrigue left Valdivia stunned. He had just lost a dozen or more men at the mines and the brig and to take seven more from his small force—especially in the face of the expected Indian rising—was a serious thing to do. Mutiny within his ranks was also serious. How could he settle the trouble? If he should grant pardons to all, would that clemency win gratitude and loyalty or only contempt as a proof of weakness? Monroy, tired of hearing his leader debate the question, threw the confessions on the table and walked out. Valdivia sat late into the night reading them and making a decision. The next morning Monroy

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[43]Declaración de Juan Alvarez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 240.

[44]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 56; Señora Inés Echeverría de Larraín, "Pan subcinericio" in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 243; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

received the sentences: death to everybody except Sancho de Hoz; for him, imprisonment.[45]

The sentences were carried out as soon as possible. Chinchilla, as the greatest offender, was hanged first and alone. He was led to the gallows, which stood on a spur of Santa Lucía hill, by Domingo, one of the priests walking at the side of the condemned one. Behind them rode Juan Gómez, Luis de Cartagena, and Alonso de Monroy. It was only a matter of moments before his lifeless body was hanging limply from the "tree of justice."[46]

The other culprits were executed soon after, temporary gallowses being erected on the main plaza. There is some confusion about both the time and the order in which they were hanged. Vásquez, it seems, after confessing himself to his priest, received a last-minute pardon.[47]

Don Martín de Solier, by virtue of being a nobleman, escaped the hangman's noose. Instead, a strong-armed executioner struck off his noble but faithless head at a single blow as the final act in that day's program of justice.[48]

The record of that day's work did not go into the *cabildo's* books. Only by knowing the events can one see a reflection of them in the actions of that body. On August 7, the *cabildo* had sat as usual and Don Martín de Solier and Antonio de Pastrana were in their places as *regidor* and *procurador*. August 11, the body met again and, ignoring Don Martín's death entirely, they elected Bartolomé Flores to take the office of *procurador* of the town, "since Antonio de Pastrana is dead."[49]

Order had scarcely been restored to the Spanish ranks before trouble with the natives once more loomed large on the horizon. Valdivia called a meeting of the chiefs, presumably to arrange for food, but when seven *caciques* responded to his call, he held them

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[45]Echeverría, "Pan subcinericio," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 250.

[46]Declaración de Martín de Candia, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 443.

[47]Declaración de Juan Jufré, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 509. Note: Accounts of the hangings are given by several witnesses at the trial of Vilagra, in volume XXII of Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, 116, 139, 171, 195, and 313. Also, Valdivia confessed to Charles V that he "hanged five men, being the leaders" of the plot, but he did not name them.—Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545. Mariño Lovera records the executions and names all of the offenders except Martín Ortuño.—Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 56.

[48]Echeverría, "Pan subcinericio," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 252.

[49]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 95, 97.

as hostages, guaranteeing their release when the food was delivered.[50] It was evident to the governor that a general uprising was brewing, and he hoped to use the hostages to his advantage.

Valdivia had stationed Pedro Gómez de Don Benito and ten soldiers on the north bank of the Cachapoal River with orders to break up any gathering of Indians that they found and to demolish any fortified areas. The men had been there several weeks and had broken up many parties but on September 9, Pedro Gómez sent a messenger to Valdivia to tell him that the parties were increasing and expressed a fear that his small garrison could not hold out long against a concerted attack.[51] Valdivia left that night with some ninety men, to reinforce him, leaving the town, as usual, under the care of his lieutenant, Alonso de Monroy. Only about fifty Spaniards remained in Santiago, thirty of them horsemen.[52]

On the morning of September 10, a *yanacona* boy belonging to Francisco Aguirre, brought news to his master that the woods not far from Santiago were full of natives, and he believed they were set on war since they chased him almost within view of the town. Aguirre relayed the news to Monroy who took immediate action. He asked Inés de Suárez if he should release the seven *caciques* still held as hostages in hopes of mollifying the natives, but such a suggestion she sternly rejected. A council of war was then held for the entire town and every person assigned to his post.[53] Guards were stationed that night and just before dawn, September 11, Santiago de Azoca, one of the sentinels, called the town to arms.[54]

The Spaniards on horses went out from the town to meet the onslaught of savages and tried to defend the territory beyond the river banks. But the Indians had resolved on a fight to the finish, and they hurled themselves into the battle with reckless disregard for their dead or wounded. Though every Spaniard wielded his sword as only the Spaniards of that period could, Indians poured in so fast no breach could be made. In spite of their horses, they found themselves forced back across the river; back to the limits of the town; finally back to the plaza itself.

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[50]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 57–58.

[51]Don Julio Vicuña Cifuentes, "La destrucción de Santiago," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 253.

[52]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545; Pedro de Valdivia to Hernando Pizarro, September 4, 1545.

[53]Vicuña Cifuentes, "La destrucción de Santiago," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 253.

[54]Probanza de méritos de Santiago de Azoca, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XII, 40.

All day the battle raged. Rodrigo González, the priest, said later that it was like the Day of Judgment for the Spaniards and that only a miracle saved them.[55] Though the priest did not designate the miracle, it seems to have been the same one that so often had saved them since their departure from Cuzco—the miracle of womankind that accompanied them: Inés de Suárez.

All day she went about among the men, carrying them supplies and food, treating their wounds, giving them comfort and encouragement. In the afternoon when the Indians had already set fire to the straw roofs of the houses and most of them were burned; when the little band of defenders had been pushed back to the plaza and were suffering torments of wounds, smoke, and thirst; when hope had almost deserted the men, Inés de Suárez stepped forward with a suggestion. All day the seven *caciques* that remained prisoners of the Spaniards had been calling encouragement to their people. So far the natives had not been able to reach the house where they were held. The proposal of Inés de Suárez was that the Spaniards should decapitate the seven chiefs and toss their heads out to their followers. There was some objection to the plan[56] since several felt that the *caciques* were their only basis for bargaining with the Indians when the city fell. Doña Inés insisted and went herself to the house where the chiefs were guarded by Francisco Rubio and Hernando la Torre and gave the order for their execution. Mariño Lovera says that the guard, La Torre, asked:

"In what manner shall we kill them, Señora?"

"In this manner," answered the intrepid woman, and seizing his sword, cut off the heads of the chiefs, "as if she had been a Rowland or the Cid."[57]

The heads were thrown in among the Indians and Doña Inés, wrapping herself in a coat of mail, went boldly out to the plaza to rally the dispirited men.

The end seems to have justified the means, for at the sight of the gory heads of their chiefs, disorder appeared in the Indian ranks, and the Spaniards, spurred to greater efforts by the woman among them, succeeded in driving the disorganized hordes from the town.[58]

The dispersal of the natives had come only just in time to save the Spaniards. Two of the force were dead and scarcely any were

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[55]Información de Rodrigo González, in Medina. *Documentos inéditos,* XXII, 160.

[56]Declaración de Luis de Toledo, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 349.

[57]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile,* 59–62.

[58]*Ibid.,* 62.

without serious wounds.[59] Many horses were killed or dying—almost as serious a loss as that of men. Night was coming on and flames and smoke from the burning buildings were rendering their position impossible. Only a house or two remained standing on the east side of the square where Francisco de Aguirre had had charge of the defense. His biographer, Luis Silva Lezaeta, gives him full credit for saving this part of the square,[60] and whether due to his efforts alone or not, it was a blessing for the tired and wounded men.

Sancho de Hoz had surprised the men about him that day. He was still in prison as a result of the plot in August but when the fight started, men were needed too badly to spare any as a guard for him so he was left to his own devices. His hands were manacled, but in the fiercest part of the battle he appeared with a lance in his hands and fought as best he could. Monroy, seeing his plight, struck the irons off his wrists and left him free to use his lance. He fought so well that when Valdivia returned and received an account of his deeds, he pardoned Sancho de Hoz from the remainder of his prison sentence and when the governor issued *repartimientos,* he gave Sancho de Hoz both land and Indians.[61]

The night following the battle was indeed a dark one for the small force at Santiago. They suffered not only from their wounds, from hunger, and from loss of their comrades, but also from fear of what the future held. Must they abandon their project? Or could they retrace their steps to Perú if they tried?

With the morning went a messenger to inform Valdivia of the day's disaster. Four days later, the governor was back in Santiago with a small force, leaving the remainder of his men to follow with Pedro Gómez. When he took stock of the resources remaining to him and his colony, salvaged by Inés de Suárez, he found that they had only the clothes they wore, which were old ones used for fighting, two pigs, one suckling-pig, a rooster and a hen, and about two handfuls of wheat—small capital for so ambitious an enterprise as the establishment of a new province.[62]

Apparently there was never any doubt in Valdivia's mind that he was going to remain in Chile, though he may have been making

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[59]Several witnesses put the death toll of the Spaniards at two. See Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* X, 271; XII, 71, 75, 81. Mariño Lovera says that none was killed (p. 66) and Valdivia puts the number at four. Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[60]Luis Silva Lezaeta, *El Conquistador Francisco de Aguirre,* 64.

[61]Declaración de Inéz de Suárez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XXII, 623. Most of the other witnesses in Villagra's trial substantiate this statement. See pages 116, 139, 171, 195 in the same volume.

[62]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

a virtue of necessity, for it seems impossible that the group could have returned to Perú considering its dearth of supplies. At the same time, he recognized that in staying there they were facing a period of great trial. The battle of Santiago was only the opening engagement in a three-year period of almost unceasing hostilities by the natives. Instead of returning to their normal way of life, Valdivia says that the Indians did not sow but fed themselves on a few roots and a small oat-like seed and other herbs "which the land grew of its own accord," and devoted their time to harassment of the Spaniards. The *conquistadores* were penned to Santiago and its immediate vicinity. To secure food was their most pressing problem. Valdivia wrote to his king:

> Seeing the plight we were in, it seemed to me that if we were to hold the land . . . we must live by the toil of our hands as in the beginning of the world, and I set about sowing.[63]

It was fortunate that the climate permitted two harvests per year. Though Santiago was destroyed in September, the Spaniards were able to plant their two handfuls of wheat at once. They were not, however, allowed to do it in peace. *Yanaconas* and Spaniards worked side by side, the latter with their arms always by their sides. The horses were kept saddled during the day and at night a mounted guard kept watch over the town and the freshly planted fields. When the sowing was completed, Valdivia divided his horsemen into groups—one to keep watch over the town and fields while the other rode with him eight or ten leagues out to break up bands of Indians which surrounded them on every side.

It was many months before a harvest came from the meager planting—and then only twelve *fanegas* of wheat, most of which was put immediately back into the ground for a second harvest—and a starvation period descended on the new-born city which beggars description. Valdivia says that

> many of the Christians had to go sometimes to dig up roots for food . . . and there was no meat, and the Christian who got fifty grains of maize a day thought himself well off; and he who had a handful of wheat did not grind it to take away the husks.[64]

The pigs and chickens were regarded as almost sacred animals and eggs and offspring were carefully guarded to build up a future food supply.

The destruction of their homes had taught the Spaniards the danger of straw roofs and wooden buildings. As the town was laboriously rebuilt, adobe bricks were used and fortifications were

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[63] Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.
[64] *Ibid.*

not neglected. Valdivia described the wall he built for protection as sixteen hundred feet square, one and one-half *estados* (one *estado* equals two *varas*) high, requiring two hundred thousand bricks one *vara* long and a *palmo* high. In case of an Indian attack, the *yanaconas* and children took refuge within it—the baggage and food were stored there—and the men on foot defended it, while the horsemen rode out to protect the sown fields. All of this was done, he said, "by our own toil; with our arms by our sides we worked from start to finish without resting an hour."[65]

It was soon clear to Valdivia that the best efforts of his small force would not be enough to save his colony unless help could be obtained from the outside. He was in desperate need of more men, more horses, more ammunition, to say nothing of clothing and food. He shrank, however, from the thought of how that help must be procured. Since his brig had been burned, there was only one way to communicate with Perú, and to retrace that hazardous path through hostile Copiapó, foodless Atacama, and difficult Tarapacá was a feat that he did not dare ask of one man or two. Sending more meant a serious depletion of his force of defenders.

When the problem of obtaining outside help was mentioned to Monroy, he volunteered to return to Perú for aid. Valdivia let him have five men to accompany him—"I could not give him more," he lamented to Charles V—and chose six of their best horses for the trip.[66] In order to take the best care of the horses Valdivia ordered his blacksmith to make new shoes for each one and to supply an extra set of shoes and one hundred nails for each horseman to carry with him. He also ordered new stirrups. Since iron was so scarce in the town, it was necessary to use gold for the stirrups and other light trappings and even for guards of the swords that had to be repaired.[67]

Valdivia was fully aware that Monroy's trip would be useless unless he could carry back some gold. The evil reputation of Chile made it necessary to refute that report by evidence of its worth. Among the Spaniards of Santiago there remained some seven thousand *pesos* worth of gold that the *yanaconas* had brought out of Malga-Malga before its destruction and that Valdivia was able to borrow. He supplemented it with personal letters of credit and made out careful reports to Pizarro, if he should still be living. One morning in December, 1541, Alonso de Monroy and his five companions—Pedro de Miranda, Juan Pacheco, Juan Ronquilla, Martín de Castro, and Alonso Salguerro—rode out from Santiago

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[65] *Ibid.*

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Thayer Ojeda, *Los conquistadores de Chile*, I, 164.

on their return trip to Perú little imagining that it would be two years, almost to the day, before that journey was completed and then only by two of them.[68]

During the two years of Monroy's absence, the little colony between the arms of the Mapocho River lived a hand-to-mouth existence. It was a period of continuous fight for survival. Valdivia says that the scarcity of food could have been better endured if only the men could have stayed in their homes, but he kept thirty or forty riding about the plain at all times. When such a group found itself without food, its members rode in and another group went out. "And so we went about like ghosts," he wrote Charles V, "and the Indians called us *cupais*, which is the name they give to their devils, for whenever they came in search of us (they know how to attack at night), they found us awake, armed, and if need be, on horseback."[69] It was such unrelenting watchfulness that enabled one hundred and eighteen men to survive and to be there to greet the help that came as a result of Monroy's efforts two years later.[70]

All went well with Monroy and his men until they reached the Copiapó Valley. There they were attacked without warning by the Indians and four of the party were killed at once. Monroy and Miranda escaped temporarily but their tired horses were unable to put enough distance between them and the Indians and they were taken prisoners. Led before Andequín, the *cacique* of the Valley, they were surprised to find another Spaniard, Francisco Gasco, his chief adviser.[71] Gasco treated them courteously and used his influence to save their lives. The prisoners were stripped of their weapons and the gold; the dispatches, too, were destroyed, though a letter of credit from Valdivia was overlooked. For several weeks they were confined to their quarters but gradually—presumably through Gasco's influence—more liberties were extended to them. At the end of three months' captivity they made good their escape by stabbing the *cacique* to death and forcing Gasco to

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[68]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 77.

[69]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[70]Thayer Ojeda, *Los conquistadores de Chile*, I, 82.

[71]According to Ramón Laval's story, the Spaniard was one of Diego Almagro's men who had been captured by the Indians. Seeing the futility of trying to escape, he had accepted his lot philosophically and after a few years' residence, during which he had won the confidence and admiration of the Indians by his flute-playing, Andequín had honored him by offering three of his female relatives as wives. Gasco had accepted the gift and at the time of Monroy's arrival was the father of many sons.—Don Ramón Laval, "El Pago de Chile," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 281.

go with them—the three left on two horses—to show them the way to Perú.[72]

When Monroy and Miranda reached Cuzco, September, 1542, they were penniless. Only the letter of credit sent by Valdivia remained to provide funds for their return journey. Soon after their arrival they learned that Francisco Pizarro had been dead since June 26, 1541—killed by Diego de Almagro, *el mozo*. Almagro, in turn, had been executed only a few days before Monroy's arrival—on the plaza at Cuzco where his father had been beheaded by Hernando Pizarro—by Vaca de Castro, the new governor of Perú. The governor received Monroy kindly and listened sympathetically to his story, but "being so busy trying the guilty, bringing peace to the land, rewarding services, sending out captains to make further discoveries," and having an empty treasury (as usual), he was not able to give much material aid to Valdivia's representative.[73]

Monroy was fortunate, however, in finding two men who not only had a desire to accompany him on his return to Chile, but also had money to invest. Cristóbal de Escobar Villarroel, who had been a trader in the West Indies since 1531 and had backed many ventures, offered him five thousand *castellanos* (about $14,500) which would equip seventy horsemen. In gratitude, Monroy appointed him *maestre de campo* of his force.[74] The other who aided him was a priest, Gonzalo Yáñez (Gonzaliáñez) whom Valdivia says accompanied Monroy back to Chile,[75] but who is not included in Thayer Ojeda's list of those who came to Chile

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[72]There are several versions of the events leading up to the stabbing of the *cacique*. Thayer Ojeda says he was stabbed openly and the prisoners escaped through a shower of arrows.—*Los conquistadores de Chile*, I, 164. Ramón Laval, in the story cited in the note above, says that the Spaniards got all of the Indians drunk at a banquet, and killed the chief and four of his followers who had heped Miranda outside when he feigned illness. Gasco was horrified by the murder and remonstrated with the Spaniards but they threatened him with the same dagger unless he showed them the way across the desert.

Mariño Lovera has still a different version in which the two prisoners offered to teach Andequín to ride. He accepted their offer and every day they and Gasco took him a little further from camp in the daily ride, two of the men running afoot each day alongside the chief and one of the others as they rode. One day when they considered themselves far enough from camp, they stabbed the *cacique*, forced Gasco to mount behind one of them, and left for Perú.

[73]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 5, 1545.

[74]Thayer Ojeda, *Los conquistadores de Chile*, II, 85.

[75]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

with Monroy.[76] Vaca de Castro was generous in allowing Monroy to recruit men for the return journey, and promised to send a ship of supplies as soon as he had order restored in Perú.

Monroy stopped in Arequipa to buy arms and supplies for his men, and to inquire about the purchase of a ship in which to send more supplies to Valdivia at once. He discovered that Lucas Martínez Vegaso, brother of the Cuzco merchant who had helped Valdivia equip his first expedition, was living in Arequipa, and he went immediately to see him. He told the merchant of the initial success of Valdivia's venture, of the gold they had found, how the stirrups and the harness-trappings of his horses had been made of gold, and, last of all, of the desperate straits in which he had left the colony. Lucas Martínez thought highly of Valdivia and had once offered to advance him money for exploratory expeditions at the time when Valdivia imagined that he and Inés de Suárez had settled in Charcas for life. The story that Monroy told moved him and after some deliberation he said:

> Look for a ship, Señor Monroy, in which to put those things most needed by your governor; I have only one [ship], the *Santiaguillo*, and I cannot give it because I use it in the business of my mines; but if you do not find a ship on the nearby coast, I am disposed to give you even the *Santiaguillo* although I should lose much by it. Prepare yourself, then, to leave.[77]

Valdivia's men left to search for a ship, but ended by taking the *Santiaguillo*—as perhaps Lucas Martínez suspected they would. He loaded it with arms and ammunition, much-needed ironware, clothing and food, and countless other things. One of the most percious items of cargo was wine—for four months in Santiago mass and all divine services had been suspended for lack of it.[78]

The captain of the small boat was Diego García Villalón, a friend of Lucas Martínez who had come to Perú only three years before. He was only twenty-six years old and when Monroy asked him to take the ship out to Chile, he answered:

> They haye told me that Chile is a place accursed of God, Señor Monroy; but when you, who come from there, invite me, I cannot refuse the honor that such a valiant one as you does me.[79]

The *Santiaguillo* left Arequipa in the latter part of May, but the young captain was navigating in strange seas and did not

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[76]Thayer Ojeda, *Los conquistadores de Chile*, II, 72.

[77]Don Guillermo Pérez de Arce, "Santiago comienza una nueva vida," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 300.

[78]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[79]Pérez de Arce, "Santiago comienza una nueva vida," in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, I, 300.

reach Valparaiso until September. He missed the port, sailed past it, and went on down the coast as far south as the later sites of Concepción and Imperial. One of Valdivia's *yanaconas* learned that a ship was in the neighborhood and brought the news to his master. Valdivia at once sent him to Valparaiso to signal the ship with fire and smoke. Seeing the signals and interpreting them rightly, Captain Diego García Villalón reversed his course and soon anchored at Valparaiso.[80]

He went immediately to Santiago with the few men he had brought to help the Spaniards. The ship was so small that he had been able to accommodate only seven others besides himself—among them Francisco Martínez, the merchant who had started out with Valdivia and who had been left at Arequipa because of the wounds received in an Indian fight. Since it was his money that had equipped the initial force, he had come to see how well he had invested his funds. And the sight that met his eyes must have been small comfort to him—one hundred and eighteen men, skeletons of their former selves, practically nude except for skins of animals, ammunition gone, "not occupied in anything more than in most laboriously sustaining themselves."[81]

The good merchant was destined, however, to witness a miracle. The ship had brought twenty-six thousand *pesos* worth of goods to be divided among the people; and when Inés de Suárez had graciously distributed new clothing for each individual from head to foot, and Valdivia had dispensed warm comfort in glasses of new wine, Santiago beheld a new citizenry. Hope now flamed where despair had smouldered. The Spaniards were ready to go forward once more in the cry of "Cristo y St. Iago!"

Monroy and his men—seventy of them—arrived at Santiago in December. Both men and horses were in bad condition "through not having seen one peaceful Indian from Perú to here, suffering much hunger through finding the food everywhere taken away."[82] Cristóbal de Escobar, the *maestre de campo*, who was rather old, had lost his nose from the intense cold of the Atacama desert—a misfortune that gave great pain to all his companions. But the men arrived well-armed and well-equipped. Twenty of them were arquebusiers. After a few weeks of complete rest for man and beast, Valdivia once more set his face toward conquest.

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[80]Declaración de Diego García Villalón, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XII, 166.

[81]*Ibid.*, 168.

[82]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

Pedro de Valdivia
Franco de Villagra
Gmo Alderete
Adelantado

CHAPTER VI

The Beginning of Spanish Expansion in Chile, 1544-1547

The arrival of the *Santiaguillo* with its clothing, food, and wine had given the little colony of Santiago a new lease on life, and the coming of Alonso de Monroy and his men with their horses and guns had restored its self-confidence. Like the bedridden man of Jerusalem, Santiago, finding itself suddenly and miraculously cured of all ills, raised itself on sturdy limbs of hope and prepared "to take up its bed and walk." In disposing of the bed, the city fathers found a good house-cleaning needed.

During the trying months following Santiago's destruction, life for the Spaniards had been confined to a desperate struggle for survival. The *cabildo* had practically ceased to meet from both lack of time away from the daily tasks of digging, building, planting, etc., and from a lack of paper to keep its records. Municipal authority had dwindled to a mere theoretical shadow that held no terror for the lusty law-breaker. Any attempt to impose fines was absurd in the face of the abject poverty of the colony and corporal punishment was not to be thought of among such a small group facing so numerous an enemy. Only Valdivia's strong will and the exigencies of self-preservation served to maintain order. The arrival of added forces made the situation more acute, and the *cabildo*, ever jealous of its prestige, quickly reasserted its authority. Within a week after Monroy's arrival, and while he and his men were still recuperating from the effects of their overland journey, the *cabildo* held its first meeting and within the following year there was scarcely any phase of community life that did not feel the weight of its hand. The following is an interesting example of its legislation at this period:

Whereas this town is newly founded and it is needful that it be known what the priests may charge in alms and debts for their services, masses . . . and other things taken over by their sacred office, I [Luis de Cartagena] give them the following:

Por una misa cantada solemne con sus vísperas	15 pesos
Por una misa cantada de Requiem	5 pesos
Por una misa rezada	2 pesos
Por un enterramiento con su vijilia y misa cantada	40 pesos
Por un enterramiento de español con oficios	20 pesos
Por un enterramiento de un niño	8 pesos

Por un enterramiento de un indio cristiano	6 pesos
Por un novenario con su vijilia y misa cantada	30 pesos
Por un treintanario rezado abierto	65 pesos
Por un treintanario cantado	130 pesos
Por una velaciones y misa	15 pesos
Por las misas que dicen de la cruz, que son trece	39 pesos
Las misas votivas cantadas	10 pesos
De una honras solemnes que se entienden nueve lecciones	100 pesos[1]

The *cabildo* also arranged for the collection of delinquent fines owed to the city "by prayers for it [the city], by the book that the scribe has, . . . and the other fines . . . they shall pay in corn." Regulations were passed concerning the economic life of the community. No one could make adobe bricks except those having certificates of permission from the *cabildo* and then only in certain areas designated by the *alarife,* Pedro de Gamboa. No person could put his horse in the common pasture without leaving someone to guard it and no person could take a horse from the pasture for use without the consent of the owner. If any person should be caught going in another's lot, *chácara,* or garden, for fruits, vegetables, or anything else without permission of the owner, he should serve ten days in jail if he were a Spaniard; if a slave or *yanacona,* he was to receive one hundred lashes publicly.[2]

Valdivia's position as governor remained as equivocal as before. Vaca de Castro had ignored the action of the Santiago *cabildo* in electing Valdivia governor—Monroy almost certainly had told him of it—and sent to Valdivia a *provisión* confirming his appointment by Francisco Pizarro as lieutenant governor. To soften the blow to Valdivia's pride, he accompanied it with another providing that Valdivia might name his successor "after his days until the will of the king should be known"—a gesture of which Valdivia said later that he "took no notice."[3] Certainly the action of the governor of Perú was a distinct disappointment to Valdivia and he took no pains to hide that fact. He refused to proclaim the provision before the *cabildo* and Medina says that he replied to Vaca de Castro that he would not accept such a subordinate position.[4]

In January, after Monroy's arrival in December, Valdivia set to work upon a task that was becoming more and more important in the eyes of his original force since the advent of new arrivals—the issuing of *repartimientos* and *encomiendas.* He had attempted a distribution of the land in the first months of the colony's life

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[1]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 104.
[2]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 107.
[3]Proceso de Valdivia, in Barros Arana, *Obras completas,* VII, 54, 89, 103.
[4]Medina, *Diccionario Biográfico,* 915.

but his ignorance of the surrounding country and of the number and location of the natives and the lack of coöperation on the part of the Indian chiefs had rendered his work ineffective. After the burning of Santiago, naturally all thoughts of such distribution had been abandoned. With new men in the colony, it became necessary to at least designate those who would remain in the district of Santiago, and that Valdivia did, naming sixty *vecinos* among whom the district should be divided.[5] The division was purely a "paper plan" which could be put into effect only after the subjugation of the Indians, a feat that Valdivia was eager to attempt as soon as Monroy's forces were fully recovered.

Hearing Monroy's *arcabuceros* fire their guns on their entrance into the Mapocho Valley, and doubtless being warned by spies of the number of the newcomers, the Indians had withdrawn from the immediate environs of the town into the province of the Promaocaes.[6] They did not, however, show any indications of submission. On the contrary, they sent messengers to Valdivia inviting him to bring the recent arrivals against them that they might see whether or not the new forces were as valiant as the old ones. If they were, further resistance was useless and they would come in and serve; if not, they would continue the war.[7] Valdivia sent them assurance that he would come soon.

By the first of February, 1544, Monroy and his men were completely recovered, and Valdivia was ready to undertake the real conquest of the country. He had sent a small advance guard on to the south and upon receipt of a message from them that the situation in that quarter looked precarious, Valdivia decided to begin operations from there.[8] The Spaniards found the Indians strongly entrenched in carefully chosen places, protected by river, mountain, or marsh. Several days they went about breaking up the bands of natives that they found and destroying their forts, walls, and ditches.[9] Once the Spanish force came near being destroyed because of native trickery. After several defeats, the Indians sent a messenger to Valdivia to ask for peace, but when the Spaniards followed the messenger, he led them into an ambush where many were wounded because of the surprise of the soldiers,

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[5]Silva Lazaeta, *El conquistador Francisco de Aguirre*, 69; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[6]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[7]*Ibid.;* Probanza de Santiago de Azoca, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XII, 109.

[8]Probanza de Santiago de Azoca, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XII, 109; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 291.

[9]Información de servicios de Rodrigo de Quiroga, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVI, 260.

the number of the enemy, and the fortifications and the difficulty of the land.[10] Convinced by the indecisive character of the fighting that it would be impossible to reach the center of resistance, Valdivia thought it the better part of valor to return to Santiago to recoup his forces.[11]

After a few days rest, the Spaniards sallied forth again. The fighting force on this expedition was composed entirely of horsemen and the marshy, bramble-covered terrain did not present such a difficulty as before. Three times Valdivia met the enemy, and three times routed him and destroyed his forts.[12] The Indians were forced to retire south of the Maule River, "leaving all their villages burned, and deserting the best stretch of land in the world, so that it looks as if it had never had an Indian in it."[13] Valdivia then returned to Santiago to prepare to subdue the Indians in the north.

The Spaniards had one little fort north of Santiago at Quillota, where Valdivia intermittently kept a small force. Thinking that the natives were not so well organized to the north, Valdivia sent a band of horsemen under the command of Pedro Gómez de Don Benito against them, but the Spaniards found them so numerous—the famous Michimalongo led them—that they were forced to return to Santiago for more help.[14] Valdivia led the second expedition and the wily Michimalongo began a strategic retreat northward, knowing full well that the self-confident Spaniards would follow him. They did not disappoint him, and in a narrow defile in the valley of Limari, the natives fell upon them in such force that most of the *conquistadores* sustained wounds, many of them severe.[15] The horses of the Spaniards again saved the day for them and the Indians were finally forced to flee.

The campaign had convinced Valdivia of the worth of an idea that he had been harboring for some time: that another settlement was needed north of Santiago where colonists coming overland from Perú could break the journey by a few days' rest. He recognized the fact that while he could get food, clothing, and other

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[10]Información de Santiago de Azoca, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XII, 43.

[11]Información de servicios de Rodrigo de Quiroga, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVI, 260; Declaración de Juan de Cuevas, *ibid.*, 145; Declaración de Pero Gómez de Don Benito, *ibid.*, 186.

[12]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 293.

[13]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[14]Probanza de méritos de Diego García de Cáceres, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVIII, 99.

[15]Información de Rodrigo de Quiroga, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVI, 119, 260.

supplies by sea, most of the men who came must still come by land because of bringing their horses. The ships of that time were small and the navigation from Perú to Chile was difficult because of the strong south wind which blew up the coast. With a heavily laden vessel the trip was extremely hazardous. In coming by land, horsemen found no particular difficulty from Perú to Atacama, since Peruvian authority was well established to that point and food could be obtained. At Atacama, they could take on enough fresh supplies to last them across the desert. It was only on entering the Copiapó Valley, still tired from the exhausting desert travel, with supplies depleted, that they were sure to encounter hostile Indians.[16] If a town could be established far enough north to enable the Spaniards to send out squads of horsemen to harass the natives and to go to the aid of any expected party, it could not fail to prove a great boon to colonization. In April, another incident still further impressed him with the need of such a town.

In that month, four or five merchants of Perú had bought and loaded a ship with merchandise useful to the infant colony and had sent it south under the command of an Italian, Juan Alberto. The ship's water supply ran low and on its arrival at the mouth of the Copiapó Valley, the crew stopped to replenish it. They saw the natives standing on shore making what they took to be friendly signs, being accustomed to the Incas of Perú, and did not hesitate to lower the boat and row in. Only three Spaniards and a negro remained on board ship. As soon as those in the boat landed, a whole swarm of natives came from the surrounding woods, killed the Spaniards, and seized the boat. The quartet on the ship had beheld the awful catastrophe, and though they were ignorant of navigation, they weighed anchor and put to sea. They hoped by some miracle to find Valparaiso. Being so frightened of the natives and compelled to stay close to the coast for fear of being lost at sea, they tried to sail at night and, in so doing, passed Valparaiso.

Francisco de Villagra heard of the ship through the Indians and sent word of it to Valdivia, who at once commanded that Villagra take twenty horsemen and go down the coast to signal the vessel and give aid if need be. The little party started, but early and heavy rains had so swollen the rivers that the Spaniards had trouble finding places to cross. When they finally found the ship, it was only a blackened hulk. The Indians had burned it, after a storm had driven it ashore in spite of the efforts of the men aboard to keep it off shore. The four men had been killed, of course, and if Mariño Lovera can be credited, the negro had died horribly. He was the first black man the savages had ever

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[16]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

seen, and they were unaware that his color would not wash off. In an effort to see what manner of creature he was, they washed him thoroughly in very hot water and scrubbed him with corncobs until he died.[17]

The incident determined Valdivia not to put off any longer the founding of the town in the north. He accordingly sent Juan Bohón and thirty horsemen to subjugate and pacify the Indians of the Coquimbo Valley where he planned to establish the town. So successful was the captain in carrying out the project "that within two months he had peace in the valley."[18]

Valdivia must have joined him there about June, though it is impossible to fix definitely the date of the town's establishment.[19] The site chosen was at the mouth of the Coquimbo Valley, on a good harbor, near the mines of Andacolla, and in an area where there was an abundance of a certain wax-yielding plant which the Spaniards used for caulking their ships. Valdivia named the town La Serena in honor of his native district in Spain, and in order that the men who were staying there should not feel that they were going unrewarded from one hard task to another, he divided the valley into *repartimientos*,[20] though he doubtless knew that it would be many months before the division could become effective.

The winter of 1544 was so filled with rain and storms that the Spaniards feared they were going to be drowned from the waters

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[17]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, 296.

[18]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[19]Mariño Lovera (*Crónica del reino de Chile*, 78), gives the date as November, 1543, but that is too early since Monroy did not return with help until December, 1543, and Valdivia says plainly that the town was established after the defeat of the Indians in April. Diego Sánchez Morales (Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVIII, 8), says the year was 1544 but mentions no month. Valdivia in his *poder* making Juan Bautista de Pastene his captain-general of the sea (Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 71), September 3, 1544, said that he had recently founded the town, but gave no date. In his letter to Charles V, September 4, 1545, he said that he had founded the town the past summer which might have been any time between October, 1544, and March, 1545. It is the opinion of both Crescente Errázuriz (*Historia de Chile*, I, 298 n.), and Tomás Thayer Ojeda (*Los conquistadores de Chile*, II, 26–27), that the initial settlement was made some time in April, May, or June (1544) but that the raising of the "tree of justice" and election of a *cabildo* was delayed until November or December of that year and has caused the confusion of dates.

[20]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545. Note: Errázuriz (*Historia de Chile*, I, 299, n.) quotes Tomás Thayer Ojeda as giving the following names for the *encomenderos* of Coquimbó: Pedro de Valdivia, Juan Bohón, Diego Sánchez Morales, Pedro de Cisternas, Juan González, Juan de Oliva, García Díaz de Castro, Pero Estéban, Santiago Pérez, Juan Francisco de Riberos, Pedro de León, Lázaro Pérez de Santiago, and Augustín de la Serna.

of the Mapocho. Valdivia said that even the Indians had never seen a winter like it "but had heard from their fathers that in their grandfathers' time there was one year like it."[21] The roads —or rather the trails that served as roads—were impassable in many quarters and any movement of troops was impossible.

When the storms were at their worst—in June or July[22]—news came to Santiago that a ship had anchored in Valparaiso. Valdivia had no doubt that it was the one promised by Vaca de Castro, and he waited impatiently for the floods to subside so that he could reach the harbor. It was August before the trails were passable, and he set out for Valparaiso at once. His surmise was correct. Vaca de Castro had sent his *criado,* Juan Calderón de la Barca, with a shipload of supplies. The pilot and owner of the vessel—the *San Pedro*—was Juan Baustista de Pastene, from Genoa—"a man of much honor, faith, and truth," according to Valdivia,[23] and fortune favored him in that he never had to revise that opinion. From the day of his arrival until that of Valdivia's death, Pastene proved himself an able and loyal aid.

Having such a good man, Valdivia resolved to use him. The one great fear of the conqueror seems to have been that Charles V would give someone else permission to explore and settle the land south of Chile and so bring about conflicts of territorial claims. Valdivia's paramount request to his king was not to let another come to disturb him in the work he proposed to do, which apparently was to weld the whole southern part of South America into one political unit.[24] He was well aware that if he

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[21]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[22]In Valdivia's letter to Charles V in September, 1545, he says the ship arrived in June; in that of October 15, 1550, he says it arrived in July.

[23]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[24]In his letter to the king, September 4, 1545, Valdivia said: ". . . as to what I wish for, that no one may come to turn me aside from Your Majesty's service, nor disturb me at this time, as this wish of mine is to . . . discover, settle, conquer, and pacify all this land down to the Strait of Magellan and to the North Sea [Atlantic]."

In the one dated June 15, 1548, he wrote: ". . . if it is Your Majesty's wish that the Strait be sailed through, send *me* your orders. . . . I will bring it about that from the day when Your Majesty's orders shall come, in a very short time, there shall be a ship in Seville which has come through it."

In that of October 15, 1550, he expressed the desire to have the limits of his grant (over which the king had finally appointed him governor) extended, and ". . . that the coast up to the said Strait be under me, and the land behind up to the North Sea."

In the last one, October 26, 1552, he said: "I am sending the Captain Francisco de Villagra . . . from Villa Rica . . . that he may go into the North Sea, for the natives say that is only a hundred leagues from it. I will see to

could get the coast explored and send Charles V a report on what had been found, his chances for retaining control would be greatly enhanced. He resolved, therefore, to send Pastene to explore the coast by sea and to send Villagra by land that they might support one another.

It was August when Valdivia reached Valparaiso. It was September by the time the cargo of the *San Pedro*—for which Valdivia paid some eighty thousand *castellanos*—had been unloaded and distributed among the Spaniards. On September 3, the governor appointed Juan Bautista de Pastene his lieutenant governor by sea in a very impressive ceremony in which he handed Pastene a banner decorated with a coat of the imperial arms below which was one of his own house, saying to him:

> Captain, I deliver this standard to you so that under the shade and protection of it you may serve God and His Majesty, and defend and sustain his honor, and mine in his name, and that you may give me an account of each and every thing that I ask of you; and you shall make an oath and a contract of homage to complete it.[25]

Valdivia also declared Valparaiso to be the port of Santiago—instead of a separate city—a status which that settlement suffered most of the colonial period, since it was 1802 before a *real cédula* transformed it into a political municipality.[26]

Juan Bautista de Pastene complied with Valdivia's request for an oath of homage and on September 4 was ready to set sail. He had not only his ship, the *San Pedro,* but also the smaller craft, the *Santiaguillo,* brought down by Diego García Villalón. To accompany him in official capacity Valdivia sent Jerónimo de Alderete, the royal treasurer, Captain Rodrigo de Quiroga, and Juan de Cárdenas, whom Valdivia had appointed as head clerk of the tribunal of Chile, in the name of the king.[27] The *San Pedro* was to go along the coast a hundred and fifty to two hundred leagues, the officials were to land and take formal possession of the treritory, to give names to the ports, rivers, islands, and districts, to acquire information about the country, and if possible to load the ship with food and sheep. The smaller ship was to accompany the *San Pedro* to the mouth of the Maule River where it was to await Francisco de Villagra and his men, who were going

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the exploring of that coast and settle it, for Your Majesty will benefit much thereby."

[25]Poder que Valdivia dió á Pastene, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 71.

[26]*Ibid.;* Aurelio Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* II, 28.

[27]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* II, 303.

by land, and assist them in crossing the difficult stream.[28] It also was to load with any grain that Villagra had been able to gather from the natives.

The ships were gone almost four weeks. On the seventeenth of September, Pastene found himself in 41° 15′ south latitude and resolved to make himself acquainted with the country where he was before progressing farther. The vessel began looking for a port and found one "an hour before sunset" whereupon the Spaniards dropped anchor and waited for morning. The dawn showed them "many fields, fertile lands, Indian houses" and a beautiful, broad bay, protected from both north and south winds, which they called San Pedro "since the governor was called Pedro and the ship that discovered it *San Pedro.*" The same day the boat was lowered and Pastene and twelve soldiers—all well armed—went in to shore in a province called Lepil, where the captain Jerónimo Alderete went through the usual ceremony of taking formal possession of the land in the name of the king and of his governor, Pedro de Valdivia. On their return to the ship they took some of the natives with them to carry to Valdivia.

That same afternoon they started the return trip aided by the south wind that blew up the coast, stopping here and there to go ashore and examine the countryside or to take on board other natives to take to their chief. In latitude 39° 40′ they found the mouth of a great river, a port, and a large Indian town, called Ainil. Alderete repeated the ceremony of taking possession, but since it was late in the day, he did not go ashore but performed the ceremony from the ship. He called both the port and the river Valdivia, in honor of his governor.

September 25, the ship found another large river and an island at its mouth. The river was named Santa Inés and the island, Imperial.

The ship passed the Biobió River in the province of Arauco and the Spaniards made the acquaintance of the Araucanian chief, Leochengo. September 30, the *San Pedro* once more dropped anchor in Valparaiso.

A week or so later, Villagra and his land forces returned. He also had brought back natives for Valdivia to interview. He and his men had gone past the province of the Promaocaes and into that of Itata where Aguirre was left with a small force to keep order on the frontier.

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[28]Poder que Valdivia dió á Pastene, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 76. The narrative of Pastene's exploration follows that found in this document unless otherwise stated.

Both Pastene and Villagra brought Valdivia good reports of the southern territory. With the aid of interpreters, the governor also got the opinion of the natives brought back by both parties. His hopes soared at the description of the land—its fertility, the number of natives, the growing crops, the populous towns, the good harbors, etc. Valdivia began at once to make plans for conquering and settling it. As usual, the first requirement was more men. Before he could send for them, however, he must have more money to outfit those who came. He resolved to put the Indians back in the mines. Profiting by his former experience, he used only *yanaconas* and in order that they might spend as much time as possible extracting the ore, the Spaniards carried food out to them from Santiago, twelve leagues away. Valdivia says the Spaniards came "to hold them as brothers, having found them such in our necessity," and that they shared equally with them the food they had for themselves and their children, "which we had sown and gathered by our own hands."[30] During the next eight or nine months, the *yanaconas* were able to extract sixty thousand *castellanos* worth of gold.

About the same time that Valdivia reopened the mines, another encouraging thing developed. The Indians who had been driven from their homes seem to have become convinced that the Spaniards were in Chile to stay. In spite of their most persistent efforts to drive the invader out, they were compelled to watch him building homes, sowing the fields, and harvesting grain, while they, the rightful owners, were driven like hunted things, living a hand-to-mouth existence. The chiefs of the tribes met and after an eloquent speech from Michimalongo pointing out the fact that the Spaniards were eating while the Indians were starving, it was agreed to send a party to Valdivia asking for peace. Valdivia, happy at the prospect of peace, called a meeting of the *caciques* at his home, where gifts were exchanged, and many speeches were made. Inés de Suárez was present and presented the chiefs with small gifts of mirrors, combs, beads, and trinkets. Michimalongo, not to be outdone, presented Doña Inés with a beautiful white feather, which he said came from a bird that lived high up in the snow. He showed her by passing it through a flame that it would not burn. One of his warriors had found it in a freshly-burned *ruca* and had brought it to him to take as a gift to the Inca of Perú who had once shown Michimalongo the signal honor of seating him at his own table. Michimalongo, however, had kept the feather, charmed by its

[30]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

purity of color, but wished the governor's lady to have it to cement the newly-made peace.[31]

From the chiefs, Valdivia got lists of the number and location of the natives formerly ruled by each one. The areas over which *caciques* held authority usually fell into natural divisions separated by rivers, mountains, marshes—any natural boundary. Valdivia used those former divisions as much as was practical in assigning the Indians in *encomienda.*[32] As things turned out, there were not as many Indians as Valdivia had expected, which made the conquest of the land to the south more imperative than ever if all the Spaniards were to receive *encomiendas.*

At the end of the *demora*—that eight or nine months period during which the Indians were able to extract gold from the mines before some of the streams they used for washing the ore dried up—Valdivia resolved to send what gold he had to Perú for more men and supplies. The sixty thousand *castellanos,* he lamented to Charles V, "were it going elsewhere than Perú, was a great amount" but the easy wealth of Perú had brought on its concomitant high prices and Valdivia was compelled to pay dearly for his supplies with the money of which "each peso cost a hundred drops of blood and two hundred of sweat."[33]

To carry the money to Perú and to invest it in supplies, Valdivia chose two men who had already shown themselves to be his loyal supporters. For bringing back horses and men by the overland route he chose the faithful Monroy, one-time savior of Santiago, and for supplies by sea, his equally staunch friend, Juan Bautista de Pastene. The money was divided between them and to Monroy was entrusted a gift of gold plates, cups, and pitchers for Vaca de Castro.[34]

With those two faithful ones, however, there went another, one whose presence in any position of trust for Valdivia is hard to explain. He was none other than Antonio de Ulloa, one of the conspirators who entered Valdivia's tent in the Atacama desert that night at midnight with the intention of killing him. He was going not to Perú for supplies but to represent Valdivia before his king in Spain. Valdivia made to the king a very plausible explanation of why he was going:

He has had letters from Spain from his kinsmen . . . wherein they told him that his elder brother, who had inherited, . . . had died childless, and so that the house should not die out by leaving no direct line, he is going to wed to

[31]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile,* 72.

[32]*Ibid.,* 74; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[33]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[34]Declaración de Diego García de Villalón, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 314.

have someone to inherit it after him. . . . I gave him the leave he sought; and since I am on the road and so busy . . . I am writing this letter for him to give to Your Majesty, so that you may know the state I am in, and give orders that my requests be granted. And since from him may be learned all that I cannot tell here, I end by very humbly begging Your Majesty that in all he shall say and ask for in my name (being convinced that he will say and act like the man he is), that you will favor him as graciously as you would me myself.[35]

Regardless of the convenience of his going just at a time when Valdivia needed a representative, it reveals an almost child-like naïveté in the character of the *conquistador* to believe that one who had once sought his death could ever represent his interests unselfishly in any quarter.

The ship bearing the men left Valparaiso in August, but since it had to be caulked in La Serena before continuing the journey, it was several days before it sailed from there. Valdivia went as far as La Serena to see them off, and it was from there that he wrote his letter to the king dated September 4, 1545. Monroy also stopped there and took with him several Indians by whom he planned to send messages back to Valdivia from Perú. On the morning of September 5, the *San Pedro* with full sails turned her prow north and started for Perú. Valdivia, after assuring himself that the guard for La Serena was sufficently strong, turned his face toward Santiago to carry out a promise he had made to his king in the letter just gone—that he would conquer and settle the land to the south.[36]

On arriving at Santiago, Valdivia immediately set about preparing for the southern campaign. Knowing that more Spaniards would be needed from Perú if the country proved habitable and aware of the need for more money to equip them, the governor declared his intention of putting the *yanaconas* back in the mines. To protect them, however, he had the *cabildo* of Santiago put into effect a code of mining laws that closely followed the one already in effect throughout the West Indies by order of the Council of the Indies, a copy of which had been lost to Chile in the burning of Santiago. Monroy was carrying a request for another from Perú but until his return, Valdivia thought it necessary to enact local laws.[37]

During the months of December, 1545, and January, 1546, preparations were made that duplicated on a smaller scale those made in Cuzco five years before. Valdivia's purpose—though he later

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[35]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 4, 1545.

[36]*Ibid.*, October 15, 1550.

[37]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 113.

denied it—was to establish a town somewhere south of the Maule River which would serve as a base from which to carry on future operations of conquest. Day after day the blacksmiths and the *espaderos* worked on swords, bridles, spurs, bits, horseshoes, nails—all the hundred and one things needed by the horsemen. At the same time, Inés de Suárez—as good a *conquistador* as the best of them, and perhaps a better planner—superintended the arrangements for carrying extra clothing, domestic utensils, pigs, kids, and crates of chickens. Juan Valiente, the negro who had escaped the massacre at Concón and who had learned much from Inés de Suárez concerning care for the sick and wounded, prepared to accompany the expedition as doctor and nurse.[38] Valdivia met with the *cabildo* to leave instructions for the redistribution of *chácaras, repartimientos,* and *solares* abandoned by the people going with him.[39]

The expedition actually got under way February 11. Valdivia and sixty horsemen[40] constituted the fighting force while one hundred fifty Indians of service carried the baggage and equipment.[41] The small party encountered no difficulties with the natives as far south as the Maule River, since Spanish authority was well established to that point. For some distance beyond the river no resistance was met with but Valdivia began to notice a great increase in native population. Sixteen leagues (the league has changed value so often that it is difficult to estimate distances given in leagues) beyond the river—apparently in the neighborhood of the Nuble River—Indian warriors came out to meet the Spaniards and to defend their trails against them. They could not hold out, of course, against Spanish guns and horses, and many fell prisoners to the governor's party. In accordance with his policy, Valdivia did them no harm but sent them as messengers to the surrounding *caciques* asking them to come to the Spaniards peacefully. The *caciques* apparently were not impressed with Valdivia's messages, and one morning three hundred natives appeared in his path, saying defiantly that they already knew what he wanted and while the Spaniards were few and the Indians were many, they (the Indians) intended to kill the invaders. At which bold words the Spaniards fell on them with their horses and killed one-sixth of the force while the rest fled.

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[38]Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* II, 69.

[39]Fact revealed by a document or fragment of a document without name, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 602–603.

[40]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550; Pedro de Valdivia á sus agentes, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* IX, 53. The narrative of this expedition follows these two documents unless otherwise stated.

[41]Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* II, 69.

That afternoon the column reached the province known as Quilacura. Feeling secure after the victory of the morning, the camp slept soundly that night guarded only by Rodrigo de Quiroga on horse and four soldiers on foot. Before dawn the guards discovered the Indians creeping up on the camp—several thousand of them—in what was meant to be a surprise attack. They sounded the alarm while holding back the attackers until the sleepers could awaken and arm themselves.[42] The battle was a fierce one lasting two hours, with the natives fighting "packed together in squadrons like Germans" in such a manner that it was difficult for the horses of the Spaniards to be used as effectively as usual. Finally, however, they managed to kill the native chief and rout the Indians, but only after two horses were killed and many wounds sustained by both horses and men. No more sleep was had in camp that night, but the time until dawn was spent in caring for the wounded and getting the camp in order.

The next day after four leagues of uneasy travel, the Spaniards reached the Biobío River—the stream destined to become so famous in the Araucanian wars. Valdivia describes it as being half a league wide near its mouth where they contacted it, and in the face of the hostility of the natives, he decided not to try a crossing. He found what he considered an excellent place for a settlement but realized that it would be impossible to hold his ground with the small force he had with him. Indian prisoners told him of a plan for concerted action among all the tribes to the south of the Biobío with those north of the river to drive the Spaniards back. His men began to consider the venture perilous. Influenced by so many disquieting indications, the governor decided to turn back to Santiago.

Valdivia says little of his return trip but Góngora Marmolejo says that it was little less than a flight. Valdivia had his followers build huge bonfires that would last for hours to deceive the natives while he and his forces slipped away up the coast.[43]

The tired force re-entered Santiago about six weeks after its departure[44] much to the joy of both those who waited anxiously in the town and those who had made the hazardous journey. Their thanksgiving was increased when they learned that the natives

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[42]Información de servicios de Rodrigo de Quiroga, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVI, 119, 176, 271.

[43]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 13.

[44]In his letter to Charles V (October 15, 1550), Valdivia says that he was gone forty days; in his instructions to his agents (Medina, *Documents inéditos*, IX, 53), he says a month and a half. The minutes of the *cabildo* meeting of March 10 says that Valdivia was present, which would make his trip only one month.—Medina, *Documents inéditos*, VIII, 119.

around Santiago and La Serena were only awaiting news of Valdivia's death—which they felt sure would be accomplished by the Araucanians—to rise again against the Spaniards in those places and make another desperate effort to force the white man to retire from their country. Fearing that there might be trouble in La Serena, Valdivia hastened to send word there of his safe return.

At the time of Valdivia's return there seems to have been no doubt in anybody's mind that he had gone to found a permanent town and had been forced to return because of the hostility of the natives and the small number of his own force. In fact, Valdivia himself publicly admitted that such was the case in April, 1546. He said:

> . . . and this I did . . . thinking to settle in that land a city, and that I would be able to sustain it with the people that I was carrying, until help should come . . . and that those in this city who were lacking *de comer* in the maintaining of it, I would have here land to give to the *vecinos* good *chácaras* and *caballerías*, as is the custom. . . . and arrived at that land . . . seeing the great hostility of the Indians and the few Christians that I was carrying for the purpose of settling and maintaining it, being begged, importuned, and supplicated by all the people to make a return to this city, until I could return with more force . . . I returned with all of them to this city.[45]

Years later, in his letter to Charles V (October 15, 1550), the governor denied that the expedition had been more than an exploratory one and asserted that he had accomplished that which he set out to do—to find a site for a future city, to see if the population was dense enough to support many *vecinos*, and to see if the natives would come in to serve peacefully.

Since Valdivia had given the *cabildo* power to reassign Indians and lands left by those who went with him, and many had thus lost their possessions, it was necessary to make some adjustment on his return. Those who had gained the goods of the dispossessed did not want to return them, of course, but it was impossible and unfair to expect those who had gone in good faith to acquire new land and who had failed in settling it through no fault of their own, to live without their property. It was an impossible task to review each case separately. Valdivia, therefore, joined by the *cabildo* to give more force to his order, commanded that all possessions should remain in the hands of those owning them before his departure[46]—an act which left much grumbling in its wake.

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[45]A document without name, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 602, 603.

[46]Document in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 602–603.

The dissatisfaction over the *encomiendas,* which had existed to some extent since the first division of *repartimientos,* and had been augmented by the recent developments, flared into open resentment in July, 1546. Bartolomé Flores, *procurador* of Santiago, carried before the *cabildo,* July 6, a request that that body should petition Valdivia to make a redistribution of the *repartimientos.* In support of his request, he contended that the district of Santiago was much smaller and was much more sparsely populated than at first supposed, so that one *repartimiento* of Perú had more Indians in it than all those of Chile combined, many of which had only fifty or twenty Indians, and that the *vecinos* and *encomenderos* were unable to keep up their arms, horses, and houses, and to supply refuge to those coming in the future from Perú. He also pointed out that those who lost by this redistribution could be reimbursed by *repartimientos* in the beautiful, thickly-populated land just recently explored to the south[47]—a suggestion which Errázuriz thinks Flores would have hesitated to make if he had had any fear of being one of those so rewarded. Being a member of the governing board of the city, he undoubtedly felt secure in his possessions.[48]

The *cabildo* at this time still contained most of the men who formed the initial body. Flores, himself, had been made a member early in the life of the colony (August 11, 1541) to take the place of the hanged Pastrana. All felt sure of their positions in the community and all favored the request of Flores except Francisco de Villagra. Knowing that it meant more trouble for his chief, he alone refrained from supporting the measure. The others, however, not only supported the request but also formed themselves into a committee to go at once to find the governor and present the petition. They found him in a crowd of people, and Luis de Cartagena read the petition. He was warmly seconded by the members of the *cabildo,* some of whom, being also the *oficiales reales* and presumably representing the rights of the crown, added their voices in the latter capacity. They had brought the request, they said, only "because it was fitting to the service of God, of His Majesty, and to the well-being of the natives and to the perpetuation of this city and of this country." To this Valdivia, after listening to the flow of oratory, rather dryly repied that he had heard and would do that "which

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[47]Requerimiento hecho á Pedro de Valdivia, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 120; all facts relative to the redistribution, unless otherwise stated, are taken from this document.

[48]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* 346.

seemed to him fitting to the service of his Majesty and the well-being of his subjects and of the land and for the perpetuation of the natives."

Twenty days passed in which Valdivia made no reply to the *cabildo*. He later told La Gasca that during that time he consulted no one but his secretary, Juan de Cárdenas.[49] On July 25, the governor proclaimed a *bando* containing the result of his three weeks' work. The number of *encomenderos* of the Santiago district was reduced from sixty to thirty-two, though only nineteen had to be dispossessed because nine were already vacant through previous occurrences. As was to be expected, the members of the *cabildo*, Inés de Suárez, the priests, and the more influential members of the community gained by the redistribution, while those of lesser influence lost. (The exception to that rule was Juan de Cárdenas. He gained nothing but since he remained a staunch friend and supporter of Valdivia, it is to be supposed that his failure to profit was of his own choosing.) To prevent trouble arising from his measure, Valdivia commanded that none of the dispossessed should talk with his former Indians nor to anybody else against the new owners, under pain of a five hundred *pesos de oro* fine, half of which would go to the royal coffer and half to the church. An attempt was made to pacify the losers by promises of rich *encomiendas* to the south as soon as that territory could be conquered.

Naturally great discontent followed Valdivia's announcement. Promises of land to the south were recognized as only "sops" to the unfortunates, since it was clear to most that the reduction of that area to service was yet years in the future. The unrest was augmented by Valdivia's threats of punishment to those who complained. Some of the more determined ones carried their complaints to the Audiencia of Perú and a few were granted repossession, but they were unable to regain control of their lands until after the governor's death.[50] The dissatisfaction occasioned by the events of that winter provided fertile soil for the efforts of the eternal conspirator in their midst—Pedro Sancho de Hoz—and bore ample fruit the following year.

The same month saw another incident that added to the prevailing restlessness. Juan Calderón de la Barca, who had come on the *San Pedro* (1544) in charge of the cargo, had remained in Chile.

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[49]*Proceso de Valdivia*, in Barros Arana, *Obras Completas*, VII, 53. The scribe's name is also written Juan de Cardeña but the name most widely used has been adopted here.

[50]Pleito de Juan Godínez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIV, 232, 245, 250, 256, 263, 269, 274, 278.

He had made a great deal of money out of that one cargo. Word got about that he was a business associate of Vaca de Castro and also carried a commission from him to go and discover some islands. He was a pompous individual and adopted the title of admiral and captain-general, and wished at all times to be treated with the same deference as that accorded Valdivia. He even insisted on an *estrado* in the church exactly like that of the governor and when it was refused, he attended an earlier mass so that his vanity need not suffer from the supposed slight. His silly pomp and presumption soon had the whole town irritated but amused as well. Juan de Cárdenas, Valdivia's secretary, took the matter more seriously and on July 11, immediately after mass, he arose in the church—as Valdivia had done on numerous occasions when there was important news—and delivered a tirade on the presumption of Juan Calderón de la Barca. It was a ranting, undignified phillipic, and the people who heard it were horrified, especially since it took place in the church.[51] Some pretended to believe that it had Valdivia's sanction. Since it occurred during the repartitioning of *repartimientos* those who had lost their land and Indians were ready to believe anything of the governor and the incident added to the already disturbed atmosphere. Perhaps the fact that in the address Cárdenas begged Valdivia to increase his *repartimiento* and *encomienda* had something to do with the fact that his was not increased in the least. The episode served to increase the embarrassment of Valdivia's position, but he did not repudiate his secretary publicly though he later told La Gasca that in his house he "reprimanded him so gravely and treated him so badly that he complained of it to many persons."[52]

Valdivia had heard nothing from the ship sent to Perú in September, 1545, nor had the Indians whom Alonso de Monroy carried with him returned with any message. Since the month of April, he had been thinking of some way to send out another captain to get help. He disliked subjecting his men to the hostility of the Indians by land, but the only sea-going vessel remaining to him was a launch that he had had built for fishing with nets near the coast. He thought, however, that it might make the trip to Perú if the need arose. As days, weeks, and months passed and he still heard nothing, his alarm grew. In the disturbed period following the redistribution of *encomiendas,* it became almost imperative for Valdivia to get some word from Perú. Besides his need for material supplies, there was a greater one for clarification of his position as governor. No confirmation of his election to the governorship

[51]Proceso de Valdivia, in Barros Arana, *Obras Completas,* VII, 66, 85, 98.
[52]*Ibid.,* 67.

by the *cabildo* had yet been received from the king, and his refusal to declare before the *cabildo* his confirmation as lieutenant governor by Vaca de Castro after Pizarro's death left him in a questionable position indeed. Perhaps a message from the king was waiting at Los Reyes. He resolved to risk a trip in the fishing boat (September, 1546).[53]

To command the group he chose Juan de Avalos Jufré—a man whose loyalty had been proven—and with him sent seven others as loyal as he. He carried copies of the dispatches taken by Antonio de Ulloa and a report of Valdivia's recent trip to the south. Valdivia instructed him to give aid to any of the captains previously sent if he should encounter them. In order that he be able to aid them or bring help from Perú, he carried the gold that had been taken from the mines the previous year, which had been loaned —"some willingly," said Valdivia—to the governor. The amount was some sixty thousand *castellanos*.[54]

After the departure of the boat, Valdivia, ever the optimist, turned to directing the planting of maize and wheat and the mining of gold

> so as to send always for men, horses, and arms, this being what we have need of here, because the other things we came to look for, if people are not lacking, there will be plenty of, with the help of God.[55]

A year passed thus in routine tasks. No attempt was made to extend Spanish control. Those who fed their hopes of riches on conquest south of the Maule River began to despair. Inaction on the part of the soldiers made them susceptible to any plan promising excitement. Pedro Sancho de Hoz was not one to see such well-turned soil go to waste. He also had lost his *encomienda* and could approach the disgruntled ones as a fellow sufferer. His soul being devoid of gratitude and his vanity obsessed by a vision of himself wielding the *vara de dos palmas* (the scepter—symbolic of royal authority—used by colonial governors), he soon approached the dissatisfied with a new plot to make himself governor and received promises of support.

The plan was so similar to the one of the Atacama Desert as to show a lack of imagination on Sancho de Hoz's part. He was to pretend to be desperately ill and was to send for Valdivia in order to consult him concerning his last will. Valdivia, being a generous man, could not refuse such a request from his old associate. Once the governor was in the room and interested in conversation, Juan

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[53]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 358–360.
[54]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.
[55]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

Romero would step from behind the draperies and give him a fatal stab with his dagger.[56] The message was sent to the governor. Against the advice of his best friends and of Inés de Suárez, he insisted on answering the call. They were unwilling to let him go alone and so many insisted on going with him that the plot was frustrated by numbers alone. The next day Valdivia left for Quillota.

Sancho de Hoz was not resigned to defeat, however, and after the departure of Valdivia, he approached Pedro de Villagra with promises of great reward if he would aid the plot. The conversation was interrupted before Pedro de Villagra had to give a definite answer, and he went immediately to Inés de Suárez with his news. She counselled him to return the following day as Pedro Sancho de Hoz had asked him to do and to see if he could get details of the plot. Pedro de Villagra did return but apparently someone had reported his visit to Inés de Suárez because he found the conspirator guarded in his conversation, referring only vaguely to two ships that were coming in answer to the complaints that he had lodged against Valdivia in Perú and Spain.[57] Again Pedro de Villagra returned to Doña Inés and that keeper of Valdivia's well-being (if not his conscience) sent a messenger to the governor to come to Santiago. When he arrived and learned the facts, he was extremely angry. For the first time he seemed to realize that there would be no peace in Chile until Pedro Sancho de Hoz was removed by one means or another. He gave the order to take him prisoner.

Valdivia had hardly got his persistent enemy confined when still more disheartening news arrived. Juan Bohón rode in one day from La Serena to bring Valdivia notice that Juan Bautista de Pastene, whom the governor had sent to Perú more than two years before, had just arrived in a ship—the *Santiago*—at La Serena, but that the vessel was in such bad shape that it would have to be repaired before coming on to Valparaiso. He had brought a letter from Pastene, however, which warned Valdivia to watch Sancho de Hoz and told him that Antonio de Ulloa was a traitor, and that the two were confederates.[58] On the heels of the letter came Pas-

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[56]Declaración de Inés de Suárez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 625–628. Unless otherwise stated, Inés de Suárez's account of the conspiracy will be followed, though varying accounts may be found by most of the witnesses of Villagra's trial. Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 26, 41, 50, 59, 74; *ibid.*, XXII, 172, 319.

[57]Two ships brought by Antonio de Ulloa to be used against Valdivia actually had landed in the northern part of Chile. Pedro Sancho de Hoz must have worked out some form of intelligence service with the Indians.

[58]Declaración de Francisco Rodríguez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 284.

tene himself, not waiting for the ship to be repaired for fear that Ulloa might arrive in Chile before him. He repeated what he had written in the letter, and he with others of Valdivia's friends counselled strong measures against Sancho de Hoz. It seemed for a while as if the conspirator were going to get his just desserts but he made a strong plea to Juan Bohón who in turn begged Valdivia on his knees to give the weakling one more chance, and Valdivia, ever fearful of complications at the Spanish court, granted a pardon. It was a conditional pardon, however. Sancho de Hoz was banished from the town of Santiago to take up his residence in the valley of the Talagante, where Bartolomé Flores had earlier been given his four brides.[59]

The remainder of the story brought by Pastene to Valdivia was a strange one—a story of misfortune, of death, of treachery, of Pastene's own loyalty. It is not strange that Valdivia shuddered when he heard it.[60]

The ship had reached the city of Los Reyes twenty-four days after leaving La Serena. There they had news of the civil war in Perú between Blasco Núñez Vela, the new viceroy, and Gonzalo Pizarro, a brother of the former governor and leader of the *encomenderos*. Captain Monroy died soon after leaving the ship and Antonio de Ulloa now showed himself in his true colors. Instead of going on to Spain to carry Valdivia's reports to the king, as he had been dispatched to do, he opened the reports and read them aloud to some of his "foolish and presumptious" friends, and after mocking at them, tore them up. He then went to a cousin of his, Lorenzo de Aldana, who had just been made chief justice of the place by Gonzalo Pizarro, and obtained an order sequestrating the gold found on the dead Monroy until he (Ulloa) should carry a report of all that had happened to Gonzalo Pizarro. Captain Pastene was restrained from leaving Los Reyes.

Antonio de Ulloa reached Gonzalo Pizarro's forces just in time to take part in the battle of Anaquito (January 18, 1546) in which the viceroy Blasco Núñez Vela was defeated and killed. After the victory, Ulloa reported to Gonzalo Pizarro and greatly played up the part he had taken in the battle. He represented himself as an agent of Valdivia and asked for an order to obtain possession of Valdivia's money, saying that he wished to return to Chile with help and supplies. The permission was granted and the order given by which Ulloa not only gained possession of the money on

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[59]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, I, 373.

[60]The narrative followed here is that given by Pedro de Valdivia to the Emperor Charles V, in his letter of October 15, 1550.

the dead Monroy but also that carried by the living Pastene. He also took Pastene's ship.

About this time Gonzalo Pizarro's *maestre de campo,* Francisco Carvajal, arrived in Los Reyes. He was a friend of long standing both to Pastene and Valdivia, having fought side by side with Valdivia in the Italian wars. Pastene went to him for help. Carvajal already knew of a plan by Aldana and Ulloa to kill Valdivia and take over the government of Chile. When he learned that Pastene had been held in the city against his will, he gave him an order permitting him to go to Quito and see Gonzalo Pizarro, but he warned him not to divulge to Pizarro the treachery of Ulloa and Aldana because they stood high with Pizarro and he would not be believed and they might be able to carry out their plan. He advised Pastene to pretend to be a friend of Ulloa and so get permission from Pizarro to aid in the buying. When once out to sea he could do "that which seems to be best for him that sent you!"

Pastene followed his instructions, got the permit from Pizarro to aid in the buying, and returned immediately to Los Reyes. He found that Ulloa had already loaded his ship—the *San Pedro*—and another one and sent them on to Arequipa. He showed Ulloa his permit and Ulloa grudgingly acceded to his request to spend part of the money. However, Ulloa, thinking that Pastene would be unable to find another ship, soon found excuse to go on to Arequipa where he hoped to take the other ships and carry out his plan before Pastene could reach Chile. Aldana aided by putting every obstacle possible in the way of Pastene's efforts to obtain supplies, but Pastene was well and favorably known all along the coast, and he found a merchant who would sell him his ship for a down payment of one thousand *pesos,* trusting Valdivia to pay seven thousand more when the ship reached Chile. Pastene found thirty men willing to go with him and with the remainder of his money bought supplies for their journey.

When Pastene reached Tarapacá, he found that Ulloa had already sailed. Here he learned more details of the plot against Valdivia. Ulloa and eight or ten of his companions planned to distribute the land and Indians among themselves while giving the government over to Gonzalo Pizarro. Pastene redoubled his efforts to overtake the conspirators and, since he was a better seaman and his ship was more lightly loaded, he overtook Ulloa's ships at Atacama. Ulloa, seeing his ship and wishing to detain him, sent Pastene an invitation to come to a conference on board his ship; but Pastene, being warned of a plot to kill him, refused courteously and put his ship out to sea. Ulloa was angry and determined to catch him. He put ashore most of his cargo and some passengers going to settle in Chile, and started after Pastene. He came in sight of the

captain's ship but was not able to overtake it, and returned to Atacama. Meanwhile Pastene had carried his message to Valdivia.

Valdivia says that when the captain had told his story

> this seemed to me so foul and hateful a deed that I stopped my ears, did not like to listen, and my body shook, that so low a man, so forgetful of his allegiance, should not only have thought of it and spoken of it but indeed should have practiced so abominable a treachery against the power of such a great and catholic monarch, his natural lord and king.

Pastene had hardly finished his story when there arrived at Santiago eight Spaniards under Captain Diego de Maldonado who had come by land and were in a terrible condition from hunger and exposure. They were men who had started to Chile as settlers on Ulloa's ship but had been unloaded at Atacama when Ulloa started out to overtake Pastene. Upon his return to Atacama, Ulloa learned of the arrival in Perú of a new representative of the king named Pedro de la Gasca, and that Gonzalo Pizarro had issued a call for all his friends to come to his support. On receipt of this news, Ulloa took the women and children back on board the ship and set sail for Los Reyes, leaving twenty unarmed men and sixty horses and mares to fend for themselves.

The stranded men had moved over into the Copiapó Valley seeking a more hospitable climate but had found instead hostile Indians who set upon them and killed twelve. The other eight escaped on some unbroken mares and made their way to La Senera but "in the likeness of men lost through the toils and hunger they had gone through."

On the first day of December, 1547, Pastene's ship arrived in the harbor of Valparaiso, fully repaired. Soon afterward Valdivia made up his mind to take the ship and go to Perú to fight at the side of the new representative of the king—Pedro de la Gasca. He took certain precautions, however, before going. He appointed Francisco de Villagra lieutenant governor during his absence and asked the *cabildo* to recognize him. This was done and his appointment proclaimed on the plaza, December 7.[61] As soon as Valdivia got news of the *cabildo's* action—he had gone on board the ship December 6—he asked Juan de Cárdenas, his secretary, to record his testimony that he was going to the aid of the king and that he was leaving in Perú the very best directions he could for the protection and maintenance of the two towns of Santiago and La Serena. He asked the men who were going with him (about ten) and some ten or twelve others, to

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[61] Carta del cabildo de Santiago al Rey, December 8, 1547, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 151.

witness the testimony so that there should never be any question concerning his loyalty to the king.[62]

The governor also collected all the available money to carry with him, mostly by means of forced loans, it seems. It was not entirely a new procedure for him, since the records are full of allusions to a "sermon" he preached from the church pulpit one Sunday after mass in which he said that his need for money was so great that he would take it from the alms plate and that if any had it to give and failed to give it, they would have to give him their gold and their hide as well.[63] There is a story to the effect that the method used by Valdivia to obtain the money for this trip was even more distasteful than that of the forced loan. He pretended to relax his law against any Spaniard leaving Chile except at his order and gave notice that all wishing to return to Spain on the *Santiago* might do so. There was an immediate rush. Many people had been saving their gold against just such an opportunity. Each person that carried gold on the ship had to deposit it with the ship's captain and get a receipt for the amount. When all the gold was safely aboard, Valdivia invited all the would-be voyagers back to the beach for a farewell dinner where he spoke to them so eloquently that most of them wept. Jerónimo Alderete and Juan de Cárdenas were waiting near the boat and suddenly Valdivia joined them. They leaped in the boat, pushed off, and made for the ship. As soon as the crowd grasped the significance of the action, they waded out into the water and one actually caught the boat, but Valdivia commanded that he be thrown back into the sea, which was done. Juan Pinel later lost his mind and committed suicide and much of the blame for it was laid at Valdivia's door. Though the above story may be somewhat exaggerated, it agrees substantially with the facts revealed in La Gasca's secret investigation of Valdivia except that the witnesses before La Gasca did not seem to regard the incident as deliberate trickery on the governor's part, but simply as a change of plans. They pointed out that the journey could not have been made "without aid from his friends" and that it was "for the welfare of all and in the services of His Majesty," and that Valdivia gave the "lenders" orders on his goods so that they would be repaid in the next *demora*.[64] The money thus obtained by Valdivia came to be facetiously referred to as the *"ochenta mil dorados"*—gold

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[62]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[63]Declaración de Luis de Toledo, in Barros Arana, *Obras Completas*, VII, 78.

[64]Información secreta hecho por el Licenciado Gasca, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 258–311.

fish netted by Governor Pedro as easily as St. Peter had brought up his net "so full that it break" of ordinary fish.[65]

A few days before Valdivia sailed, news came to him from Santiago of the final chapter in the series of conspiracies set in motion by Pedro Sancho de Hoz. That ever-zealous architect of rebellion could not refrain from taking advantage of the resentment of those whose money Valdivia had taken to try once more for the position of governor. Sancho de Hoz had been prohibited from coming into Santiago since the uncovering of his September plot, but he had henchmen there who kept him well informed of every development. On December 8, he approached the city and sent a letter by Juan Romero to Hernán Rodríguez Monroy advising Monroy to consult others (evidently supporters of Sancho de Hoz) and decide on a time for Sancho de Hoz to appear in the town. He suggested that the time be not later than midnight but agreed that he would wait until they said, "now is the time," and when that call came he would appear on the plaza though

> I do not have nor wish to have other arms to fight nor defend me than the arms of the king, which is *una vara de dos palmas*, and these seals, by the authority of you and of those who in this case wish to show themselves loyal vassals of the king.[66]

Hernán Rodríguez Monroy approached Juan Lobo, the priest, and Alonzo de Córdoba with the plan. He not only found them unreceptive but they warned him that they were going to acquaint Francisco de Villagra with the plot. Monroy became alarmed at his own position and asked what he could do to save himself. The others advised him to take the letter to Villagra and reveal the plan, thereby putting himself on the side of law and order. This he did in their company. Villagra took instant and decisive steps. He recognized at once, if he were to maintain order in Valdivia's absence, that he could not allow anything even approaching a rebellion to develop. His only course was to nip any plot in the bud, and though he had once interceded with Valdivia for the life of Sancho de Hoz, he now ordered his arrest at once. Juan Gómez, the *alguacil mayor,* immediately went to search for him. He was not long in finding the would-be governor, for apparently he had come on into town on the heels of his letter, and Juan Gómez found him with the *vara* in his hand ready to go to the plaza where Juan Romero was to proclaim him governor in name of the king, by virtue of the *real cédula* which Sancho de Hoz had once carried.

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[65]Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,* II, 92–105.

[66]Proceso de Pedro Sancho de Hoz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 155.

Juan Gómez arrested him and took him to Francisco Aguirre's house for safekeeping while he (Juan Gómez) returned to look for Juan Romero. He found him on the plaza waiting for the appearance of Sancho de Hoz "with a falcon in his hand . . . and a *machete* in his belt."[67]

At Aguirre's house, Villagra interviewed Sancho de Hoz in an attempt to uncover his fellow conspirators. The prisoner refused to divulge the information, however, saying, "Señor, you are a gentleman; treat me as such." Villagra then asked him if he wrote the letter which Monroy had received and which Villagra held in his hand. Sancho de Hoz admitted that he wrote it. The lieutenant governor then called the scribe, Luis de Cartagena, and without more ado asked him for an order commanding that Sancho de Hoz's head be cut off. The scribe did not hesitate to write it. A negro executioner was called and Juan Gómez handed him his sword. An hour later the head of Pedro Sancho de Hoz, one-time favorite of Charles V, was gracing the gallows tree of Santiago.[68]

The following day Juan Romero was given a thorough questioning, at which he revealed the full extent of the plot. Its ramifications were wide and reached at least two members of the *cabildo*. Villagra was wise enough to see that it would be better to make examples of the leaders and perhaps deter the less daring than to attempt to punish all the guilty. Sentence was passed, therefore, condemning Juan Romero—"he being the principal cause of the disturbance and the uprising of Pero Sancho"—to be hanged "until he renders up his soul and dies naturally." The sentence was carried out the same day.[69]

The news saddened the departure of the governor. Time after time he had shown leniency toward his former associate, always hoping with his accustomed optimism that the miscreant would prove himself a good man in the end. Also he feared the interpretation which the Spanish court might put on his death unless the king could be acquainted with the real state of affairs. Furthermore, he was fond of Juan Romero, who had ridden into camp as a mere boy (only seventeen years old) and who had befriended him on the night of the attempted assassination in the Atacama Desert. It was, therefore, with a heavier heart than was his wont that the governor of Chile sailed from Valparaiso December 13, once again to lend his aid to his king in a crisis.

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[67]Declaración de Alonso de Córdoba, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 172.

[68]Proceso de Pedro Sancho de Hoz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 154–170.

[69]*Ibid.*, 171.

CHAPTER VII

Valdivia in Perú, 1548-1549

Some confusion seems to surround the intended destination of Pedro de Valdivia when he left Chile in December, 1547. It is clear that—confronted with a civil war in Perú—he was determined once for all to clarify his own position in Chile by getting, if possible, royal confirmation for the post to which the *cabildo* had elected him. But did he intend to go to Spain for an audience with the king or merely to Perú where his aid to the king's representative would probably bring royal recognition? Valdivia says in one of his letters to the king:

> I was embarked with ten noblemen, whom I carried with me to go and serve in the provinces of Perú against Gonzalo Pizarro's rebellion, to serve him who should come in Your Majesty's name and with your authority to put them [Gonzalo and his followers] under your imperial and royal obedience.

Also he says later in the same letter that after arriving at the camp of La Gasca,

> I showed him [La Gasca] the document I made in the harbor of Valparaiso before the *escribano mayor* of the tribunal [Juan de Cárdenas], and the certificate he gave me showing how I was coming to look for him and serve him in Your Majesty's name.[1]

The letter, however, was written after the civil war was over and after Valdivia had been confirmed in his governorship, and it is possible that his purpose appeared more clearly defined in retrospect than at the time of his departure. In his letter to the *cabildo* December 8, 1547, asking that Francisco de Villagra be recognized as lieutenant governor during his absence, Valdivia expressed his purpose of going to the Spanish court:

> Whereas I am leaving for the court of His Majesty to present myself before his exalted person, before the honorable president and *oidores* of his royal council and chancellery of the Indies; and to tell him of all that his subjects and I in these provinces have done for him; and to ask and request that it be to his service to grant to me this government, in order to be better able to serve him, and to reward the persons who have helped me conquer this land . . . I select you [Francisco de Villagra] . . . for my lieutenant general.[2]

The *cabildo*, too, seems to have believed that his intention was to go to Spain. In its report to Charles V, after enumerating the

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[1]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.
[2]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 129.

hardships, losses, and expenses that the governor had endured, it pointed out that he was attempting to improve the situation by going

> to kiss your most sacred hands, and to present himself before your caesarean presence, and to give an account of all that which pertains to the service of Your Majesty in these parts.[3]

Among the Spanish soldiers whom La Gasca interviewed in secret to obtain information concerning Valdivia's activities, there was some diversity of opinion, though most of them, too, believed that Valdivia was on his way to Spain. Bernardino de Mella, one of those who accompanied Alonso de Monroy to Santiago in 1543, assured La Gasca that he, himself, believed that Valdivia left with the intent "of going to Spain to beg the government [of Chile] from the King," but that many of the soldiers said that he was going to raise a rebellion and that others said he was going to Portugal to live on the money he had taken from the people of Chile.[4] It was the opinion of García de Cárdenas that the governor left Chile "to go to find the Señor Presidente [La Gasca], . . . even though he should have to go to Quito or any other part of the *sierras nevadas*," and to aid him against Gonzalo Pizarro.[5] Luis de Toledo admitted that "only God is able to judge the heart" and that some suspected that the governor "would go away to other foreign kingdoms," but that he believed, and it was generally believed in Chile, that "the said Pedro de Valdivia was going to Spain to His Majesty."[6]

The most probable explanation, it seems, is that Valdivia did leave Chile with the intention of going to Spain and then changed his mind en route at the news he received before reaching Callao. Just before his departure, Valdivia had received a letter from Gonzalo Pizarro telling him that the rebel army of *encomenderos* in Perú had succeeded in killing the viceroy, Blasco Núñez Vela, and a great many of those who remained loyal to him, and that the country was practically in his (Gonzalo Pizarro's) hands. He added, furthermore, that though they had heard that there was a priest, Pedro de la Gasca, and two *oidores* at Nombre de Dios on their way to Perú—sent out by the king and possessing great powers—that he had dispatched Lorenzo de Aldana, with all the powers of the cities of Perú, to warn La Gasca to turn back. He said he believed that the priest would return to Spain but that

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[3] *Ibid.*, 132.

[4] Declaración de Bernardino de Mella, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 299.

[5] Declaración de García de Cárdenas, *ibid.*, 309–310.

[6] Declaración de Luis de Toledo, *ibid.*, 303.

if he did not, then the *encomenderos* "would do to him as they had done to Blasco Núñez."[7] With Perú thus in the hands of rebels against the king's representatives, Valdivia, if he was to secure his position by royal authority—and there is no evidence to indicate that he ever thought of attempting anything else—would be compelled to go on to Spain.

While the governor was in La Serena giving instructions to Juan Bohón for the conduct of affairs there during his absence, more news came which strengthened his belief that Perú was wholly under the control of Gonzalo Pizarro: a *yanacona* arrived from Copiapó with the report that Gonzalo Pizarro had defeated Diego Centeno—one of the few leaders remaining loyal to the king—and routed his troops.[8] At Tarapacá the report of Centeno's defeat was verified by one Tremiño, mayordomo of Lucas Martínez, who said many flattering things about Gonzalo Pizarro and his prowess, including the boast that the rebel leader would be in Lima by Candlemas.[9] In that same port, however, from some "Christian" (probably the same Tremiño), Valdivia got a bit of encouraging news: the new president of the Audiencia, Pedro de la Gasca, was in Perú—either at Tumbez or Jabja—and Lorenzo de Aldana had turned over to him the ships and men entrusted to him by Gonzalo Pizarro, and the said fleet was in the harbor of Callao. The knowledge that the sea was safe was a great relief to Valdivia and he sailed from Tarapacá with new heart.[10]

The news received at Tarapacá seems to have decided Valdivia on his future course. Francisco Rodríguez said that they had hardly left port when Valdivia called all the men on the ship together and made them a speech,

> saying to them: "sons, already you know that I go to seek the king and they say that the king is in this land, because [here] is his president with great powers; . . . what do you think?" and all of them answered that since the king was in this land, it was better to seek him [here]. And then the said Pedro de Valdivia smiled and was happy. He said that was what he was wishing but because he was thinking of putting himself and them in the battle with the Señor President, he talked of Spain because from them should

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[7]Gonzalo Pizarro to Pedro de Valdivia, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 137–151. *Note:* The letter is without date but must have been sent about December, 1547, since those who instigated the suit against Valdivia in Perú mentioned a letter that he received from Gonzalo Pizarro just before his departure. One witness says that Pastene brought it, which is probable.

[8]Declaración de Francisco Rodríguez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 282.

[9]Declaración de Diego García de Villalón, *ibid.*

[10]Declaración de Diego Oro, *ibid.*, 279.

come that [the suggestion that they should stop in Perú]. And all were happy and offered to go into it [the battle] with the said Pedro de Valdivia.[11]

Once the decision was made, Valdivia was in great haste to add his small force to that of the president before a decisive battle took place between him and Pizarro. He commanded the sailors to throw overboard some plants and shrubs he was taking with him so that they would not use up the water they had on board and force them to stop for more. He wished, however, to keep in touch with the developments of events on shore, and he stopped now and then to gather news. At Arica he sent Diego García de Cáceres and Jerónimo Alderete ashore secretly in a small boat; but warned them that only one should leave the boat, and if he should be taken by Pizarro's men, the other should return to tell Valdivia. They followed his instructions, Jerónimo Alderete remaining with the boat. In the town, Diego García found five or six men who had escaped when Centeno was defeated and from them learned that two of Pizarro's best captains, Dionisio de Bobadilla and Francisco Carvajal, were nearby. He also learned that La Gasca had already started inland to meet Gonzalo Pizarro. He carried the news to Alderete to take to Valdivia while he (Diego García) made some purchases for the ship, but when Valdivia heard the news he was in such a hurry to join La Gasca that he sent Alderete for Diego García and would not take time to load the supplies although they were already paid for.[12]

At the port of Hilo, Valdivia stopped long enough to put his secretary, Juan de Cárdenas, ashore with letters for La Gasca, thinking that the secretary might be able to secure a horse and reach the president overland before the ship could reach Los Reyes. Juan de Cárdenas had instructions to destroy the letters if he was taken by Pizarro or his men. The unfortunate secretary did fall into the hands of Francisco de Espinosa, who took his horse and refrained from hanging him only on the grounds of past friendship. Juan de Cárdenas finally managed to reach La Gasca just before the battle of Jaquijaguana[13] but after Valdivia had already joined the president. In the same port, Valdivia found several men who had taken no part in the conflict, rejecting overtures from both parties "because they did not know which side would win." Valdivia was able to present the king's cause forcibly enough to enlist them on his side and these he added to his small force immediately.[14]

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[11]Declaración de Francisco Rodríguez, *ibid.*, 283.
[12]Declaración de Diego García de Cáceres, *ibid.*, 306.
[13]Declaración de Diego García de Villalón, *ibid.*, 275.
[14]Declaración de Francisco Rodríguez, *ibid.*, 283.

At Guarco, the Chileans ran into contrary winds and were forced to put in to shore for repairs. Valdivia, fearful of the delay, sent Jerónimo Alderete and Alvar Núñez to Lima to apprise Lorenzo de Aldana of his coming so that his ship would not be fired on when he entered Callao.[15] As soon as repairs were completed, he hastened without any more landings to Callao, where his ship arrived about the middle of January, 1548.

The situation in Perú was more hopeful than reports had led Valdivia to believe. After the first flush of enthusiasm for rebellion among the *encomenderos,* prudence had come to warn the more cautious ones that rebellion was a dangerous game. If Spain chose to press the matter, the killing of a viceroy could have disastrous results—witness the prison sentence of Hernando Pizarro for the beheading of Almagro. Many became more interested in finding a way out than in waging the civil war.

The new representative of the king, Pedro de la Gasca, made the way easy for them. He came from Spain without pomp and without salary and with no title save that of President of the Audiencia of Perú. He was a priest and in physical aspect was unprepossessing. Under his unattractive exterior and simple manners, however, he carried a keen mind and a patient will, and Charles V had armed him with powers that would have delighted an ordinary viceroy. He was charged with judging the rival factions in Perú and if the viceroy, Blasco Núñez Vela, should be found in error, the president was to return him to Spain. He also had power to give governments, authorize discoveries, distribute *encomiendas,* appoint officials, pardon the guilty—in short, to act in all things "as if he were the king."[16]

The president arrived in Panamá almost unnoticed. He sent a messenger to Gonzalo Pizarro with letters both from himself and from Charles V—very diplomatically worded epistles saying that the past affair was doubtless to be blamed on both parties and calling on Gonzalo Pizarro to coöperate with La Gasca in restoring order. Pizarro, drunk with success and the prospect of future power, sent Lorenzo de Aldana to warn the priest not to come to Perú. It was then that La Gasca scored his first victory and gave indication of the type of man that Pizarro had to fight. While talking with Aldana, the wily priest persuaded him to transfer both his fleet and his loyalty to him.[17] He then sent secret messengers to certain influential men in Perú—members of the *cabildo,* royal officials, etc.—promising them a pardon for everything past if

[15]Declaración de Diego García de Cáceres, *ibid.,* 307.
[16]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* II, 182.
[17]Cunninghame Graham, *Pedro de Valdivia,* 56–57.

they would at once cease their rebellious activities and aid their king. Also he promised repeal of the *real cédula* concerning the *encomiendas,* which had been the cause of the rebellion in the first place. Encouraged by the response to his promise of pardon, La Gasca was at last able to land in Perú where the city of Lima received him with open arms. He had just been able to recruit a sizeable force and had started to the interior to meet Gonzalo Pizarro when Pedro de Valdivia landed at Callao.[18]

The Chilean governor left his ship to be used in the royal navy and taking eight or nine men,[19] he went up to the city of Lima from which place he sent a messenger to the president saying that he would join him as soon as he could outfit his men and asking him to wait for him. The president agreed, and after spending ten days and sixty thousand *castellanos* for equipment for his men, Valdivia, at the head of his now well-equipped little group, joined La Gasca in the valley of Andaguailas—fifty leagues from Cuzco, early in March.[20]

La Gasca was very happy at Valdivia's arrival, "knowing him for a man of diligence and experience and courage, and [one] to whom great credit is given in this land in the things of war."[21] He allowed all his forces to celebrate the occasion with fiestas and games, and, according to Valdivia, he went to the extreme of saying that he valued Valdivia's presence there "more than if he had received eight hundred good soldiers."

Though La Gasca in a manner led his own forces, he did not attempt to formulate the military strategy of the campaign. Instead he had a military council composed of Alonso de Alvarado, Pedro de Hinojosa, and Pedro de Valdivia. Alvarado and Hinojosa remained with the army while Pedro de Valdivia rode ahead,

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[18]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* II, 184.

[19]In La Gasca's letter to Charles V (March 9, 1548), he says Valdivia arrived with seven or eight horsemen. Barros Arana (*Obras completas,* VII, 144, n.) quotes Diego Fernández as naming ten men with Valdivia: "Jerónimo de Alderete, Gaspar de Villaroel, Juan de Cepeda, Captain Jofré, Luis de Toledo, Don Antonio Beltrán, Diego García de Cáceres, Vicencio del Monte, Diego de Oro, and the secretary of Valdivia, Juan de Cárdenas." Two of these names are known to be erroneous. Diego García de Cáceres said in his *declaración* that he remained with the ship (Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XV, 140) and La Gasca wrote that Juan de Cárdenas had not arrived when Valdivia reached him.

[20]The narrative of the military campaign follows that of Valdivia's letter to Charles V (October 15, 1550) or La Gasca's letter to Charles V, May 7, 1548 (Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 195–219), unless otherwise stated. Varying accounts are found, however, in the testimony of those who gave secret information to La Gasca (*ibid.,* 258–311).

[21]Barros Arana, *Obras completas,* VII, 144, n.

choosing the camp site and determining the distance which should be covered each day—

> sometimes great, because of the snow being gone through, and with which it [the army] might be harmed by cold and want of food; other times small that the men and horses might be rested.

Valdivia displayed his military skill in the rearrangement of La Gasca's forces. He made the musketeers into a separate company and arranged the squadrons in such a manner that they could keep order on the march, and managed so that at all times they were supplied with powder and match, and all small arms. He put the artillery to march in a certain position and gave them orders to be carried out daily. In short, he brought such order and discipline into the forces, that when Francisco de Carvajal—a companion of Valdivia in the Italian wars but fighting for Pizarro in the civil war—saw the camp just before the battle of Jaquijaguana, though he was ignorant of the fact that Valdivia was in Perú, exclaimed:

> Valdivia is in the land and directs that camp, or else the devil [does it].[22]

The army of La Gasca and the king advanced without mishap until it reached the Aporima River, twelve leagues from Cuzco. Riding ahead, Valdivia found there that the bridge on the main road had been burned and the army could not cross because the river "flows very deep down in the mountains, and is swift, without a ford." He knew, however, that there were other bridges—five within a distance of twenty leagues—along the river and immediately sent some of his soldiers to inspect the others and, if they had been burned, to start gathering material to replace them (they were swinging bridges—ropes of plaited osier-like rods supporting a timber floor). They found all the bridges burned and armed men waiting on the other side to frustrate any attempt at crossing.

Work began at once on rebuilding the nearest bridge. Six ropes, two *palmos* thick, were woven to support the floor—which Valdivia thought would be strong enough to cross the men and baggage, and the horses could swim. Valdivia inspected the work on Maundy Thursday and instructed Lope Martín, who had charge of the bridge building, not to attempt to put the ropes across until he (Valdivia) could go back and bring up the main army. He reached the camp next day (Good Friday) and informed La Gasca of his work. The priest set the camp in motion at once, and on Easter Sunday Valdivia and Alvarado rode proudly with the vanguard toward the river crossing.

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[22]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, II, 188.

At eight o'clock that morning they met a Dominican friar riding recklessly up the mountain side to tell them that Lope Martín, thinking to have the bridge completed by the time of their arrival, had thrown it across on Saturday, but since he had not sufficient force to protect it, Pizarro's men had come that night and burned it. The catastrophic results of his disobedience had so alarmed Lope Martín that he and his helpers had fled. Without taking time to report the calamity to La Gasca, who was with the rear-guard of the army, Valdivia took two hundred of his musketeers under Captain Palomino, and hastened to the scene. Stationing his artillery so that they could protect the working area, he set the Indians to renewed work on the bridge. That night, however, Pizarro's men on the other side—about twenty Spaniards and a few Indians—managed to destroy the bridge support on their side of the stream, and the royal army was forced to abandon its attempt to cross at that point.

It was twelve or thirteen leagues to the next bridge, and snow covered most of the route. The army was tired from its recent march and grumbled loudly at being put on the road again. Valdivia understood and explained to La Gasca that when they left their present position, the road to Lima lay unprotected and that they must move as rapidly as possible to the next bridge and try to effect a crossing before Pizarro's men became aware of their move. La Gasca coöperated wholeheartedly with the plan. Leaving Pedro Alonso Carrasco, with four or five other Spaniards and several Indians, to deceive the enemy by apparently continuing work on the bridge there, he ignored the complaints of his soldiers and hurried them by forced marches to the location of the next bridge. Valdivia and a picked group went on ahead. Pizarro's men on the opposite side, being few in number and seeing so many men in Valdivia's force, retreated upstream a league or so, and doubtless sent a messenger to Pizarro to report the situation.

Valdivia lost not a minute's time. He set the Indians to weaving ropes. When one was done, he sent his musketeers across with it—five of them swimming and carrying a cord tied to the rope. By midnight he had three or four rafts completed and by means of them and the ropes, he crossed two hundred of his men to the other side. He worked feverishly refusing to let the men pause for food or rest until enough ropes for the bridge had been pulled across. Such strenuous labor was rewarded by seeing completion of the bridge before the end of the next day—Sunday.

During the night of labor, La Gasca had been pushing the main force along as best he could and it arrived at the bridge site about noon on Sunday. Valdivia called the president to view his work and said to him:

Sir, it is my wish to cross and take the heights, for if the enemy takes them from us, we shall find it difficult to climb them.

The priest at once agreed and urged all haste, "since His Majesty's honor lies in your hands." The crossing was effected without accident, and the army moved toward the heights. About halfway up the mountain, Juan Núñez de Prado, a deserter from Pizarro's camp, brought the news to them that Juan de Acosta, one of Pizarro's captains, was on his way with two hundred musketmen and eighty horsemen to prevent the crossing of the bridge. Although it was too late to prevent the crossing, Valdivia, fearful of an encounter with the enemy, hastened his advance guard to the top of the mountain and took up an advantageous position. The next day the remains of the army joined him there.

The enemy lay five leagues away in the valley of Jaquijaguana and after reconnoitering and changing positions for two days, La Gasca's forces were in a position to strike. The night before the attack, Valdivia kept the soldiers in position all night and both he and Alvarado sat their horses until dawn. After morning mass, the movement of the troops began, led by the musketmen. Four pieces of artillery were mounted so strategically that they fired straight into the enemy camp, producing havoc, especially among the Indians, who began to flee.

The battle of Jaquijaguana (April 9, 1548) was hardly a battle at all. La Gasca lost only one man, and the other side some thirty or forty—not counting the ones La Gasca hanged or beheaded or shot after the firing ceased. From the moment the two armies faced each other, Gonzalo Pizarro's forces—whether from uneasy conscience because they were fighting against their king, or from the persuasive work of La Gasca's spies, or from a conviction that there was no chance to win—had started disintegrating. Many of his leading men openly fled from his camp to the other—Diego Guillen, captain of his *arcabuceros,* Cepeda, the priest, Garcilaso de la Vega, father of the Incan historian, and a cousin of his were among the first to desert. The priest just barely made a successful escape, for as he spurred his horse across the intervening space between the two camps, Pero Martín from Pizarro's camp went in pursuit. He succeeded in killing the priest's horse, and La Gasca told the king that Martín would have lanced the priest "if we had not aided him and even killed there Pero Martín." It was a battle reminiscent of the Greek siege of Troy, when men came and went between camps, where battles between individuals were watched with interest from both sides, and even the weapons used were hardly more destructive.

Gonzalo Pizarro and Francisco de Carvajal were both captured, Valdivia having the signal honor of bringing his old friend and fighting companion before the priest. La Gasca saw no use in moving the men to Cuzco before settling accounts. The next morning he had Pizarro's head cut off and sent it to Lima for public display, and in the afternoon he evened the score with Carvajal by having his body quartered—hardly justice, he thought, since "of the 340 or so men that Gonzalo Pizarro and his ministers executed during the time of the rebellion, this Carvajal executed 300 of them."

The next month was spent by La Gasca in "doing justice" to the rebels. He entered Cuzco and began ferreting out all who had given aid and comfort to Pizarro and his men. Some of these he merely whipped publicly, some he hanged and quartered, one at least—a mother who would not divulge the hiding place of her son—he tortured to the point that she took poison, and many he sent to Spain to work the galleys. He sent a fellow priest, Palo Ondegardo (who later wrote a treatise on the social and political organization of Perú under the Incas), to Charcas to mete out the king's justice there, and sent Gabriel de Roja to Porco and Potosí for the same purpose. On April 23, he dispatched Pedro de Valdivia as governor and captain-general of the province of Chile, stretching from the Copiapó Valley in 26° of south latitude to 41°. This was only the formal grant. The day after the battle, when Valdivia reminded the priest that he had carried out his promise to defeat Pizarro without the loss of thirty men, the president recognized his position as governor by saying:

"Ah! Sir Governor! What a lot His Majesty owes you!" Before, he had only called him captain.

The goal for which Valdivia had strived so persistently, which in fact had brought him to the aid of La Gasca, had at last been reached.

The first thought of the newly-recognized governor was to get back to his province and to carry with him as many men and supplies as possible. La Gasca granted him permission to take certain men to Chile—many of them former Pizarristas condemned to perpetual banishment from Perú—and ordered the officers of the fleet to give him two vessels on credit. He prohibited him, however, from carrying away any of the *yanaconas* or those Spaniards condemned to the galleys. From Cuzco, Valdivia sent one of his captains at the head of eighty horsemen to await him in the Atacama Valley, where the captain and his men should get together enough food to cross the desert while Valdivia gathered more men in Lima.

Valdivia and his captain left Cuzco on the same day. At Lima the naval officers let the governor have the two ships for twenty-eight hundred *pesos*, and he bought a third. He spent the month of May outfitting the fleet and loading it with supplies; then, putting it under the command of Jerónimo Alderete, his ever-faithful follower and friend, he, himself, left by land—since it was a bad season for navigation—to join the men whom he had sent from Cuzco. He found a considerable number of his men in Arequipa but, fearing that they might prove unwelcome in the town, he equipped them as soon as possible (ten days) and departed for Atacama August 31, where he expected to join the main force. But fate, who had played the *conquistador* so many mean tricks—as well as some good ones—had another to deal him before he reached his men in Atacama.[23]

Lorenzo de Aldana, who had aided Antonio de Ulloa in his plot against Juan Bautista de Pastene and Pedro de Valdivia, 1545–1547, who had gone as Gonzalo Pizarro's representative to Panamá to warn La Gasca not to come on to Perú, and who had capitulated to the persuasion of the crafty licentiate and surrendered the fleet to him, had become La Gasca's inspector of ports after the battle of Jaquijaguana. It is not to be supposed that he was any too happy at seeing Valdivia receive favors from La Gasca, and soon after the departure of Valdivia's fleet, he reported to the president that the governor of Chile had carried away on board his ships some *yanaconas* from Perú. He complained that when he had attempted to inspect the ships, Valdivia had refused to let him go aboard. At about the same time—and perhaps from the same source—La Gasca heard that Valdivia had taken from Arequipa some prisoners condemned to the galleys—especially one Luis de Chávez—and also learned of the death of Pedro Sancho de Hoz. The priest-president, who apparently trusted no one, immediately became suspicious of Valdivia, and sent to General Pedro de Hinojosa an order signed by the Audiencia of Lima commanding him to bring Valdivia back for questioning.[24]

General Hinojosa, accompanied by ten musketmen, caught up with Valdivia between Arequipa and Arica in a valley called Zama. He was afraid, it seems, when he saw Valdivia's large force—some 120 men—to present the document for the Chilean governor's detention. When Valdivia straightforwardly asked him why he had come, he equivocated by saying that La Gasca had reports that Valdivia was robbing the countryside and harassing the natives

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[23]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[24]Pedro de la Gasca al Consejo de Indias, in Barros Arana, *Obras completas*, VII, 203.

and had sent him to check up on the situation. Valdivia asked him if he was convinced that the reports were false, and the general assured him that everywhere he had received good reports on the behavior of both him and his men, but strongly "advised" him to go back and report to La Gasca. Valdivia very reasonably pointed out that unless it was necessary for him to go back—an order from the president—he was already far along his road at the farthest point of inhabited Perú, that his men might do damage to the land during his absence, that if he continued, he would be able to found another town that year, and finally, that it was a long road back to Lima—"a hundred and forty leagues of shifting sand." Hinojosa allowed him to go on. Several days later at Atacama, Hinojosa again overtook him, stationed his men with loaded muskets in the courtyard of Valdivia's lodging, went in and handed the governor the order from the Audiencia. Valdivia was surprised and dismayed that the general had not told him the true purpose of his visit the first time they met. He quieted his captains and his men, however, when they showed signs of nervousness over the situation and asserted his willingness to comply with the order. After making the arrangements for the disposal of his men until he should come back—four of them accompanied him—he signified his readiness to retrace his steps. They reached Arequipa in seven days and, finding one of his ships there, they boarded it to make the journey more quickly than by land.[25]

When the ship reached the harbor of Callao, October 20, La Gasca came out to meet Valdivia on board ship. He greeted him cordially and made quite a flowery speech to the effect that he was sure the charges were all false and only the result of jealousy and that he greatly appreciated Valdivia's patience and humbleness and the example he had given of obedience—"a thing most needful in this land at this time"—but as representative of the king it was his duty to investigate reports of infraction of royal rules, etc. Valdivia's reply was that he came willingly, that it had not been necessary to send an order—a simple letter would have sufficed—and that he would always come cheerfully to a request of his king "though he should be at the world's end."[26] The answer no doubt did much to confirm the good opinion of Valdivia already held by the man who was ultimately to be his judge. La Gasca was in no hurry, however, to exonerate the man who had rendered him such valuable aid in establishing his own authority. On the contrary,

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[25]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550; Pedro de la Gasca to the Council of the Indies, November 26, 1548, in Barros Arana, *Obras completas*, VII, 205.

[26]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

he leisurely set about his "investigation" while Valdivia chafed uneasily at what turned out to be a month's delay.

The trial of Valdivia falls into two periods: the week spent by La Gasca in gathering secret information, October 22 to November 1, and the period of actual trial, October 28 to November 19.

The very day that La Gasca initiated his secret investigation, a ship arrived in Callao from Chile bringing cargo of both good and bad portent to Valdivia. So many months had passed since the departure of the governor from Santiago and so little news had been received there concerning him that the members of the *cabildo* had become more and more uneasy. They were not displeased at the government of Francisco de Villagra; but no lieutenant governor, however competent, could deal successfully with the problem of *repartimientos* and *encomiendas*—always among the main interests of those participating in the conquest—since his assignment of them must eventually be approved by the governor. The same feeling of disquiet that had pervaded the settlement in the early days and had led to the election of Pedro de Valdivia as governor began to be felt again. Taking notice of it, the *procurador* of the city, on August 22, 1548, presented a request to the *cabildo* that some person or persons be sent to President La Gasca

> to beg in the name of all the *vecinos* and settlers of this government that somebody be sent in the name of His Majesty . . . to govern us. This in case that the said Señor Governor Pedro de Valdivia does not come or has died.[27]

The request was unanimously endorsed, and Pedro de Villagra was appointed to carry out the mission. He was instructed to ask for the appointment of Francisco de Villagra as governor if anything had happened to Valdivia. There is nothing in the minutes of the *cabildo* meetings at this period to indicate the slightest disloyalty to Valdivia on the part of either his lieutenant governor or the *cabildo*. It was rather the same desire that Valdivia, himself, had so often felt of having matters clarified—some regime to give security to the men who had risked so much and, as yet, had gained so little in the conquest. In fact, the *cabildo* took special care to make it clear to La Gasca that no other person could be as satisfactory as their former governor. At the September 10 meeting, that body endorsed a letter to be carried by Pedro de Villagra that said, in part:

> We beg you that if, through any necessity which his presence may have had for the wars there, since he understands them so well, he may not have left, please do us the favor of sending him with the greatest haste possible, because it is conducive to the peace and tranquility of this land; and if he is detained and

[27] Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 148.

Your Honor does not favor us by sending him, our loss and damage would be great . . . through having hopes each day of being repaid by him for our work and losses which we have suffered in the conquest of this land; and His Majesty would lose very much and no other could come to govern it that would not destroy it, and do much damage to all the vassals of His Majesty who live here, because he would not know the merits of each one, nor would he respect their merits; and we could not escape being very aggravated and His Majesty very disserved.[28]

Pedro de Villagra, carrying that letter, was on board the ship that arrived in Callao October 22, 1548.

There was another element in Santiago, however, which as ardently desired the dismissal of Valdivia as his friends desired his return. It consisted of the remaining followers of Pedro Sancho de Hoz (one of whom, Rodrigo de Araya, was a member of the *cabildo*), those dispossessed of their land and Indians, and the few personal enemies (such as Juan Pinel) that Valdivia had made by his high-handed methods of obtaining money. All of them were eager to gain La Gasca's ear, and on the same ship that carried Pedro de Villagra and the letter from the *cabildo* went about twenty of the malcontents. They not only fanned the tiny flame kindled by the petty charges of Lorenzo de Aldana, but they also brought new fuel: charges of murder, immorality, and—gravest of all—tampering with the royal box of the three keys.[29]

In gathering his secret information, La Gasca interviewed eleven men. They were: Vicencio de Monte, who had come to Perú with Valdivia; Diego García Villalón, former skipper of the *Santiaguillo,* who carried the first aid to starving Santiago, but who had been absent from Chile for three years; Diego de Oro and Francisco Rodríguez, both companions of Valdivia in the recent campaign; Vicencio de Pascual, a sailor from the recently-docked ship from Chile, who could not write his name; Gregorio de Castañeda, a passenger on the ship just arrived; Guillermo de la Rocha, also a passenger on the above-mentioned ship—another who could not write; Bernardino de Mella, who had gone to Chile overland with Alonso de Monroy in 1543; Luis de Toledo, who had been with Valdivia since he left Cuzco in 1540 and had served with him in the recent campaign; Diego García de Cáceres, also a companion of Valdivia since 1540; and García de Cárdenas, whose stay in

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[28]*Ibid.*, 154.

[29]Pedro de la Gasca to the Council of the Indies, November 26, 1548, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 244; charges brought against Valdivia, items 1, 3, 6, 11, 22, 24, and others, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* VIII, 311–315.

Chile had been comparatively short, since he arrived after Valdivia's return from the south in 1546.[30]

The questions asked by the priest, though they sometimes varied in form, covered the following points:

1. Conditions in Chile at the time of Valdivia's departure—with special emphasis on his methods of obtaining money.
2. Relations between Valdivia and Sancho de Hoz: the kind of provisions carried by Sancho de Hoz, the manner of his death, whether or not the witness thought his death necessary to the peace of the land, and whether or not Valdivia was responsible for his death.
3. The intent with which Valdivia left Chile—was it to serve the king or to aid Pizarro?
4. The state of Chile at the present time.
5. Would Valdivia's return to Chile as governor be beneficial to that province or would it produce civil war?

On the condition of Chile at the time of Valdivia's departure there was substantial agreement among nine of the witnesses. The exceptions were Guillermo de la Rocha and García de Cárdenas. The nine admitted frankly to La Gasca that there was some discontent in Chile—"even as there is in this country," said Diego García de Villalón. They pointed out that not enough of the country had been conquered to furnish Indians to all the Spaniards there, and those who had failed to obtain *"de comer"* were naturally discontented. That discontent had been augmented by the discovery that the number of Indians was much smaller than at first believed and that the number of *encomenderos* must be reduced. Those who lost their Indians in the rearrangement joined the group of the disgruntled.[31] Also there were some loyal friends of Pedro Sancho de Hoz who felt or pretended to feel that he had a legal claim to the government of Chile and some of them were willing to resort to force to see his claim established. The witnesses agreed, however, that the two groups constituted a small minority, but that the number had been increased by the incident of the forced loans (related in a former chapter) just before the governor's departure. They admitted that the people had deposited their gold on the ship

[30]All the information given concerning the secret testimony is taken from Document No. LXV—Información secreta—in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 258–311, unless otherwise stated.

[31]This was a situation that La Gasca could understand since at the time he was holding the investigation there were in Perú only two hundred vacant *repartimientos* and fifteen hundred applicants for them. He had so far met the situation by procrastination, but the discontent was mounting daily; and he knew that eventually he would have to face the issue—which might bring on another civil war.

in the belief that they were going to be allowed to return to Spain with it, but apparently they did not believe that Valdivia had deliberately tricked them. It seems that the governor had at first intended to send Jerónimo Alderete to Spain and Francisco de Villagra to Perú, but, after getting news of the civil war in Perú, had determined to go himself and present his case to the king. Since he had no money to make the trip, he made the people a very persuasive speech, stressing the fact that he was going in the interest of all and in the service of the king. While they had no choice about leaving their gold on the ship, Valdivia did assure them that he was only borrowing the money, and he gave each of them an order on his *haciendas* (to be honored by his agent) saying that those whose gold he was taking should be repaid as soon as possible from his share of the gold mined in the next *demora*—"and generally this witness saw that all remained content," said Vincencio de Monte. "Some, although few," said Francisco Rodríguez, "showed themselves to be angry with the said Valdivia." Both thought the money probably was repaid by that time. All of the nine witnesses agreed that the seizure of the money and the ensuing discontent had contributed greatly to Sancho de Hoz's resolution to make another attempt to get control of the government at that time.

Of the two men who dissented from the main opinion—Guillermo de la Rocha and García de Cárdenas—little is known to history. La Rocha, according to Thayer Ojeda, accompanied Alonso de Monroy to the relief of Santiago in 1543 and was a former Almagrista in Perú.[32] Cárdenas is not listed with any of the parties going to Chile but by his own account, he did not arrive there until after Valdivia's return from Arauco in 1546. Both men seem to have been prejudiced against Valdivia's return to Chile, and they stressed the discontent and gave as their opinion that "he does not know how to make war against the Indians." At the same time they could not deny his generous treatment of Sancho de Hoz and that the land at present was at peace.

When La Gasca closed the interview with La Rocha by asking the witness if anybody had talked to him of what he should say in the interview, La Rocha told him that Rabdona, Landa, and Taravajano (three of those who later signed the formal charges against Valdivia) had talked to him many times "and especially . . . today," telling him "that if the Señor President should talk to him of something, he should tell him the truth."

La Gasca's probing of the relationship between Pedro de Valdivia and Pedro Sancho de Hoz brought forth a flood of details

[32]Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile*, II, 99.

from the witnesses, particularly those who had been with Valdivia since his departure from Cuzco in 1540. They told the priest of the unprovoked attack on Valdivia's life in the Atacama Desert in which Antonio de Ulloa as well as Sancho de Hoz participated. They pointed out Valdivia's generous treatment of them in return—how he had given them both land and Indians and had sent Ulloa with dispatches to the king and how in every instance he had been repaid with treachery. Only one of the witnesses—García Cárdenas—claimed to have seen the provision on which Sancho de Hoz based his claim to governorship and—though he was one of the two unfavorable to Valdivia—he admitted that the *cédula* provided for "discovery of the land of the other part of the Strait." The others had "heard it said" that the provision applied to "other governments" and not Chile. All eleven agreed on the manner of Sancho de Hoz's death and some had seen the seditious letter.

There was also substantial agreement on the opinion that Valdivia could not have been responsible for the death of his former associate because the governor was twelve or fourteen leagues away from Santiago and everything happened too quickly—the witnesses variously estimated the time from thirty minutes to an hour and a half. Several agreed that the news of Sancho de Hoz's death weighed heavily on Valdivia and saddened his departure, and they called La Gasca's attention to the fact that Valdivia had had many opportunities to execute the conspirator on what most people would certainly consider legal grounds but had refrained from doing so because Sancho de Hoz had been his partner. Bernardino de Mella said "that on this point he would be able to stand a trial by fire that the said Pedro de Valdivia was never implicated in the death of the said Pero Sancho." Three other witnesses said that upon receipt of the news of the execution, Valdivia was heard to mutter, "if the lieutenant has done this, he shall give an account of it."

All the witnesses admitted—though some more warmly than others—that the death of Pedro Sancho de Hoz had brought peace to the land. Perhaps the testimony of Luis de Toledo, which Barros Arana characterizes as "the least impassioned of all,"[33] covers the ground more completely than any of the others. He told La Gasca that when

> the said Francisco de Villágrán had cut off his [Sancho de Hoz] head, he went out to the plaza and said: "Señores, we are here in the service of God and of the king, there should be no scandal and that which is past should be past; I am here in the name of His Majesty and of the governor Pedro de Valdivia and I will do that which it is my duty to do to all of you; and we are friends;" and all responded that they would die for him.

[33]Proceso de Valdivia, in Barros Arana, *Obras completas*, VII, 71, n.

La Gasca apparently was not satisfied at Toledo's depiction of the harmony following the gruesome act of justice—perhaps he suspected that some of the fervent loyalty might fade once the gory head and headless body of Sancho de Hoz no longer graced the square—and asked him pointedly if he believed "the said pacification was sufficient to excuse the deaths of Pero Sancho and Juan Romero." Toledo's answer was

> that it seems to this witness that if the said Pedro Sancho should be there, he would be continually making trouble, because everybody said that he was *una cabeza de lobo* for holding designs that each day would have [caused] revolts and dangers.

He also added that it was his opinion that, if Sancho de Hoz had carried out his plan of going to the plaza with the *vara* in his hand, he would have caused civil war in Chile; the population would have been so reduced that the Spaniards would not have been able to maintain themselves against the Indians, and the land would have been lost.

All the witnesses agreed that Valdivia had left Chile to serve the king, though they were somewhat divided—as previously mentioned—on whether his purpose was to go to Spain or Perú.

On present conditions in Chile, those who had left that province with Valdivia ten months before were not able to give any definite information. Vicencio Monte, who was being interviewed the day that the ship arrived at Callao from Chile, had heard that the frigate was coming and that it was bringing news of another uprising in Chile and the death of Villagra. The rumors, however, proved false; and those who came on the frigate assured La Gasca that Villagra held the land "in justice, peace, and quiet." Even La Rocha admitted that when he left "the land remained peaceful and all the Spaniards well cared for with the said Villagrán."

La Gasca's fifth point—whether or not Valdivia's return to Chile as governor would benefit the country or would produce civil war—provoked various comments. Again a majority—six out of the eleven—stood solidly for Valdivia. They were: Vicencio de Monte, Diego García de Villalón, Diego Oro, Francisco Rodríguez, Gregorio de Castañeda, and Diego García de Cáceres. They based their opinion on the following points: First, it was Valdivia's right to return to the land that he had conquered and held after it had been abandoned by another and was considered worthless by most. Only some very grave defection on his part—which in their opinion did not exist—could cancel that right. Second, he was thoroughly acquainted with conditions in Chile and his government would be more just than that of another. Third, the governor was "very jealous in the service of His Majesty" and was *un trabajador*—

his efforts to push back the frontier and extend His Majesty's sphere of influence would be unceasing; furthermore, he did not send, but led, troops against the Indians. Fourth, Valdivia's prowess was known and respected by the Indians and they feared him; however, after once conquering them and forcing them to serve, he insisted on humane treatment for them. One witness said that "he had never seen a man treat the natives so well as he [Valdivia] treats them." Two others told the same story of how Alonso, a native chief, came to Valparaiso to see Valdivia leave, and that he wept and begged to be allowed to go with him.

Bernardino de Mella and Luis de Toledo agreed in the main details with the above opinion but believed that before Valdivia returned, he should declare his intention of pardoning and reinstating in their possessions those who had been against him in the past. Mella also added the condition that he should send to Spain "a woman that he has, called Inés de Suárez, because . . . the said woman is crazy."

La Rocha and García de Cárdenas were opposed to Valdivia's return on the professed ground that he did not know how to make war against the Indians—an opinion that must have caused La Gasca to smile, if the licentiate ever permitted himself that luxury.

Vicencio de Pascual, the sailor from the frigate, admitted frankly that he knew very little of conditions in Chile and therefore

> would not know what to say in the present case more than that in the time he was in Chile he saw that some were friendly toward him [Valdivia] and some were unfriendly and that this witness does not know if there will be more of the friendly ones or unfriendly ones.

Before La Gasca had completed his secret investigation, formal charges had been brought against Pedro de Valdivia by eight men—six of whom had just arrived from Chile on the frigate. October 28, Hernán Rodríguez de Monroy appeared before the president and asked to submit the charges. They were fifty-seven in number and ranged from petty and obviously spite-inspired accusations of favoritism and bigotry to graver ones of murder and embezzlement.[34] Among the more serious charges were: (1) promiscuous executions of offenders—great and small; (2) taking money from the king's box and diverting the *quintos* to his own use; (3) immoral relations with Inés de Suárez; (4) insubordinate words against the king; (5) taking Indians and land from one *vecino* to give to another; (6) commandeering horses and goods for the Indian wars, and instituting forced loans.

The eight men who signed the charges were: Antonio de Ulloa, Hernán Rodríguez de Monroy, Gabriel de la Cruz, Antonio Tara-

[34]See Appendix for complete list of the charges against Valdivia.

vajano, Lope de Landa, Diego de Céspedes, Francisco Rabdona, and Antonio Zapata. The personal animosity of the accusers toward Valdivia did not escape the sharp wits of the priest. He later wrote to the Council of the Indies:

> It seemed to me that they gave me [the charges] so slyly that one suspects that those who had been making them wished to be witnesses, and for that reason I took information from those who had been among the accusers.[35]

He interviewed seven of them—for some reason Antonio de Ulloa did not appear before the president—but confined his questioning to learning if each witness fully endorsed all the accusations. (Later he called Monroy and Landa back to ask if either of them had read the provisions that Sancho de Hoz had carried.) He gave them no opportunity to vent their spleen against the man they wanted to keep out of Chile.

October 30, La Gasca notified Valdivia of the charges, and the governor made his defense, which he presented to the president on November 2. He answered each of the fifty-seven charges, denying some and admitting others to be true as to facts, but explaining the motive that lay behind the facts. He admitted the deaths of several men—not all, for Escobar, one of those named in the indictment, was at that time living in Spain—but showed them to be mutinous members of his forces whose removal was necessary to the preservation of order. Naturally, he denied any words of insubordination against his king and denied the illegal taking of the "fifths" or other royal goods—a denial in which he was supported by witnesses. As for Inés de Suárez, he could hardly refute the fact of his taking her to Chile, but he assured La Gasca that she went as his *criada* by permission of Francisco Pizarro, that she was an honored woman, much beloved by all because of her care for the sick and for her many other good works. Valdivia attempted an explanation of his redistribution of *encomiendas* and his use of the horses and his forced loans rather than denying them. Since La Gasca was at that time facing something of the same situation in Perú, perhaps Valdivia's explanation sounded more reasonable than it would have otherwise.

In addition to Valdivia's defense, La Gasca called four witnesses—all of whom he had formerly interviewed in his secret investigation. They were Luis de Toledo, Gregorio Castañeda, Diego García de Villalón, and Diego de Cáceres. Their testimony was in substantial agreement with that of Valdivia, though in several instances they were more candid than the governor had been—especially concerning Inés de Suárez. La Gasca also allowed

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[35]Pedro de la Gasca al consejo de Indias, November 26, 1548, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 244.

Pedro de Villagra to present the letter of recommendation sent from Santiago by the *cabildo* in support of Valdivia. He then recalled Monroy and Landa to ask if they knew what provisions Pedro Sancho de Hoz carried. Neither had read them, and they could only quote what they had heard said. Pedro de Villagra, however, had read them and was quick to assure the priest that the provisions applied only to land beyond the Strait or that which lay in no other grants.

The sentence pronounced on Valdivia was signed only by the priest, La Gasca, although he wrote the Council of the Indies that it was concurred in by Jerónimo de Loayza, Archbishop of Lima, Pedro de Hinojosa, Alonso de Alvarado, and Lorenzo de Aldana.[36]

Although the verdica confirmed Valdivia in his governorship, it dealt him a staggering blow. The first item commanded that within six months after his arrival in Santiago he must break off all relations with Inés de Suárez, the woman who had contributed so much—perhaps as much as he, himself—to the conquest of Chile, and that he must either marry her off to somebody else or send her from the province. In addition, he must finish repaying the forced loans in one year and must refrain from such practice in the future; he must give license of departure to all who wished to leave Chile; in issuing *repartimientos*, he must see that they contained enough Indians to keep the natives from being overworked, and once they were issued, they could be redistributed only on royal orders; and, last, all that was taken or borrowed from the royal box must be returned to it as soon as possible and put in the chest with the three keys in charge of the *officiales reales*.[37]

To the Council of the Indies, La Gasca gave the following reasons for his decision:

> Considering that Pedro de Valdivia had conquered that which was in that province and had sustained it in peace and had come to serve His Majesty, notwithstanding [the fact] that Gonzalo Pizarro had sent to him by Baptista [Juan Bautista de Pastene] to make offers in order to gain more of his favor, sending refreshments of wine and conserves and woven goods and silks, as it appears from the said informations;
> And considering how well and with how much jealousy he had served His Majesty and had worked on this expedition [to Perú], and that which he had

[36]*Ibid.;* there is good reason to doubt the sincerity of Aldana since it was he who had aided Antonio de Ulloa—a relative of his—in the plot against Pastene and Valdivia. Besides he had switched sides many times. He had accompanied Diego Almagro to Chile in 1536, but when he saw the Pizarros winning, had gone over to them. In the recent affray he had deserted Gonzalo Pizarro to serve La Gasca.

[37]Sentencia, Proceso de Valdivia, in Barros Arana, *Obras completas*, VII, 138.

spent on it and on the fleet and people that he brought from Chile . . . and on these two things not only had he spent that which he brought but had pledged himself for a great deal;
And how not returning to the conquest he would be able to pay neither His Majesty nor the individuals whom he owes, and as he is the person most experienced in the things of that land and has other qualities . . . for this conquest . . . especially that he is careful of the conservation and good treatment of the natives . . .;
And considering that the moneys that he had forced them to lend had been to send for help and to come to serve in this expedition, and that in it he has spent them, and that the horses which it is said that he had taken, had been for the war, and though he had killed some Spaniards, it seems that it was in good judgment because of [their] wishing to make trouble and rebellions, which should be punished in this country more than in others [an opinion which the good priest upheld by example as well as precept] because of the frequency there is of committing them and the great evils that have followed them and that of having kept that woman, although it was a thing of bad example, was not a cause that should weigh so much with warriors that for it he [Valdivia] ought to leave the conquest and the government;
It seems to us and all that it is due him to give him authority in a manner conforming to the provision which in Cuzco made him governor and captain-general of the province of Chile.[38]

Valdivia had, of course, no choice about accepting the sentence. The only alternative was war. While it provided one thing for which he had constantly hoped and worked—confirmation of his appointment as governor and captain-general of Chile—it took away that which made the achievement worthwhile—the companionship of the woman who had helped him make the conquest. It was little enough reward for the deeds accomplished; however, he thanked La Gasca for the measly recompense and asked for a copy of the sentence to carry to the *cabildo* of Santiago.

La Gasca gave Valdivia permission to recruit men in Lima to accompany him back to Chile. The difficulty over *repartimientos* in Perú was becoming so embarrassing to the priest that he probably would have been glad to see several hundred men go with Valdivia. The governor of Chile, however, had no money to equip so many, and La Gasca was either unable or unwilling to provide the necessary funds. Conditions were approaching a crisis and some of the discontented ones approached Valdivia with the suggestion that if he would become their leader, they would rise against La Gasca, seize the king's silver which lay in the Charcas, and take over the government for themselves. They pointed out to him what indignities he had had to suffer at La Gasca's hands. Upon Valdivia's refusal, they threatened to take him by force to lead the uprising. Seeing the dangerous mood they were in, he

[38]Pedro de la Gasca al consejo de Indias, November 26, 1548, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, VIII, 244.

put them off with evasions, saying that they greatly exaggerated his worth and that only his loyalty to his king gave him any worth at all. To avoid further complications, however, he hastily gathered ten loyal men and left overland for Arequipa, where he hoped to find his ship awaiting him.[39]

Valdivia reached Arequipa on Easter Eve, and so great had been the strain of the Peruvian campaign, the tension of the trial, and the sorrow occasioned by the verdict of La Gasca, that the governor fell desperately ill in that town. For several days his life was despaired of and only careful nursing by two women—María de Encio Sarmiento and Juana Jiménez—saved his life. When he regained consciousness and set about his preparations for departure, both of them wished to accompany him to Chile. He allowed them to do so.[40]

La Gasca had warned Valdivia not to tarry along the road because the men might damage the towns and countryside. Besides, the royal silver was stored in Charcas, and the president was afraid to bring it out until Valdivia had his men well outside Perú; therefore, Valdivia felt obliged to move on as soon as he was able. At Arica he found the ever-faithful Jerónimo Alderete and two hundred men awaiting him with one of the ships. Valdivia arrived at that town January 18, 1549, and on January 21, they set sail for Chile, though the ship was leaking in three or four places and their food supply was confined to maize and fifty salted sheep—with no wine.

The navigation proved exceedingly difficult for the stiff south wind reduced the voyage to one of rowing, some days "gaining three or four leagues, and other days losing twice that much or more." By diligent effort, however, the long voyage was finally accomplished, and in the first days of April Valdivia set foot once more upon the land for whose government he now held a royal provision. Why, then, did he loiter in Valparaiso until the middle of June? Was it, as he wrote Charles V, only to await the coming of Francisco de Villagra—who was north in the Coquimbo Valley punishing the natives for a recent uprising—before going on to Santiago,[41] or was it because he dreaded to face the consequences of the execution of La Gasca's sentence?

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[39]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.
[40]Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, II, 209.
[41]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.


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LOS Reyes (Lima)
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Cuzco
Urubamba R.
Lake Titicaca
Arequipa
Tacna
Arica
Tarapaca
Loa R.
Atacama la Chica
Atacama la grande
(San Pedro de Atacama)
Atacama Desert
Copiapo Valley
(Extent of Peruvian Control)
PACIFIC OCEAN


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Copiapó Valley
El Boreo
(Santiago del Estero)
28
Hausco R.
La Serena
30
Coquimbo Valley
32
Quillota
Valparaiso
Santiago
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Mapocho R.
Maule R.
Ñuble R.
36
Concepcion
Arauco
Bio Bio R.
Tucapel
Los O R.
Confines
38
Imperial
Cautin R.
Villarica
Valdivia
40
Atlantic
Ocean
42
Chiloé I.
PACIFIC OCEAN (MAR DEL SUR)

CHAPTER VIII

Valdivia's Last Years: 1549-1553

It was almost two months after Pedro de Valdivia reached Valparaiso that Francisco de Villagra, his lieutenant, returned from the north to give his chief a full account of the calamity that had befallen Chile in his absence—the total destruction of La Serena.

The natives of the north—in the valleys of Copiapó, Limari, and Huasco—had remained consistently more restless than those around Santiago ever since the arrival of the Spaniards in Chile. The founding of La Serena had changed the situation somewhat, but the subjection of the surrounding Indians had been more apparent than real. The natives had missed no opportunity to repay with interest the debt of vengeance they owed the Spaniards. Diego Maldonado's story of their attack upon him and his camp, brought to Santiago upon the eve of Valdiva's departure for Perú, had determined Villagra to lead an expedition against the Indians just as soon as matters in Santiago would permit. The uneasiness occasioned by the mutiny of Sancho de Hoz delayed the campaign and Thayer Ojeda thinks it may have been April of the following year before Villagra actually left for the northern valleys.[1]

The campaign itself seems to have been indecisive. Failing to obtain a complete victory over the Indians, Villagra returned to Santiago in August, leaving Juan Bohón—who had pacified the area around La Serena in the first place—and a sizeable force of horsemen to maintain peace in the area.

In October of that same year (1548), news came to La Serena that there was a Spanish captain and a body of horsemen in the Copiapó Valley. Andrés de Escobar, who seems to have been stationed in La Serena by Villagra to keep him informed of developments there, was alarmed at the news, not knowing whether the Spanish force was friendly or if it was a detachment of Gonzalo Pizarro's troops sent to establish his authority there. As a matter of fact, the captain was Esteban de Sosa, sent by Valdivia from Cuzco soon after the battle of Jaquijaguana to gather men and supplies to take to Santiago. In the absence of any knowledge concerning the force, however, Escobar sent a messenger to Villagra informing him of the situation. Villagra hurried to La Serena

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[1]Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile,* II, 30.

and sent Juan Bohón and thirty horsemen to meet the captain to determine the nature of his coming.[2]

Juan Bohón met Captain De Sosa in the Copiapó Valley and, learning that he had been sent by Valdivia, allowed him to proceed to Santiago with his horsemen. Juan Bohón and his men remained in the Copiapó Valley, hoping to quiet the Indians who were showing signs of growing disquiet. Villagra returned to Santiago after cautioning Andrés de Escobar to keep a sharp lookout for signs of an Indian uprising.[3]

Only a few weeks after Villagra's departure—one night in December—the Indians crept upon Juan Bohón's force and completely annihilated it. Not a man was left to carry the news to La Serena,[4] but Andrés de Escobar began to suspect that some deviltry had been perpetrated because of the increasing insubordination of the Indians around La Serena. He confided his fears to the *cabildo* of the town but no steps were taken to increase protection, and about the middle of January, Escobar left for Santiago to report the situation and his fears to Villagra. In so doing he saved his life, for almost immediately—possibly the very night he left—the Indians moved in on La Serena. Their plan was well conceived. In order to avoid facing Spanish horse and sword, they crept noiselessly into town in the dead of night and stationed a man at every doorway in La Serena; then, when the alarm was given and the Spaniards rushed out for their horses, each Spaniard met death at his own doorway before he had a chance to mount. Only two men escaped. Mariño Lovera says that the Indians killed madly as if they were lions or tigers, torturing the women, killing the *yanaconas* and their *mestizo* children. They killed even the dogs, cats, and chickens—every living thing; then, they dragged the furnishings from the homes and burned them in the street. Lastly, they applied the torch to the houses and left the town in ashes.[5]

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[2]Declaración de Andrés de Escobar, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 492.

[3]*Ibid.;* Declaración de Lope de Ayala, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, X, 99; Declaración de Luis Ternero, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, X, 106.

[4]Note: Góngora Marmolejo (*Historia de Chile*, 15) says that Captain Bohón was taken prisoner and horribly tortured before he was killed by hanging, but other historians refuse to accept his version since none of the witnesses interviewed concerning the event gave a similar account. Most of them speak of having seen the bodies of the massacred men and one specifically mentions having seen "the said Captain Bohón with them." (Información de Pedro de Villagra, XIII, 327).

[5]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 101. Note: The witnesses interviewed in Francisco Aguirre's Información de servicios (Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, X, 79–215) give varying reports of the tragedy but the main facts are substantially the same as those given by Mariño Lovera.

The two survivors of the catastrophe attempted to make their way to Santiago on foot, hiding by day and traveling by night. They finally reached the small fort of Quillota, practically naked and almost dead of hunger. From there, news of the tragedy was sent on to Santiago at once where it was received on February 1—only five or six days after the arrival of Escobar, whose warning had been ignored in that city.[6]

The *cabildo* of Santiago took immediate action. So serious did its members consider the situation that they asked the lieutenant governor himself to lead the forces against the Indians, naming Francisco Aquirre to take his place in Santiago during his obsence.[7] Villagra hastily gathered sixty men—thirty horsemen and thirty *arcabuceros*. The *arcabuceros* he sent by sea under command of Diego Maldonado and the recently-arrived Esteban de Sosa, while he, himself, rode out at the head of the thirty horsemen.

The *arcabuceros* arrived at La Serena ahead of the horsemen, and, according to the account of Lope de Ayala, one of Maldonado's men, they landed and attempted to fortify some part of the ruined town. The Indians, however, drunk with the success of their recent tragedy, moved against the Spaniards with such great numbers and so much enthusiasm that they wounded many and killed two, and forced the others back into the ship to await the arrival of Villagra and his men.[8] The next day Villagra arrived and the men on the ship joined him and together they set about chastising the Indians. The Spaniards followed the Indians as far as the valley of Huasco but did not venture into Copiapó, though apparently Villagra's orders from the *cabildo* of Santiago had named Copiapó as his destination.[9] On Villagra's return to the burned town—his intention was to rebuild it—he got news of Valdivia's arrival in Valparaiso and, leaving most of his men with Maldonado, he returned by ship to Valparaiso to report to his governor.

The news of the disaster at La Serena had produced consternation among the inhabitants of Santiago and its environs. Pleas for help and protection poured in to the *cabildo* from day to day, along with reports of suspicious incidents. Nor were all the reports mere fragments of overwrought nerves. The Indians of Rodrigo de Araya, a *vecino* a few leagues out from Santiago,

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[6]Declaración de Andrés de Escobar, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 493.

[7]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile*, I, 166.

[8]Declaración de Lope de Ayala, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, X, 99–100.

[9]Declaración de Diego Sánchez Morales, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, X, 93.

rose and managed to kill a Spanish soldier;[10] the natives of Cachapoal attempted a revolt and it was necessary for Francisco de Aguirre to take ten or twelve men and go to the relief of the *vecinos* there.[11] By far the greatest consequences of the fear seizing the countryside came from Malga-Malga. Pedro Gómez de las Montañas sent a letter from there, in the name of the miners (fourteen signed it), asking the *cabildo* for armed guards to protect the workers at the mines. He asked for six horsemen to be paid from the royal chest. In case they were not sent, he informed the *cabildo,* he and the other miners were going to leave the mines—since there was a very real danger of an Indian uprising there—and go into Santiago. He pointed out that the loss, both to the king and to the *vecinos,* of closing the mines would greatly exceed any expense attached to sending a guard. The *cabildo* offered to send four of the six horsemen asked for, at a salary of fifty *pesos* per month, "to keep watch when it was necessary at night and to guard with arms and horses during the time that the mine gang should be delivering the gold mined during the day."[12] The miners refused the *cabildo's* offer and the mines were closed.[13]

Such was the state of affairs in Chile when its rightful governor returned, and such was the report that Villagra had to make upon meeting his chief at Valparaiso the last week in May, 1549.

Valdivia had not hurried to reach Santiago nor did he hurry after Villagra's arrival. It was evident to him that order must be restored and the mines—which were the principal source of wealth for the colony—must be reopened. He set about these tasks gradually, arriving at the capital city on June 20.[14]

The *cabildo* of Santiago had taken cognizance of Valdivia's arrival in Chile in its May meetings by recognizing the royal officials appointed by La Gasca for Chile—Jerónimo de Alderete as treasurer, Esteban de Sosa as *contador,* and Vicencio de Monte as *veedor*—and permitting them to have their "voice and vote" in *cabildo* meetings. In the session of June 17, knowing that Valdivia was on his way to Santiago, the matter of a reception for their long-absent governor was taken up.

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[10]Declaración de Juan de Almonacid, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XVIII, 428.

[11]Información de servicios de Francisco de Aguirre, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* X, 88.

[12]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 167–68.

[13]Información de servicios de Francisco de Aguirre, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* X, 88.

[14]Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile,* II, 32.

Since the departure of Valdivia for Perú, the *cabildo* of Santiago, forced to meet many emergencies of government, had greatly expanded its powers and privileges. Naturally, it was now loath to part with any of its newly-acquired prestige, but greatly feared that it might do so at the hands of its energetic and capable governor. To secure its position, Pedro de Miranda, *procurador* of the city, presented a request—as was customary—to the other members asking that Valdivia not be received unless he had previously taken an oath to respect the laws, maintain the privileges and positions of the *conquistadores,* and preserve and increase the favors and the rights of the *vecinos* and *moradores.* The request received the approbation of the entire group and a committee, composed of Francisco Aguirre and Esteban de Sosa, was appointed to confer with Valdivia and learn his reaction to the request.[15]

Valdivia had no wish to lock horns with his old friends in the *cabildo* immediately upon his arrival in Chile, but neither could he see the necessity of leaving his present work to appear before it to take the requested oath. A compromise measure was worked out. Jerónimo Alderete, carrying a *poder* from the governor, countersigned by Juan de Cárdenas, should appear before the council, and take the oath in the governor's name. The *cabildo* accepted the compromise and at its meeting on June 19 the oath was administered to Valdivia's proxy. After the meeting was over they commanded the town crier—Domingo, the negro—to proclaim publicly from the plaza that they recognized as governor the "*muy magnífico* Señor Don Pedro de Valdivia."[16]

The next day, June 20, Valdivia entered Santiago. His arrival was something in the nature of a triumphal entry. Díaz Mesa says that the entire population of the city went outside the city proper to greet him, the *yanaconas* and the Chilean Indians of service carrying branches of myrtle and cinnamon which they waved as they followed him back to the plaza. An arbor had been erected on the plaza, under which the members of the *cabildo* received the governor and from which—after the troops had paraded in their new uniforms and Valdivia had gallantly saluted the banner of Charles V that blew in the breeze—they accompanied him to his own house. Once inside, however, they revealed that though they had welcomed their governor with all enthusiasm, they were not entirely pleased with the situation. Francisco de Aguirre, Valdivia's old and faithful friend, asked him courteously if he would renew personally the oath of office that Jerónimo de Alde-

[15]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 171, 173, 178.
[16]*Ibid.,* 180.

rete had taken in his name the day before. Valdivia was taken completely by surprise since he had thought the matter settled. He looked questioningly around the room but saw only the faces of men whom he knew to be his friends—Villagra, his lieutenant, who had just ridden in with him; Pastene, his lieutenant-at-sea; the Alderete brothers, who had been with him since he left Spain; Juan Gómez de Almagro, now in his ninth year as *alguacil mayor;* Rodrigo de Quiroga, and many others. If they made this request of him, it was only because they were convinced that municipal government could now function in Santiago and that autocratic control was no longer needed. Reading the situation correctly, Valdivia graciously consented to the request and took the desired oath. He had to take it a second time, however, before the *cabildo* was satisfied because the first time it was administered "he placed his hands one against the other, which is a pledge of homage" when they wished him to place his hand on the token cross, where the *cabildo* members placed theirs. The second time the oath was taken in the required form and the incident passed off without ill feelings.[17]

When the *cabildo* had gone, Valdivia realized that his home was empty. The woman who had shared his hearth and his life for ten years was no longer there. Inés de Suárez, learning the content of La Gasca's sentence long before Valdivia reached Valparaiso, had faced the condition imposed by the priest with her accustomed straightforwardness. There was no doubt in her mind that Valdivia must obey the mandate of the king, given through La Gasca. To do otherwise was to fall into royal disfavor and to see all that he had accomplished go for naught. There remained, therefore, for her the choice of the two alternatives offered by the sentence: she could return to Spain or she could stay in Chile by marrying someone there. In either case she could have six months more with Valdivia, if she chose, before fulfilling the sentence. With her usual clarity she saw that six months of renewed companionship could only add to the poignancy of separation and she resolved to be out of the house before the governor's return. But should she go out of the country as well? In Spain, she had neither relatives nor goods, while in Chile she held an envied position. Possessed of wide *repartimientos* and numerous Indians, she enjoyed the prestige loaned by wealth, while her kindness to the poor and sick engendered a sincere love for her on the part of the unfortunate.

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[17]Díaz Mesa, ***Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos,*** II, 239–40; Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 182.

She carried her problem to Rodrigo González, the priest who had taught her to read. His advice coincided with her own desires—to marry and remain in Chile. The good father also suggested that to expiate the sin of her unlawful love for Valdivia, she should build a hermitage where she could pray continuously for her own soul and for that of her one-time lover. She followed his advice in both instances, and, whether with the aid of the priest or by simple woman's wiles, by the time of Valdivia's arrival in Santiago, she had been for a month the bride of Rodrigo de Quiroga, one of Valdivia's best friends.[18]

Inés de Suárez also started immediate construction of the hermitage. The actual building of it was placed in the hands of Bartolomé Flores, the German who had superintended the building of several of Santiago's best structures. When the hermitage was finished, Inéz de Suárez deeded the building and grounds to Rodrigo González.

There is a story to the effect that Valdivia's last meeting with his former mistress and co-conqueror was in the hermitage: When Valdivia learned that Doña Inés had married another and was gone forever from his house, a sadness swept over him that paralyzed his will. He spent days doing nothing. Hearing of the hermitage she had built, he went one afternoon to pray before its altar. Long meditation brought a certain calmness to his spirit and, thinking that he had won sufficient strength to follow the path destiny pointed out to him, he rose to leave the place of worship. At the door he met Doña Inés. All his noble resolutions were swept away in an instant and he was once more the lover, pleading and importunate. Her will—always the stronger of the two—sustained them both and sent him away resolved to do the work that his king expected of him.[19]

Valdivia turned all his energies toward bringing the land to peace and productivity. On the ninth of July, he sent Francisco de Villagra back to Perú with reports for La Gasca and all the available gold—thirty-six thousand *castellanos*—for horses and supplies. He thought that by that time La Gasca would have been forced to issue *repartimientos*, and that those receiving none would be willing to come to Chile—especially if a captain in whom they had confidence was there to lead them.[20]

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[18]Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, II, 242–44.

[19]Hermelo Arabena-Williams, "The Conqueror's Star," in *Andean Quarterly*, Spring 1943, p. 71.

[20]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

That same month (July), the captains whom Valdivia had sent on by land when he had been called back to Lima by La Gasca—Pedro de Villagra, Juan Jufré, and Francisco de Ulloa[21]—arrived in Santiago with almost a hundred men. They had started with a great number of horses but had lost many of them—Valdivia says one hundred[22]—in the Copiapó Valley where the natives had proved themselves most hostile. The forces had arrived in Copiapó only a short while after the massacre of Juan Bohón and his men, while the Indians were still puffed up over their victory, and the going had been difficult, many of the Spaniards sustaining serious wounds and all suffering from lack of food.[23]

Their arrival in Santiago bolstered Valdivia's forces to the point where he thought he could once more begin operations to the south. The governor, himself, had brought two hundred men with him and the added hundred gave him a larger army than he had yet brought into combat against the Indians. Before he could leave to subdue Arauco, however, he knew that La Serena must be rebuilt. He could not afford to be without a settlement there if he wished to bring people and horses to Chile by land. He therefore sent Francisco de Aguirre and a small force of horsemen to punish the natives, rebuild the town, issue *repartimientos*, establish a *cabildo*, and raise the "tree of justice." The second founding took place August 26, 1549.[24]

Valdivia's preparations to leave for the south, which had begun immediately after Aguirre's departure for La Serena, was interrupted in a painful manner early in September. While inspecting the people who were ready to leave and who were passing in review, Valdivia's horse fell with him and fractured his foot[25] so badly that the bones of the toes worked out in pieces, and it was three months before he could leave his bed. So horrible was his suffering that many times his life was dispaired of, and it was

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[21]Juan Jufré had managed to get himself recognized as leader by Ulloa's men, and Ulloa's name does not appear in the questioning of the witnesses, but after their arrival in Santiago, Ulloa brought suit against Jufré for usurpation of his authority and won a sentence in his favor, forcing Jufré to pay him damages. (Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile*, II, 132.)

[22]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[23]Declaración de Lope de Ayala, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, X, 100.

[24]*Ibid.*, 101; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[25]Díaz Mesa says the horse fell because Valdivia was mistreating the animal—the result of his resentment against the world because Inés de Suárez left him. He also used the excuse of the broken foot to try to get his mistress back, but, though she directed the treatment of his injury from afar, she refused to come to his bedside. (Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, II, 245.)

impossible for him to superintend the preparations for the projected plan of conquest or even to advise in the routine matters of government.[26]

Out of the governor's inability to discharge the duties of his office arose a situation at once ludicrous and dangerous to the welfare of the city: Valdivia had brought back with him from Perú one Antonio de las Peñas, a lawyer, whom he appointed, in July of that year, *justicia mayor* of Santiago. The *cabildo* confirmed the appointment and administered the usual oath. After Valdivia's accident—Villagra being out of the city—Las Peñas took upon himself the presidency of the *cabildo* and informed its members that any session held without his presence would be illegal and the transactions of such a meeting null and void. One afternoon the members of the council had gathered at Villagra's house—the *cabildo* had no meeting place of its own but usually met at Valdivia's house. Not wanting to disturb him in his illness, they had moved the meeting place to Villagra's house—and they sent Juan de Almonacid, *alguacil menor,* to notify Antonio de las Peñas of the change of meeting place. The lawyer, it seems, was miffed because he had not been consulted. He said to Juan Almonacid:

"I do not want to go, and if they wish to have the *cabildo,* they must come to my house."

The *alguacil menor* remonstrated with him and told him that the *cabildo* was already in session, to which Las Peñas replied:

"Surely they have to come to where I am to have a *cabildo* meeting and I will order the scribe of the *cabildo* not to seat the *cabildo* if I am not present at it."

When Almonacid returned with the lawyer's answer, the ire of the council rose. It retaliated by passing an act saying that the *justicia mayor* of the council had refused to assist at a session and had spoken unfitting words against the authority of the *cabildo,* and that he would not be summoned again but that he might assist when he wished at the meetings which would be held in the house already chosen.[27] The issue was deadlocked with neither side willing to give an inch. Fortunately Valdivia had one of his less-painful weeks and settled the matter by commanding the *cabildo* to resume its meetings at his house, and later they were moved to the church.[28]

By Christmas of 1549, Valdivia was able to sit in a chair but could not bear his weight upon his crippled foot nor mount a

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[26]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[27]Actas del cabildo, in *Historiadores de Chile,* I, 204.

[28]*Ibid.,* 208.

horse. The expedition to the south was so important to him, however, that he again set in motion preparations for the proposed journey. He knew that unless he left soon, the rainy season of the winter would force him to postpone the long-wished-for settlement another year. Early in January, he announced himself ready to leave Santiago.[29] Apparently he realized that he was leaving his capital city forever. La Gasca's sentence had stipuplated that he must bring out his wife to Chile and he must have seen the impossibility of establishing the lawful House of Valdivia in the same neighborhood that was so permeated with memories of Inés de Suárez, and where her continued presence as the wife of another must necessarily serve to complicate matters. Two days before he left, he deeded all the lands he held within the limits of the town of Santiago in perpetuity to the support of the hermitage erected by Inés de Suárez, on the simple condition "that his soul be prayed for continuously one day each month."[30]

The expedition got under way the first week in January. Valdivia was still unable to mount a horse but started the journey carried in a hand chair by the Indians. He had two hundred men—both foot and horse—which he divided into four companies, commanded by Jerónimo de Alderete, his lieutenant general, Pedro de Villagra, his *maestre de campo*, Diego de Oro and himself.[31] He was accompanied by numerous Indians, both *yanaconas* and Chilean auxiliaries, but he promised the *cabildo* to return the *yanaconas* when he crossed the boundary line of the territory assigned to Santiago—a promise which he kept to the letter.

The departure marked the initial step in the Araucanian wars which were to disturb the peace of Chile almost three and a half centuries. Errázuriz says of the expedition:

> Pedro de Valdivia and his two hundred companions knew, without any doubt, the dangers of the enterprise they were undertaking; but, accustomed to see Spanish arms triumph immediately and definitely in America, accustomed to see the Indians, who a day before resisted and gave battle, converted into docile *yanaconas* and into auxiliaries of their armies, they did not imagine, certainly, the century-long and bloody war which they were going to initiate in those moments.[32]

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[29]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[30]Document translated by Stella Burke May, in *The Conqueror's Lady*, 330; also found in Díaz Mesa, *Leyendas y Episodios Chilenos*, 247.

[31]Información de servicios de Pedro de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIII, 17, 48, 58, 66.

[32]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, II, 322.

All went well with the expedition while crossing the territory controlled by Santiago. The Indians were quiet and food was easily obtained. Travel was slow because of Valdivia's condition and it took the Spaniards twenty days to reach the Itata River—the boundary of the Santiago district. By that time Valdivia was again able to sit his horse and took his place at the head of the force. He resumed the tactics he had found so effective on the journey from Cuzco to Santiago—that of sending out small groups of horsemen each day to reconnoiter and explore, to pick out roads, and to select campsites for the main army. The native carriers and the baggage were kept in the center of the main force with a group of fighting men leading the way and closing the rear. Soon after crossing the river, the Spaniards noticed an increased Indian population and began to suffer many minor harassments; however, no serious encounter occurred until they reached the Nivequeten River (now the Laja). This stream, an important tributary to the Biobío, flowed very quietly and smoothly, according to Valdivia's report, but was deep enough to reach the horsemen's stirrups. While the Spanish forces were engaged in crossing the river, the Indians attacked and Pedro de Villagra and his company fought off some two thousand of them, making prisoners of two or three chiefs.[33]

On January 24, 1550, Valdivia reached the Biobío River—the limit of his southward penetration in 1540. The stream was too wide and too deep to be crossed on the horses, and rafts had to be constructed. While Valdivia's men were building the rafts, the Indians appeared on the further bank, but, not being content to wait until the Spaniards got across to begin a battle, the natives plunged into the stream in great numbers to prevent the use of the rafts. The Spaniards killed ten or twelve and routed the others, but they were afraid to risk an attempt at crossing there and moved on upstream. Two leagues up the river, they met a large force of Indians, but Captain Alderete and his men dispersed them and even pursued them across the river. One Spanish soldier was drowned in the crossing, but the others had a very successful day and returned in the evening with a large number of sheep which served to give Valdivia's men a good and an unusual supper.

The Spaniards continued up the stream another two or three leagues where they pitched camp for the night after once more

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[33]Información de servicios de Pedro de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIII, 17; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550. Note: The narrative of Valdivia's explorations follows the above-mentioned letter unless otherwise stated.

driving off the natives. The next day Valdivia and fifty of his horsemen crossed the stream and rode toward the sea for two days, leaving the main force on the other side. They found the Indians so numerous that they did not go farther with such a small force and returned hastily to the main camp.

The Spaniards remained in camp at that place for eight days, exploring the surrounding country. On the ninth they moved toward the sea along the north bank of the stream, recrossing the Nivequeten River. Half a league from the coast, in the Andalien Valley, they again pitched camp on a fresh-water lake in order to look for a town site. Their force was divided into two parties—one keeping watch each night until midnight; the other, from midnight until dawn. On the second night just as the watch was being changed, the Indians attacked. They could approach from only one side, since the lake protected the other, but they came in overwhelming numbers and surprised the Spaniards by fighting in such closely-packed squadrons that they could not get in among them with their horses. The foot soldiers, too, were falling back when Valdivia, in order to strengthen their spirit, asked some of his foremost horsemen to dismount and fight with them on foot. Several complied with his request, among whom were Francisco de Riberos, Juan Godínez, and Gregorio de Castañeda. Valdivia also sent some thirty of his horsemen around to attack the Indians from the rear, and after three hours of fierce and bloody fighting, the Spaniards succeeded in driving off the natives. Only one Spaniard was killed, and he was a casualty of Spanish arms: an *arquebusier* was trying to direct his fire over the heads of the Spaniards in front of him into the ranks of the Indians, but one soldier was so tall that he caught the charge in his back and died of the wound.[34] There were also many wounds from the Indians' weapons—Valdivia says "sixty horses and as many Christians"—and the remainder of the night and all the next day was given over to caring for the injured.

The next day Valdivia went to look again at the spot chosen by him in 1546 as the future site of a city. The location still appeared to him as one of the best. He described it thus to Charles V:

> . . . I went to look at [the place] where, in past years, I had resolved to make a settlement, which is . . . on a harbor and inlet as good as there is in the Indies, and a big river falling into the sea around a headland, with the best fishing in the world . . . ; and on the other side another small stream that runs all year of very soft and clear water.[35]

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[34]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 22.

[35]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

On February 23, Valdivia moved his entire force into the chosen site, and at once set about building a fortress fence to protect them from the Indians—"so that we could come out to fight when we chose, and not when the Indians should force us to." Inside the fence a deep ditch was dug as further protection. The fort was completed on March 3, and on that day Valdivia allotted quarters and assigned lodgings to each of his men. When all were once inside, the night watch was greatly reduced and the *conquistadores* were allowed more rest.

Nine days later, the Indians appeared, coming in on the fort from all four directions at the same time. Valdivia sent Jerónimo Alderete and fifty horsemen out at one gate to break up a squadron coming to attack that side of the fort, and so thoroughly did they scatter them that the other squadrons turned and fled. The Spaniards pursued them, killing many and taking numerous prisoners. It was on these prisoners that Valdivia wreaked a punishment out of all keeping with his former policy toward the Indians. During the long trek from Cuzco to Santiago, his instructions to his captains had always been that they must do no harm to any captive but should send him with gifts and a message of peace to his *cacique,* explaining the mission of the Spaniards and asking him to come to them for further explanation. Whether Valdivia had become convinced that the Araucanian Indian was a different breed from his kinsmen of the north and that peaceful methods would not work, or whether, as Díaz Mesa suggests, his character had become hardened by his separation from Inés de Suárez, it is impossible to know. For some reason, however, from two hundred of the prisoners taken in the battle at the fort of Penco, Valdivia ordered that the hands and noses be cut off. This act of cruelty mars an otherwise humane and generous record and seems so out of keeping with Valdivia's character that it lends some support to the theory that his character had undergone a change. The excuse that he gave Charles V seems rather lame in view of the facts. He wrote:

> . . . from two hundred of them [the prisoners] I had the hands and noses cut off for their obstinacy since I had many times sent them messengers and given them the commands as ordered by Your Majesty. After this act of justice, when all had been brought together, I talked to them, for there were some *caciques* and important Indians among them, and told them how this was done because I had sent often to summon them and bid them come in peace, telling them for what purpose Your Majesty had sent me to this land, and they had received the message, and had not done as I bade them, and this seemed best to me for fulfilling Your Majesty's commands, and the satisfaction of your royal conscience; and so I sent them away.[36]

[36] *Ibid.*

Eight days after the attack on the fort, Juan Bautista de Pastene, Valdivia's lieutenant-by-sea, arrived in the harbor with fresh supplies for Valdivia's troops, much to everybody's joy. Immediately after unloading his cargo, Valdivia sent Pastene on south to look for more food. To support him by land he sent Jerónimo de Alderete and sixty horsemen. Pastene, instead of loading from the mainland, stopped at Santa María Island (then known as Talca), where he was cordially received. Some of the natives accompanied him back to the fort and Pastene reported to Valdivia that he had seen "the greatest prosperity of the Indies" and conditions favorable for a city greater than Seville.

Jerónimo de Alderete's journey was hardly less successful. When his force started across the Biobío River, it proved too deep for the horses to wade and the Spaniards were forced to swim them. Seeing some natives waiting for them on the other shore, they were apprehensive lest the Indians should attack before the horses regained their footing. As they approached the other bank, however, the natives fled, and they learned later than they were only watching out of curiosity, never having seen a horse swim before.[37] Alderete was received without any display of animosity on the part of the Indians. Some of them even promised to serve the Spaniards peacefully, and he returned with several *caciques* and Indian prisoners.[38] He brought glowing reports of the abundant population and the desirability of *repartimientos* in that section of the land.

Valdivia spent the next four months pacifying the country around the fort. During the winter, he sent Pastene on two more trips to the nearby islands and to the mainland districts for food, and to carry his oft-repeated message urging the Indians to come in and serve the Spaniards. The islanders seem not to have been so bellicose as their kinsmen on the mainland, and Pastene was able to secure plenty of food from them, but on the mainland at a port called Lavapié, when the Spaniards attempted a landing, five of their number were killed and many others badly wounded.[39] In spite of minor adversities, however, enough of the Indians submitted to service that Valdivia felt justified in founding a town and sharing out the land and Indians. On October 5, 1550, he founded the city of Concepción around the nucleus of Fort Penco, appointed a *cabildo*, set up the "tree of justice," and issued land

[37]Declaración de Juan Gómez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVI, 435.

[38]Información de Rodrigo de Quiroga, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVI, 261.

[39]Interrogatorio puesto por Juan de Montenegro, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XVIII, 420.

and Indians.[40] The territory assigned to the new city included only that which the Spaniards believed to be definitely conquered—from the Maule River on the north to the Lavapié on the south.[41] Valdivia's lack of knowledge of the surrounding country created a situation similar to that of Santiago in its early years and it was necessary, later, to readjust the *repartimientos*.

Valdivia's extravagant praise of Concepción suggests that he intended eventually to make it his capital city. It was here that he intended to establish the House of Valdivia, when Jerónimo de Alderete, whom he sent to Spain in 1552 to bring out the long-neglected Doña Marina, should return. Concepción became his headquarters from which he went out in summer to found other towns and to which he returned for winter.

October 15, 1550—ten days after Concepción was founded—Valdivia dispatched Alonso de Aguilera to Spain with a report for Charles V concerning the conquest. He then turned his attention to the building of a fort large enough to protect the inhabitants of the town in case of an Indian attack. The fort was built of adobe, more than twice as high as a man and one and a half *varas* wide. When it was completed, Valdivia took a hundred and seventy men—he left twenty horsemen under the command of Diego de Oro for added protection to the town—and departed toward the south to found another town.[42]

It was mid-February, 1551, when the Spaniards crossed the Biobío River. Their force was large enough that they had little to fear from the Indians, but the choice of a site for a town was something so important that it could not be done quickly; therefore, they advanced some thirty leagues to the banks of the Cautín River before they found a suitable location just above the junction of that river and the Damas. There they erected a fort —a better one than that of Penco, Valdivia says—and gave it the name of La Imperial in March, 1551. For about six weeks longer the governor stayed in that area pacifying the Indians and becoming acquainted with the surrounding country in order to issue *repartimientos* at some future date. On April 4, Valdivia returned to Concepción for the winter, taking some twenty horsemen with him. The remainder of his force was left at La Imperial under command of Pedro de Villagra.[43]

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[40]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 15, 1550.

[41]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, II, 361.

[42]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, September 25, 1551.

[43]*Ibid.;* Información de servicios de Pedro de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIII, 21–22.

During the winter in Concepción, Valdivia reassigned the *repartimientos* of that town among forty *vecinos*. In June two ships arrived from Perú bringing supplies and about a hundred men—enough reinforcements to enable Valdivia to found another town the following summer. The same month, the governor received a letter from Francisco de Villagra, the lieutenant whom he had sent to Perú for supplies in 1549. The letter was brought by Captain Diego Maldonado—who had accompanied Villagra to Perú—and a small force of eight men who had crossed the mountains in mid-winter to bring strange news to Valdivia:

In June, 1549, Pedro de la Gasca had given Juan Núñez de Prado—the soldier who deserted from Gonzalo Pizarro's army and joined La Gasca's forces the day before the battle of Jaquijaguana—permission to found a town in the province of Tucumán.[44] Núñez de Prado had gone with a rather small force and had founded a town which he called El Barco. When Francisco de Villagra left Perú for Chile, he obtained permission from La Gasca to come through Tucumán to avoid the difficulties of desert travel. He had to give La Gasca a promise, however, to keep a distance of thirty leagues from the newly-founded town. Apparently Villagra did not fulfill his promise and trouble occurred between the two forces. Valdivia says that Núñez de Prado's men fell on Villagra at night shouting, *"Viva el Rey y Juan Núñez de Prado!"* but from accounts of some of the witnesses, it seems that trouble had started between the two groups back in Perú and was climaxed by a battle near El Barco.[45] Whether Núñez de Prado acted of his own free will, as Valdivia says, or was forced by Villagra, he gave up the authority he held over the town, and the *cabildo* and inhabitants asked Villagra to administer the government in Valdivia's name, since in their opinion it fell within his jurisdiction. Villagra was glad to comply with this request until he could receive instructions from Valdivia. The governor, however, sent the request on to the king and before he could receive an answer, Núñez de Prado had destroyed the town.[46]

In October (1551) Valdivia returned to La Imperial to finish the work of issuing *repartimientos*. He found that Pedro de Villagra had been so assiduous in carrying on the work begun by

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[44]Roberto Levillier, *Chile y Tucumán en el siglo*, XVI, appendix E, p. 109.

[45]Varying accounts are found in the Proceso de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, vols. XXI and XXII, and in the Información de Núñez de Prado contra Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 130. Valdivia also gave account of it to Charles V in his letter of September 25, 1551.

[46]Pedro de Valdivia's letters to Emperor Charles V, September 25, 1551, and October 26, 1552.

him that the town was in good order and the countryside at peace. To reward such diligence, Valdivia gave the captain his choice of *repartimientos,* saying in effect that nobody else should receive anything at all until Pedro de Villagra should be completely satisfied.[47] The captain had had six months to become acquainted with the land and had made good use of the time, riding out almost constantly, with part of his force, to keep order and to learn the land. As a result he was able to choose one of the most fertile and most thickly populated sections of that area for his *repartimiento,* getting, it seems, some fifteen thousand Indians.[48] The remainder of the territory was divided among eighty *vecinos,* and nowhere in Chile did the *conquistadores* receive richer reward for their services than in the vicinity of La Imperial.[49]

Some time during that same month (October, 1551), the military fort of Arauco was established. The date is uncertain but it had been built by October 20, for on that date Cristóbal Pérez wrote a letter to his father in which he said:

> The governor of this land has for me a very good will and has made me his *mayordomo* and *alcalde* of a *casa fuerte* and all his Indians in a valley called Arauco . . . and the gold which the Indians take out [of the earth], I have in my control, and the food that is harvested I have in my power. I have under my hand six horsemen to guard this fort; it is an honorable and profitable position.[50]

By the first of November, Valdivia was ready to move still farther south to found another town. He was accompanied by a hundred and fifty Spaniards and numerous Indians.[51] One of the most valuable members of his group was the priest, Rodrigo González, who, each evening after camp was pitched, admonished the soldiers, in a short address, of their responsibilities as propagators of the Christian faith—a custom which helped maintain order among the troops and at the same time strengthened their resolution to carry on.[52]

The Indians did not prove as peaceful as those around La Imperial, and the Spaniards had several encounters with them before reaching the Mariquina Valley, not far from the site on the

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[47]Declaración de Rodrigo Gonzales, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XIII, 49.

[48]Información de servicios de Pedro de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* XIII, 23.

[49]*Ibid.;* Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 26, 1552.

[50]Cristóbal Pérez á su padre, October 20, 1551, in Medina, *Documentos inéeditos,* IX, 406.

[51]Carta del cabildo de Valdivia al Rey, July 20, 1552, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* IX, 428.

[52]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* II, 450.

Valdivia River where the governor hoped to found his next town. It was in that valley while resting his men that Valdivia received the news—brought by Pedro de Miranda—that Francisco de Villagra had arrived in Santiago with approximately two hundred men, five hundred horses and mares, and much material needed to carry on the war.[53] Seeing in such bountiful reinforcements an opportunity to enlarge his prospective operations, Valdivia resolved to await the arrival of Francisco de Villagra before continuing his advance. He had his soldiers build some temporary quarters of branches and straw, and sent Jerónimo de Alderete with some fifty men to examine the countryside for a good townsite.[54]

Toward the end of November, Villagra arrived in Maraquina but he had left his main force in Santiago, taking only fifteen or twenty men with him. Valdivia received him with every evidence of great joy, sending his secretary, Juan de Cárdenas, to La Imperial to accompany him from there to Maraquina.[55] Valdivia, himself, rode out to meet him as he neared Maraquina, and, when he saw Villagra, Valdivia "dismounted from his horse and embraced him and wept with him from pleasure and happiness at his return."[56] The happy reunion did not last long, however, for after a few days, Valdivia sent Juan Jufré to Santiago to bring the rest of Villagra's forces, and sent Villagra to La Imperial to await their arrival. Gratefully appreciative of the great service that Villagra had rendered him and Chile, Valdivia later assigned Francisco de Villagra an exceedingly productive *repartimiento* near La Imperial[57] and again named him the lieutenant general of the land and had his appointment proclaimed by the town crier in each of the existing towns.

Soon after the departure of Villagra and Jufré, Valdivia started moving down the bank of the river toward the sea. The Indians, doubtless knowing through their spies of the absence of Alderete and his men, and seeing Villagra and his men depart, fell on the Spaniards in a surprise attack just as they were preparing to break camp one morning. The timing of the attack was bad for the Indians for the Spaniards had only to mount their horses and ride the attackers down. Errázuriz characterizes the encounter as a slaughter rather than a battle, for the natives fled from the

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[53]Declaración de Juan Godínez, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 489.
[54]Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, ch. 36.
[55]Declaración de Juan de Cárdenas, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 476.
[56]Declaración de Juan Jufré, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 514.
[57]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 30.

horses without any attempt to defend themselves. Some threw themselves over a high cliff into the Toltén River, and many were slaughtered on its banks.[58]

The Spanish force continued its way down the river and two days later met Jerónimo de Alderete returning to report on the good condition of the land and the abundance of natives. The reunited force made its way slowly because of unseasonable rains and finally found its progress barred by a tributary stream which was so swollen that a crossing could not be made at once. The Christmas season was spent in camp there.[59] Upon resumption of the journey, Valdivia sent Jerónimo de Alderete and thirty men forward to explore, and they found a beautiful valley not far from the excellent harbor named several years before by Pastene and his men, in honor of their governor, Valdivia. The site was too good to pass up and it was there that Valdivia founded his next town, called also Valdivia—"for a river which others named when exploring the coast," he wrote his king.

It was February, 1552, before the town was founded, the *cabildo* appointed, and the "tree of justice" raised. Almost three months longer Valdivia remained in that area, sending out parties of exploration and giving out lands and Indians. Francisco de Villagra and his men arrived soon after the founding and many of them were among the seventy *vecinos* who received lots and *encomiendas*.[60]

Winter was approaching, but so great was Valdivia's desire to establish another town that he sent Jerónimo de Alderete to select a site and found the town, while he, with almost a hundred warriors, went south to explore toward the Strait.

Alderete selected a most advantageous site in an upland valley that commanded the pass of the Andes communicating with the Rio de la Plata area. He called the town Villarica because of the rich mines of gold and silver which the natives had revealed to him in that section. Forty *vecinos* received land and after the solemn act of establishing the town (April, 1552), Alderete returned to Valdivia.[61]

Pedro de Valdivia and his hundred men traveled south along the central valley until they were stopped by a river so wide and deep that they were afraid to attempt a crossing—Valdivia wrote the

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[58]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, II, 455; Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 29.

[59]Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile*, II, 35.

[60]Declaración de Gabriel de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 563.

[61]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, II, 460; Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 26, 1552.

king that the stream was a mile wide. They followed the bank of the river up into the mountains hoping to find a place to ford it, but instead they found a large and beautiful lake from whence the stream flowed, stretching away, according to Valdivia's account, for forty leagues. Seeing that it would be impossible to reach the Strait before winter caught them, Valdivia led his men back to the town of Valdivia and on back to Concepción for the winter,[62] arriving there early in May.

Still dominated by the idea of making the southern part of the continent one political unit, Valdivia during the winter of 1552 planned an expedition to the Strait of Magellan for the following year[63]—despite the fact that Charles V had ignored his request for an extension of the limits assigned to his government by La Gasca. In a *real cédula* of May 31, 1552, the Spanish monarch had confirmed La Gasca's appointment of Valdivia as governor, but had not changed nor even mentioned the limits of the territory he was to govern.[64] Valdivia seemed determined, however, to establish the authority of his king and himself far enough south to prevent any unfriendly ship from coming through the Strait. The governor had at that time a sufficient force to carry out his plan had he been able to gather it in one place. The Spaniards in Chile equipped for conquest at that period numbered at least a thousand,[65] but they were divided among the several towns and each section was so isolated that it was unable to give aid to another in case of hostilities from the natives. It was this factor of isolation that eventually led to the governor's death and the evacuation of several of his towns.

Valdivia had been planning for some time to send Jerónimo de Alderete to Spain. In fact, in his letter to Charles V dated September 25, 1551, he had told his monarch that Alderete would be there with the letter. He had found other work for his faithful captain, however, and had not sent him. Alderete was several years older than Valdivia and had given loyal and efficient aid to his chief, and it was fitting that he should receive some reward at court. Valdivia also planned to have him bring his (Valdivia's) wife to Chile, since he had not yet complied with La Gasca's order. In the spring, therefore, the governor went to Santiago in order to arrange for Alderete's departure.[66]

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[62]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 26, 1552.
[63]Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile*, II, 35.
[64]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, II, 462.
[65]Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile*, II, 35.
[66]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 26, 1552.

Alderete left with *poderes* from the cities of Santiago, Concepción, and La Imperial, with petitions from the governor and many captains, and with all the money that Valdivia could get together. The royal officials sent the king's *quintos* by him—some sixty thousand *pesos*—and Valdivia sent seven thousand, five hundred *pesos* of his own money to his wife to pay for her passage over.[67]

Valdivia remained in Santiago the rest of that summer. Again the idea of extension of his government is evident. He wrote his king that he was sending his lieutenant, Francisco de Villagra, from the newly-founded town of Villarica to explore the North Sea (the Atlantic) since the Indians had told him that it was not more than a hundred leagues across the land to it.[68] Villagra prepared to depart that same month. In November, Valdivia appointed Francisco de Aguirre, who had been serving as his lieutenant in La Serena since the refounding of the city in 1549, to go to El Barco to add that territory to the northern zone. Aguirre seems not to have been particularly eager for the task but, since it was assigned to him, he set out the following month with a sizeable force of horsemen to establish Valdivia's authority in Tucumán—a feat which he accomplished by the middle of the next year, but only after moving the town of El Barco and changing its name to that of *Santiago del Estero del Nuevo Maestrazgo,* conveniently shortened to Estero.[69]

Also in November (1552) the Spanish forces of Santiago were augmented by the arrival from Perú of Don Martín de Avendaño and Gaspar de Villarroel with about a hundred and twenty men.[70]

Valdivia returned to Concepción for the winter, and Don Martín de Avendaño went with him. The governor gave Don Martín a good *repartimiento* with many Indians near the town of Villarica, but the latter was not satisfied with it and asked permission to return to Perú. Valdivia gladly gave it and Don Martín and thirty of his men retraced their steps to the land of rich *repartimientos.*[71]

In June (1553), Villagra returned from his exploratory trip that had had for its destination the Atlantic Ocean near the Strait of Magellan. He had crossed the Andes from Villarica and had continued his journey several days but, finding his way barred by two mighty rivers, he had been forced to return. He

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[67]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile,* II, 464.

[68]Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Charles V, October 26, 1552.

[69]Silva Lezaeta, *El Conquistador Francisco de Aguirre,* 120; Información de servicios de Francisco de Aguirre, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* X, 57.

[70]Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile,* II, 36.

[71]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile,* 32.

had explored as much territory as possible on the way back to Villarica and had encountered hostile Indians.[72] At La Imperial, on his way to report to Valdivia concerning his expedition, Villagra encountered a situation that alarmed him: a *yanacona* had arrived with the news that the Indians of Pucureo, halfway between Villarica and La Imperial, had risen in revolt and killed the Spaniards there. Villagra took thirty of his men and hurried to the place, hoping that the Indian's report was exaggerated. Such was indeed the case, and he arrived in time to save most of the garrison, though the captain, Alonso de Moya, had already been killed.[73] The next day Villagra sent Indian messengers to the natives urging them to come back and serve the Spaniards peacefully. At first the message met with a sullen refusal, but one day one *cacique* ventured in and when Villagra explained to him that he had no intention of punishing the Indians if they returned to their work, the chief promised to bring other *caciques* to a peace parley. The chiefs came with hidden weapons, however, and Villagra narrowly escaped with his life, but the Spanish soldiers promptly smothered the attempt at massacre. They made examples of the more hostile chiefs and sent the others back home to bring their people in to serve. Most of them returned to service and the neighborhood, on the surface at least, was restored to peace.[74]

Villagra was not too confident that the land was as peaceful as it seemed. He had heard of mutinies of small bands of Indians here and there, and before leaving La Imperial for Concepción—where Valdivia was—he left part of his men stationed there and cautioned Pedro de Villagra to send more help to Pucureo. Francisco de Villagra then went on to Concepción to report to Valdivia on his journey to the North Sea and to communicate to him his fears concerning the natives. He arrived in Concepción August 20.[75]

Villagra's news got little consideration in Concepción, except from the governor himself. The inhabitants were in an orgy of gold mining. The mines had been discovered early in the life of the settlement, but Valdivia had issued orders that no *vecino* could

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[72]Declaración de Alonso de Reinoso, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI, 403.

[73]Accounts of the attack are given by most of the witnesses in the Proceso de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXI and XXII. That of Pedro de Castro (XXII, 610) is perhaps the most detailed.

[74]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, II, 528.

[75]Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile*, II, 37; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, 529.

mine the precious metal until the town was founded, lots distributed, and houses built, "looking to the perpetuation of this country."[76] When the restrictions were lifted after Valdivia's return from Santiago, there had been such an excess of mining activity that Valdivia had been forced to restrict the number of Indians that any *vecino* could employ in mining to one out of every ten held by him.[77]

Valdivia heard Villagra's report about the natives but apparently his optimistic nature rejected the full import of the incidents. Instead of strengthening the already-existing forts and towns, the governor was still planning to create more. In September (1553) he commissioned Francisco de Ulloa to go by sea to explore the Strait, and the coastline en route. It took forty days to prepare the captain's "armada"—one large ship and two small ones—and it was near the end of October before he sailed from Valdivia.[78]

No sooner was he gone than Valdivia sent Francisco de Villagra—with sixty-five of the men who had come with him from Perú and had as yet received no reward—to found another town where *repartimientos* might be issued to those lacking them.[79] They left the first days in November.

While preparations for these two expeditions were in progress, Valdivia founded another town nearby. He called it Los Confines because it was on the boundary line between Concepción and La Imperial.[80] At the same time he built forts at Purén and Tucapel. The small population of La Imperial was further reduced by Valdivia sending Pedro de Villagra, *comandante* of that town, to investigate reports of a salt mine on the other side of the mountains. The number of men accompanying him is not known.[81]

Persistent rumors of unrest among the Indians led Valdivia, early in December, to send Diego de Maldonado with four other warriors to reinforce the fort of Tucapel. They arrived at the fort of Arauco without incident, but when they left there for Tucapel, a large force of Indians attacked them suddenly, killing three of the men at once. Maldonado and the other escaped

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[76]Jerónimo de Alderete to Emperor Charles V, September 27, 1551, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 405.

[77]Confesión de Francisco de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XX, 84.

[78]Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile*, II, 534.

[79]Declaración de Luis Bonifacio, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XXII, 582.

[80]Declaración de Muñoz de Illanes, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 149.

[81]Información de servicios de Pedro de Villagra, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIII, 24, 125, 216, 308.

by returning to Arauco.[82] The great uprising of the natives had begun in earnest.

The one Indian more responsible than any other for the successes of the natives in their war against the Spaniards was Valdivia's former stableboy, called Alonso by the Spaniards and Lautaro by his kinsmen. He had lived in Santiago a few years and had learned the secret of handling a horse—the animal that paralyzed his people with fear and gave the Spaniards such an advantage over them. One day Alonso escaped and returned to his tribesmen. With him he carried a message of both hate and hope. The hate the Araucanians could understand. It burned fiercely in the heart of each of them, but the hope was slow in catching fire. Repeatedly Lautaro told them that the Spaniards were only mortals like themselves, that the horses were mortal also and tired easily in hot weather, that to win they must believe they could win.[83] Slowly but surely he built a faith that fanned revolt from one end of the country to the other. The attack on Maldonado was the opening gun of their campaign.

Other incidents followed in rapid succession. Alonso Coronas, the commander of the fort of Purén, captured some *caciques* one day and when he put them to torture, they confessed that the whole land had planned to rise at once. Coronas immediately wrote Valdivia of what he had learned and sent to La Imperial for help.[84]

The fort of Tucapel was attacked soon after by a hundred Indians who came with bundles of grass for the horses. Once inside the fort they dropped their bundles, took out the weapons hidden inside, and attacked the Spaniards. Although taken by surprise, Captain Martín de Ariza and his men fought valiantly and succeeded in driving most of the Indians out. Some were held prisoners. Outside, the repulsed ones joined forces with others who had lingered in the woods to see how the plan worked, and all waited for the Spaniards to come out. Ariza made several short forays against them, wounding many and temporarily breaking up their squadrons, but they only withdrew and formed again. It was evident to Ariza that his small force could not hold out long if the Indians should make a determined and concerted attack; therefore, under cover of night, after killing his prisoners with an iron bar, he and his men slipped away to join Coronas in the fort of Purén.[85] The next day the Indians burned Tucapel.

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[82]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 150.
[83]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 36.
[84]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, 151.
[85]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 35.

Meanwhile the town of La Imperial had gotten Purén's plea for help and had sent Juan Gómez de Almagro and some soldiers to help defend the place.[86] The Indians attacked three days after their arrival, but the Spaniards, realizing that it was a matter of life or death, fought with supercourage and succeeded not only in defending the place but in routing the Indians—an achievement which Juan Gómez proudly reported to Valdivia at once.[87]

Valdivia had received the letter from Alonso Coronas about the middle of December. The report, coupled with certain occurrences around Concepción, made the governor fear an extensive revolt and he decided to go himself and re-establish peace in Tucapel. It was hard to find men since the population had been so reduced by the expeditions recently sent out and the return to Perú of Avendaño and his men. He managed to raise a force of forty soldiers and left for the troubled area. He did not hurry, however, but went first to the mines of Quilacoya, where he left part of his small force to protect the miners. From there he went to Arauco, where he learned of the disaster at Tucapel. He left at once for the fort because he had sent word to Juan Gómez to meet him at Tucapel on December 25, with twenty men.[88]

Valdivia sent out four of his men to reconnoiter but they never returned. Instead, next day he found an arm and the jacket sleeve of one of them in his path. His *yanacona*, Agustinillo, begged him to return for more men, pointing out to him from signs along the way that the Indians were in large force while his own men were pitifuly few. Valdivia ignored the advice of his servant, and even after coming in sight of the smoking ruins of the fort, he did not turn back but rode on into the trap Lautaro had set for him.

Spies along the way had kept the Indians well informed of Valdivia's every movement, and Lautaro had proposed that the natives should keep themselves well hidden on the mountain side until Valdivia and his men approached the fort. When the Spaniards were close enough, the natives should send one squadron against them, then another, and another, and so on until numbers alone would force the Spaniards' tired horses into the marshy lands where other natives would snatch the defenseless soldiers from their mired horses.

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[86]Información de servicios de Juan Gómez de Almagro, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIV, 94.

[87]Declaración de Antonio Díaz, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos*, XIV, 106.

[88]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile*, 35; note: there is no conclusive evidence of how Valdivia went to his death, but the narrative of Góngora Marmolejo is followed herein.

The plan worked all too well. Valdivia had grown accustomed to victory and it was inconveivable to him that the natives could triumph over him. When the Indians appeared from their hiding places, he drew his small force up in three companies with the baggage in the center, and confidently commanded one company to rout the Indians. The natives, however, did not display their former fear of the horse but held firm in their ranks and quickly replaced those killed by the Spaniards. Valdivia threw in his second company. Still the natives did not flee. Leaving ten men to guard the baggage, he led his own company against them. Their ranks held. It was then that he saw his mistake, and calling his men together, he said, "Gentlemen, what shall we do?" One of his captains answered him: "What does your lordship wish us to do but fight and die?"

Valdivia tried one more strategem: he withdrew his horsemen from the baggage, hoping that it would engage the enemy's attention long enough to let the Spaniards escape on their horses. Lautaro had prepared for that, also, and gave orders that the baggage should not be touched until the Spaniards were killed or captured. Slowly the great number of natives forced the tired horses closer to the marsh, and in the end, Indian warriors reached out from the brush to drag Spanish soldiers from their mounts, and killed them just as Lautaro had planned.

Valdivia might have escaped for he was on an exceptionally strong horse, but he refused to leave Bartolomé del Pozo, a priest who had stayed at his side. At last their horses were mired and both were captured.

There are many different versions of the manner in which Pedro de Valdivia met his death, but since no Spaniard survived the catastrophe of Tucapel to carry an authentic account of the tragedy to his comrades, the historian is dependent on reports from the Indians themselves. The capture of the governor took place on Christmas Day, 1553, but it seems that he was not killed immediately—possibly not until after the first of the year, 1554.

Góngora Marmolejo, the soldier-historian, who narrowly missed being with Valdivia's forces, and who heard the reports current at the time of Valdivia's death, says that the governor, after being captured, was disarmed and undressed, except for his helmet, and made to walk several miles at a fast pace to a place where the Indians were gathered together. There he found his faithful Agustinillo who had given him such excellent advice (which he had ignored). The servant took the heavy helmet from his master's head and made him as comfortable as possible. Later, a council was held among the *caciques,* to decide the fate of the prisoners,

where many insults were hurled by the victors upon the unfortunate captives. The priest, seeing that the end was near, made himself a cross from two twigs and entered upon his last prayers. Valdivia tried talking—promising the Indians to leave Chile to them if they would release him. Instead, the natives built a huge fire and after cutting pieces from Valdivia's arms with muscle shells—though they had both knives and swords—they roasted them and ate them before his eyes. Other torture followed which was finally terminated by decapitation. His head—along with those of the other Spaniards—was proudly exhibited on a lance by the victors.[89]

Mariño Lovera, the other historian contemporary with Valdivia, says that the governor met his end by means of a stout cudgel in the hands of one of his vassal-Indians, Pilmaiquén, who had a personal grudge against him. As Valdivia stood before Caupolicán, the *toqui,* and attempted to talk his way out of his predicament, Pilmaiquén, fearing that the governor was having some influence on Caupolicán, brought his heavy club down on Valdivia's head and broke his skull to pieces.[90]

The above-mentioned account, with some variation of details, is concurred in by the poet, Ercilla y Zúñiga, and Sir Clement Markham, the historian.

The report of the governor's death sent to the Audiencia of Lima by the *cabildo* of Santiago, February 26, 1554, attempts few details of the disaster, but supports Góngora Marmolejo in saying that Valdivia "lived three days, they [the Indians] eating him alive by mouthfuls." It adds further that none of the Spaniards was left "to bring the news of what had happened, until three or four days afterward some *yanaconas,* who were there, came and told us how it happened."[91]

The death of Valdivia was a real calamity to the infant cities of Chile. He had in great abundance those personal qualities which enabled Spain's *conquistadores* lastingly to superimpose Spanish culture upon a subject people: an optimistic courage that left much to the care of St. Iago, an arrogant faith that assured them they were saving souls, and a resourcefulness that brought them out of unbelievable difficulties. In addition to those qualities he had breadth of vision and greatness of spirit. He never saw Chile as a series of small, isolated, struggling towns but as a compact unit, something approaching a modern nation, with one stable government for the whole area. The settlement of Chile, to him, was not

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[89]Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile,* 38–9.

[90]Mariño Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile,* 157.

[91]Cabildo of Santiago á la Real Audiencia de Lima, in Medina, *Documentos inéditos,* IX, 460.

an adventure but a life work. His wisdom in restricting mining activities until the towns were founded and in good condition reveals his solicitude for the future of the country. While solicitous of the individual welfare of his people, his first thought was always for the good of the country as a whole. Though his methods were sometimes rough, they were based on the maxim that the end justifies the means. If others did not share his idea that the country came first, they were made to contribute their share to its maintenance anyway. And one must always bear in mind that he dealt with rough men. Vicuña Mackenna pays fitting tribute to the *conquistador* when he says:

> We do not justify . . . the defects of the discoverer, conqueror, colonizer, and defender of Chile; neither his cruelty, nor his mendacity, nor his public lack of morality, nor the little respect with which he maintained his house and his obligations as man and as husband. But taken in respect to his own age, his task, and his followers, his figure rises high above all his contemporaries and makes itself worthy of the marble which today commemorates him, and of the cuspis that supports the pedestal of his memory.[92]

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[92]Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, "Semblanza de Valdivia," in Roca del Campo, *Tradición y Leyendas de Santiago*, 60.

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Appendix

PROCESO DE PEDRO DE VALDIVIA

Acta de Acusación[1]

1. In Atacama, on the way to Chile, the governor garroted a soldier called Escobar, because Inés de Suárez complained of him.

2. Also, on arriving at Atacama, he [Valdivia] took Pero Sancho prisoner and wanted to hang him, and he forced him to make a renunciation of the [rights granted by] royal provisions and of those that the marquis [Francisco Pizarro] had [given him], and he [Valdivia] took them [the provisions] and burned them, and he made him [Sancho de Hoz] dissolve the company which they had made in goods, and he agreed to pay for that which Pero Sancho had given him to equip the people that he had, and he never paid it. Before that, he held him a prisoner in irons a long time, and regarded as enemies those that talked to him or shared with him, and for this Inés de Surárez always had spies and extensive means for knowing who talked to him, and nobody dared to speak to him, so that he [Valdivia] should not punish him.

3. Also, that he hanged in this same valley Juan Ruíz, without confession.

4. Also, that having arrived at the valley of Copiapó, he took possession of it for His Majesty without carrying provisions except from Don Francisco Pizarro as his lieutenant, giving us to understand that he already was governor, as he was within two months.

5. Also, that upon his arrival in the Mapocho Valley, in which the town [Santiago] was founded, he [Valdivia] had himself called governor and elected by the *cabildo* against the wishes of all.

6. Also, in this same town he hanged Don Martín de Solier . . . Cortreño . . . Márquez . . . Pastrana . . . Chinchilla . . . and Juan de Boláños; morever, they had confessed Vásquez to bring him out to hang.

7. Also, during this time the land came to peace, and against the wish of all, he [Valdivia] started to get out the gold and he put thirteen Spaniards to collect the gold, whom the Indians killed, and they [the Indians] were risen [in rebellion]—that which was the total destruction of the land.

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[1]Note: In the interest of clarity it has been necessary at times to rearrange the illogical and disjointed phraseology of this document.

8. Also, when the land was divided to the satisfaction of Inéz de Suárez to those whom she liked, those who wished to serve him [Valdivia] had a *repartimiento* and public favors, and he [Valdivia] said repeatedly "love me, love my dog."

9. Also, that during the time of distribution [of lands], Inéz de Suárez said to those whom she regarded as friends, "when we are in the bed, the governor, my lord, and I, come in and talk to him and I will be the third, and in this way we will negotiate affairs. . . ."

10. Also, that this Señora said many times that he [Valdivia] would not give anything to anybody who was not her friend.

11. Also, that all the time he [Valdivia] has been in Chile and ever since he left Cuzco, which is more than eight years ago, he has been excessively devoted to this woman, and they sleep in one bed, and eat from one plate, and consort publicly to drink the *flamenca,* saying: "I drink to you." And he commands the justices like the governor himself, and the *cabildo* tells him beforehand what they are going to do and after they have done it, because always Valdivia, the governor, makes the *cabildo* of his *criados* and friends.

12. Also, when Captain Monroy went [from Perú to Chile], he carried provisions from Vaca de Castro, which he [Valdivia] did not show or obey.

13. Also, he [Valdivia] said many times publicly that the king did not provide things for the Indies like he should, because he [the king] was sending ridiculous little priests [*licenciadillos*] who understand only how to rob the land and go back, and that he [the king] was not lacking in sense in sending him such a priest whom he had to obey without sending him [the priest] to study, because if the king wished to provide another [an educated priest], that he had to give him three hundred thousand *pesos* before he would enter the land [America].

14. Also, thus he wrote to the king that if he wished to provide another for the government [of Chile], that he should send him the said three hundred thousand *pesos* and because Juan Zurbano, *vecino,* said to him: "And what if the king asks you what fields and cattle you sold [to come to America]?" he [Valdivia] said that he ought to hang him; and he abused him with words, and left him without Indians.

15. Also, while he [Valdivia] was removing Indians, Negrete, *vecino,* said, "If he takes mine from me, someday there will come some priest from the king that will do me justice." When the governor learned of it, he said publicly that for that reason he had taken the Indians—and he took them.

16. Also, Baptista [Juan Bautista de Pastene], the *maestre* [of the sea], arrived at this land [Chile] and telling about the rebellion of this land [Perú], Valdivia was very happy, and he said publicly: "However well the king may negotiate for these ten years, he can not enter the land."

17. Also, some of those who came on this ship praising that which Centeno had done in the service of the king, he [Valdivia] angrily said to them that nobody should speak of that before him, because nobody must go against his governor . . . and nobody must call Gonzalo Pizarro to account, except it should be the king in person.

18. Also, speaking of the affairs of Gonzalo Pizarro, and how the Señor President came to these provinces, he [Valdivia] said: "If the governor Pizarro conquers this one [La Gasca] the king will never enter Perú."

19. Also, he demonstrated a great desire and hopefulness that the affairs of Gonzalo Pizarro should go from good to better, and he said publicly, when someone was speaking adversely of his [Pizarro's] machinations, that nobody should speak ill [of Pizarro] because he [Valdivia] was better informed than they, and that he was made by the Pizarros, and that it was important to him that nobody should speak ill of the Pizarros; and for that reason, nobody dared to speak ill of the affairs of Gonzalo Pizarro.

20. Also, he said many times publicly that the king did not have in this land [Chile] more of it than he wished to give him, because he had gained it at his cost and with his work; and he said this because the *vecinos* told him that without permission of the king that it was not good to give him less than his royal fifths, and he said that he had gained the land and that the king must be contented with that which he wished to give him.

21. Also, the first year that gold was mined, it all went to him, and he ordered that all horses (without leaving any) should carry food to the mines . . . and those who did not want to go, he threw them into the chain gang—Juan Gutiérrez and Hidalgo.

22. Also, in this year he did not pay more than one-tenth to His Majesty, because he collected less money.

23. Also, three other *demoras* he wanted them to pay fifths, because they had a greater quantity of gold, so that he [Valdivia] could take it [the fifth] as he had always taken it.

24. Also, that he [Valdivia] treated very badly the officials of the king , especially Francisco de Arteaga, who maintained that it was not good that he should take the gold from the box of the king, so much so that after his [Arteaga's] death, he [Valdivia] said that he was sorry he was dead because if he were not, he would give him a hundred blows on the neck with the king's books

[account books] because he found a memorandum [in them] of how he [Valdivia] had taken the money against his [Arteaga's] wish.

25. Also, that after the death of Francisco de Arteaga, those that are officials of the king, are his [Valdivia's] servants, and have neither done nor said more than he has commanded them.

26. Also, that after the arrival of the ship of Juan Baptista, he [Valdivia] gave an order to the royal officials that they should look for him a loan of fifty thousand *pesos,* and the officials, after receiving the command, said that nobody wanted to lend them gold, and the said governor, seeing their reluctance, gave an order to his *alguacil mayor* to take bodily Francisco de Vadillo, Juan Higueras, and Bartolomé Sánchez, conquerors, and to put their heads in the stocks, and to give them neither food nor drink until they should give all that they had, and this was done; and seeing that they had no other remedy, the sufferers were advised by their friends to give all the gold that they had, since it was better to give it than to die in that prison, for they already knew the temper of the governor who by killing them would not be worried at all, and thus they gave all that they had, and they advised them not to talk [of it] or it would cost them their life.

27. Also, that during this time he made a sermon in the church among many others [sermons], in which he said that all those that had gold should lend it, that he would pay them very well, and that he who would not lend it if he [Valdivia] should find it out, that he would bring it [the gold] out and the hide with it, and by this sermon he had some, especially Father Juan Lobo and Pero Gómez, who searched for gold to borrow in order to give it, because they had brought out gold that *demora,* and they did not dare to go to him to say that they had spent it and paid their debts.

28. Also, that Francisco de Villagrán, *maestre de campo,* went to Alonso de Escobar and Gregorio Blas and he said to them: "Señors, I come to advise you, because you are my friends: I know that the governor is going to send to you to ask for the gold that you have . . . and if you refuse it, he is going to put your heads into the stocks, and you will not come from there until you give it; so, since you know his disposition as well as I do, do not do anything but give it"; thus, after hearing this, from fright they gave it.

29. Also, [concerning] that first ship that went to that land [Chile], and the clothing that came on it, he [Valdivia] ordered the merchant who brought it [the clothing] not to sell it nor give credit until he [Valdivia] should give a memorandum of those whom he must credit or not, and the governor made an account

in which he ordered two hundred to four hundred *pesos* [credit] given to each soldier, and that for them each should make a contract [to pay], and after having sold all the clothing, he [Valdivia] gave the merchant, in payment for the merchandise, three *caciques* from three conquerors and discoverers.

30. Also, when Diego García [merchant] went to that land [Chile], the governor took for himself a great deal of the clothing, and afterwards when he [the merchant] wished to come away, he [Valdivia] gave him a *cacique* for him and for the son of Lucas Niño, and he took him [the *cacique*] from Negrete, *conquistador* and he ordered another from Francisco de Rabdona, and the said Diego García made him much loss, and he gave him the debts which the soldiers owed him, and he recovered many of them from the soldiers.

31. Also, that the governor owed a quantity of money to Alonso de Escobar and Galiano, and he told them that they should lose the money that he owed them and that he would give them Indians in the land, and they agreed. And after he had closed the account with them, and had given them some money so that they could come down here [Perú], he took the money from them and would not let them come, and he gave them the *caciques:* to Escobar, he gave him [the *cacique*] of Córdoba and that of Riveros and that of Juan de Vera and another of Mateo Díaz and he took them against their will. And to Galiano he gave those of Antonio de Ulloa, and after the departure of the ship he took them and gave them to a *criado* of his called Diego García, and he is here.

32. Also, that nobody dared to ask justice before any *alcalde,* because he [Valdivia] has told the *alcaldes* and *rejidores* that he will hang them with the *varas* at the throat, and he put one *alcalde* in some irons [and through pleas released him from them] because he commanded a *criado* of his, called Diego Díaz, to pay a debt.

33. Also, one called Francisco Martínez, who aided him [Valdivia] in the journey [to Chile in 1540] with money and horses in order that he could make it, going to him to ask *"de comer,"* because he had served the king, he [Valdivia] said that nobody in that land had anything but him.

34. Also, that to another *conquistador* begging *de comer,* he said he was undeceiving him—that although all the land should become vacant, that he did not have an Indian to give even to the Son of God.

35. Also, that he [Valdivia] gambled a *cacique* with Bernardino de Mella in this manner: he said to him, "play up to seven or eight thousand *pesos* and if you win, I will give you Juan Darongo," and with this *cacique* he won from Bernardino de Mella

more than fifteen or twenty thousand *pesos,* and afterwards he came to him to play the same *cacique* and the said Mella won seven thousand or more *pesos,* and he asked him for the *cacique,* and he [Valdivia] said to him if he would have *criados* that there he must also have death, and he reviled him with words, and the said Mella made it public and all the land knows it, and he is here.

36. Also, that the father, Pérez, and Juan de Avalos, wishing to come [from Chile]—they held many *yanaconas,* and goods, and good lands—he [Valdivia] bought them, taking the money from individuals, as is said, and from the box of His Majesty [to pay for them].

37. Also, that up until now in the land, nobody has had a thing for his own, because all the gold that in all the *demoras* has been brought out, he [Valdivia] has taken it.

38. Also, that when he came and went out from the port of Chile, he took all the letters that came for the Señor President and for the *vecinos*—servants of His Majesty—and he threw them into the sea, because it was talked among all, and they held it certain, that he was coming to serve Gonzalo Pizarro for the words that he said in town in favor of the said Gonzalo Pizarro.

39. Also, that he has removed Indians many times, taking them from some and giving them to others. And to his mistress [Inéz de Suárez] he had given a great number of Indians, taking them from Francisco Núñez and Landa, *conquistadores,* to give to her despite the many that she had.

40. Also, that he gave to Jerónimo de Alderete, above that which he holds (being an old man, unfit for war, and he never worked at it) the Indians of Luis Tornero and of Francisco de Rabdona and of Vergara, *conquistadores* and discoverers with Don Diego de Almagro, because he [Alderete] did not serve at any other thing but to accompany this Señora and carry her by the hand, and for this he [Valdivia] has made him all the time up to now in that land four years *alcalde,* and four, *rejidor.*

41. Also, that he told Carreño that he should give him [Valdivia] certain goods and Indians, and that he would give him one thousand, five hundred *pesos* so that he could go away to his wife and sons, and after the goods and Indians of the said Carreño were delivered, he [Valdivia] did not wish to give the said thousand and five hundred *pesos* until he had recovered half of them, and he [Carreño] went with this money to embark, and he [Valdivia] took it and commanded to throw him [Carreño] on the beach, and it is held certain that he died of anger, because he was crippled and was coming to be cured.

42. Also, to Gamboa, who became deaf and lost an eye in that land, and the *vecinos* and permanent settlers of that land gave him eight hundred or a thousand dollars from charity, and [Valdivia] wishing to take the money from him, as from the others, he [Gamboa] fell on his knees weeping, and embraced him and said to him: that by the passion of God he should give him something of that which he was taking in order to cure him and which they had given him in alms, and he [Valdivia] commanded a *criado* of his, Artano, that he should throw him from there into the sea; and his *criado* answered: "You throw him in, Your Lordship, since you take his money."

43. Also, to an old man Núñez, whom he had given certain goods and he knew that he had a thousand *pesos,* he commanded him that he should give them and that if he did not give them, he would take off his hide, and old Núñez answered: "I do not have but three hundred *pesos,* and for that matter, the skin is speckled and old and is no good."

44. Also, that all the soldiers that Alonso de Monroy carried with him, when they arrived at that city [Santiago], he [Valdivia] commanded his *alguacil mayor* that he should take from them all the sheep and tents and sacks and chains which they brought.

45. Also, that he took all the valley of Chile, himself, in which he had many lands from which all those who were *vecinos* or not *vecinos* might have had food, and he did not wish to give them to anybody, for which there has been much reason for the natives becoming less and suffering much work, and for this cause a great quantity of gold has not been brought out from which His Majesty should have had many royal fifths, because he [Valdivia] wished to take it all for himself.

46. Also, that to a *conquistador* called Vadillo, for going to him to ask for the principal which the governor had begged from him as a loan until he could find something else to add to that which he had, he [Valdivia] gave him blows and his *criados* wished to kill him.

47. Also, the land being in rebellion, they went to conquer it with the governor, and he left them, and came back posthaste to see Inés de Suárez.

48. Also, that of three parts of the land, the governor has two, and Inés de Suárez and Alderete [have] the other.

49. Also, that because a soldier called Caro, was not in a house of his, he [Valdivia] took his horse and his arms from him, and put him in irons, and abused him with words, and he [Caro] thought he would command them to hang him.

50. Also, two men of those that they robbed on the ship [when Valdivia left Valparaiso, December, 1547] coming along the road chanced to meet Juan de Cárdenas, his [Valdivia's] secretary, and he said to them: "How are you, brothers?" and because they answered the said Juan de Cárdenas as angry men, the governor commanded his lieutenant by letter that he should hang them.

51. Also, that Vallejo, a soldier, going to see Inés de Suárez, [found that] a priest, called Rodrigo Gonzales, was showing her how to read, and the said Vallejo said to the priest: "Show the lady how to read and from reading she will come to other things." For this and because he said one day that they were sending them for maize, seeing them dead of hunger, they threw him in a chain gang with two collars, and they wanted to hang him.

52. Also, that Gonzalo Pizarro wrote to the governor that he [the governor] should take from Calderón [de la Barca] the goods that he held from Vaca de Castro, saying that he owed them to the minor sons of the marquis [Francisco Pizarro] and he [Valdivia] commanded him to deposit the contracts that he held from him and from individuals in order to carry out the command of Gonzalo Pizarro.

53. Also, that in that land was a secretary of his called Juan de Cardeña [Cárdenas], who, among many others that he had in the city, made a sermon one day on the altar within the *iglesia mayor* of that city, which was the most abominable in dishonor of God and of the king and of his subjects, being present the Governor Pedro de Valdivia and all the priests and all those who found themselves in the town, because thus it was commanded that they should go to hear it by an *alguacil;* Your Lordship should command the *vecinos* that came on the frigate that they should tell about this sermon, since it is in the service of God and of His Majesty, because there are things in it that it is well that Your Lordship should know.

54. Also, that at the time that the ship of Baptista wished to leave port, the governor gave licenses for all those that wished to go [from the country] that they should go, and after they had disposed of their goods, he did not wish to give them [the licenses] if it was not for money, which some of them gave to him, and for that which was given by them, he reaffirmed the license—and there are part of them here.

55. Also, that after buying the license . . . they went to embark, and on board ship they were wishing to set the sail, [when] the governor arrived posthaste at the port, and sent Francisco Villagra . . . that he should make everybody come off the ship because he [Valdivia] wished to speak to them and to give them

his blessing, and when they came to land, he said to them that he was begging them that in all things they should favor him, and they all promised thus and he said to them that it would be more fitting that they should affirm it by their names; and it being signed, he went out secretly and went to the boat with his *criados,* and one Marín who is here, went, saying how they were carrying away his money, robbing him, and he went running to throw himself in the boat, thinking to get his money, and they threw him into the sea, and [he left] the others on the beach dishevelled and robbed. The quantity that he robbed them of was great.

56. Also, that when Alonso de Monroy went [to Chile] with the help which Vaca de Castro sent, he carried provisions of his [Vaca de Castro's] by which, in the name of His Majesty, he [Valdivia] should be lieutenant and captain-general in the land and not governor, since he holds no authority—no provisions from His Majesty to be governor, that he should obey those provisions that the said Monroy was carrying from Vaca de Castro, and he [Valdivia] replied to him that he did not recognize Vaca de Castro, and that he must not say such things and he said he did not believe such, "but I am for giving you one hundred daggers;" not restraining him, Monroy said, "I wish to give them to the *cabildo,* because thus Vaca de Castro commanded me," and Valdivia did not consent that he should give them, and from fright he did not give them.

57. Also, that a *vecino* called Herrera sent a man to the valleys to conquer them, and when the man came back, the Indians had been taken away from the said *vecino,* and he [the man] begged him [*vecino*] to pay him the wage which that man had earned in going to the said valleys, and the *alcalde* commanded the said Herrera to bring out his horse and sell it at auction, and the governor passed by there and asked what horse was that and they told him that it was to pay that soldier, and he said that these were tricks and that he understood them, and that he would be denying his upbringing if he did not put him under the ground, because these had to be treated thus.